Resolve race condition between initializing the mutex vs hwrng
register.
Remove the HWRNG FIFO, not required in Software.
Change-Id: I9fa3e5c7e2e9e14feb88a4656dcfab7dec3cbd67
Signed-off-by: Dinesh K Garg <dineshg@codeaurora.org>
This patch adds calls to enable and disable bus bandwidth
for every RNG Read call.
Change-Id: Ia1ac31ffa79a8be2761c243eee9bf87f25422c24
Signed-off-by: Dinesh K Garg <dineshg@codeaurora.org>
Changing the type from long to u32 of the buffer that is used to
read data from the RNG hardware to reflect the size of the HW
register
Change-Id: I54e8eeae40a66c8033637044e627023150d6c411
Acked-by: Baranidharan Muthukumaran <bmuthuku@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dinesh K Garg <dineshg@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7bcafc734d)
commit b1132deac01c2332d234fa821a70022796b79182 upstream.
get_random_long() reads from the get_random_int_hash array using an
unsigned long pointer. For this code to be guaranteed correct on all
architectures, the array must be aligned to an unsigned long boundary.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: I934433b231a96a0ded6dc8c41d93b536f2f0b3a2
commit 81e69df38e2911b642ec121dec319fad2a4782f3 upstream.
Fedora has integrated the jitter entropy daemon to work around slow
boot problems, especially on VM's that don't support virtio-rng:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1572944
It's understandable why they did this, but the Jitter entropy daemon
works fundamentally on the principle: "the CPU microarchitecture is
**so** complicated and we can't figure it out, so it *must* be
random". Yes, it uses statistical tests to "prove" it is secure, but
AES_ENCRYPT(NSA_KEY, COUNTER++) will also pass statistical tests with
flying colors.
So if RDRAND is available, mix it into entropy submitted from
userspace. It can't hurt, and if you believe the NSA has backdoored
RDRAND, then they probably have enough details about the Intel
microarchitecture that they can reverse engineer how the Jitter
entropy daemon affects the microarchitecture, and attack its output
stream. And if RDRAND is in fact an honest DRNG, it will immeasurably
improve on what the Jitter entropy daemon might produce.
This also provides some protection against someone who is able to read
or set the entropy seed file.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: I4d4ac36af58c5f3d1a5066b54afff4b8f478affd
commit 69efea712f5b0489e67d07565aad5c94e09a3e52 upstream.
It turns out that RDRAND is pretty slow. Comparing these two
constructions:
for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(ret))
arch_get_random_long(&ret);
and
long buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(long)];
extract_crng((u8 *)buf);
it amortizes out to 352 cycles per long for the top one and 107 cycles
per long for the bottom one, on Coffee Lake Refresh, Intel Core i9-9880H.
And importantly, the top one has the drawback of not benefiting from the
real rng, whereas the bottom one has all the nice benefits of using our
own chacha rng. As get_random_u{32,64} gets used in more places (perhaps
beyond what it was originally intended for when it was introduced as
get_random_{int,long} back in the md5 monstrosity era), it seems like it
might be a good thing to strengthen its posture a tiny bit. Doing this
should only be stronger and not any weaker because that pool is already
initialized with a bunch of rdrand data (when available). This way, we
get the benefits of the hardware rng as well as our own rng.
Another benefit of this is that we no longer hit pitfalls of the recent
stream of AMD bugs in RDRAND. One often used code pattern for various
things is:
do {
val = get_random_u32();
} while (hash_table_contains_key(val));
That recent AMD bug rendered that pattern useless, whereas we're really
very certain that chacha20 output will give pretty distributed numbers,
no matter what.
So, this simplification seems better both from a security perspective
and from a performance perspective.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221201037.30231-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Change-Id: I868e7472df493f410744dd8ed210dd1c4ca5e55d
Commit 6133705494 introduced a circular lock dependency because
posix_cpu_timers_exit() is called by release_task(), which is holding
a writer lock on tasklist_lock, and this can cause a deadlock since
kill_fasync() gets called with nonblocking_pool.lock taken.
There's no reason why kill_fasync() needs to be taken while the random
pool is locked, so move it out to fix this locking dependency.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Russ Dill <Russ.Dill@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
The module parameter that turns debugging mode (which basically means
printing a few extra lines during runtime) is in '#if 0' block. Forcing
everyone who would like to see how entropy is behaving on his system to
rebuild seems to be a little bit too harsh.
If we were concerned about speed, we could potentially turn 'debug' into a
static key, but I don't think it's necessary.
Drop the '#if 0' block to allow using the 'debug' parameter without rebuilding.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
The value stored in last_data must be primed for FIPS 140-2 purposes. Upon
first use, either on system startup or after an RNDCLEARPOOL ioctl, we
need to take an initial random sample, store it internally in last_data,
then pass along the value after that to the requester, so that consistency
checks aren't being run against stale and possibly known data.
CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Fix the following warnings in formatting debug output:
drivers/char/random.c: In function ‘xfer_secondary_pool’:
drivers/char/random.c:827: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 7 has type ‘size_t’
drivers/char/random.c: In function ‘account’:
drivers/char/random.c:859: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 5 has type ‘size_t’
drivers/char/random.c:881: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 5 has type ‘size_t’
drivers/char/random.c: In function ‘random_read’:
drivers/char/random.c:1141: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 5 has type ‘ssize_t’
drivers/char/random.c:1145: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 5 has type ‘ssize_t’
drivers/char/random.c:1145: warning: format ‘%d’ expects type ‘int’, but argument 6 has type ‘long unsigned int’
by using '%zd' instead of '%d' to properly denote ssize_t/size_t conversion.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
The static lock initializers want to be fed the proper name of the
lock and not some random string. In mainline random strings are
obfuscating the readability of debug output, but for RT they prevent
the spinlock substitution. Fix it up.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
commit 6d4952d9d9d4dc2bb9c0255d95a09405a1e958f7 upstream.
hw_random carefully avoids using a stack buffer except in
add_early_randomness(). This causes a crash in virtio_rng if
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.
Reported-by: Matt Mullins <mmullins@mmlx.us>
Tested-by: Matt Mullins <mmullins@mmlx.us>
Fixes: d3cc799647 ("hwrng: fetch randomness only after device init")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Change-Id: I4b47fc4e5a5623ffe3538c8872784e8f0ae30fd2
[ Upstream commit 17fb874dee093139923af8ed36061faa92cc8e79 ]
The kthread_run() function can return two different error values
but the hwrng core only checks for -ENOMEM. If the other error
value -EINTR is returned it is assigned to hwrng_fill and later
used on a kthread_stop() call which naturally crashes.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Change-Id: I4ad273645fdf8cb16f4a04d274e40330ab77bade
commit 78887832e76541f77169a24ac238fccb51059b63 upstream.
add_early_randomness() is called by hwrng_register() when the
hardware is added. If this hardware and its module are present
at boot, and if there is no data available the boot hangs until
data are available and can't be interrupted.
For instance, in the case of virtio-rng, in some cases the host can be
not able to provide enough entropy for all the guests.
We can have two easy ways to reproduce the problem but they rely on
misconfiguration of the hypervisor or the egd daemon:
- if virtio-rng device is configured to connect to the egd daemon of the
host but when the virtio-rng driver asks for data the daemon is not
connected,
- if virtio-rng device is configured to connect to the egd daemon of the
host but the egd daemon doesn't provide data.
The guest kernel will hang at boot until the virtio-rng driver provides
enough data.
To avoid that, call rng_get_data() in non-blocking mode (wait=0)
from add_early_randomness().
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>
Fixes: d9e7972619 ("hwrng: add randomness to system from rng...")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: Iaa47b1d5351140ecc8137441979a88c258ef8f38
Commit d9e7972 "hwrng: add randomness to system from rng sources"
added a call to rng_get_data() from the hwrng_register() function.
However, some rng devices need initialization before data can be read
from them.
This commit makes the call to rng_get_data() depend on no init fn
pointer being registered by the device. If an init function is
registered, this call is made after device init.
CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # For v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
rng_get_data() returns the number of bytes read from the hardware.
The entropy argument to add_hwgenerator_randomness() is passed
directly to credit_entropy_bits() so we should be passing the
number of bits, not bytes here.
Fixes: be4000bc46 "hwrng: create filler thread"
Acked-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
This can be viewed as the in-kernel equivalent of hwrngd;
like FUSE it is a good thing to have a mechanism in user land,
but for some reasons (simplicity, secrecy, integrity, speed)
it may be better to have it in kernel space.
This patch creates a thread once a hwrng registers, and uses
the previously established add_hwgenerator_randomness() to feed
its data to the input pool as long as needed. A derating factor
is used to bias the entropy estimation and to disable this
mechanism entirely when set to zero.
Signed-off-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
When bringing a new RNG source online, it seems like it would make sense
to use some of its bytes to make the system entropy pool more random,
as done with all sorts of other devices that contain per-device or
per-boot differences.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
My static checker complains that:
drivers/char/hw_random/core.c:341 hwrng_register()
warn: we tested 'old_rng' before and it was 'false'
The problem is that sometimes we test "if (!old_rng)" and sometimes we
test "if (must_register_misc)". The static checker knows they are
equivalent but a human being reading the code could easily be confused.
I have simplified the code by removing the "must_register_misc" variable
and I have removed the redundant check on "if (!old_rng)".
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
rng-core module allocates rng_buffer by kmalloc() since commit
f7f154f124. But this buffer won't be
freed and there is a memory leak possibility at module exit.
Signed-off-by: Satoru Takeuchi <satoru.takeuchi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This patch adds an interface to the random pool for feeding entropy
in-kernel.
Change-Id: Id9031d6b615877ea957ee2d2aba1f8150ec699b9
Signed-off-by: Torsten Duwe <duwe@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Git-commit: c84dbf61a7
Git-repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git
[sboyd@codeaurora.org: Bring in ENTROPY_BITS() define,
s/random_write_wakeup_bits/random_write_wakeup_thresh/, and pass
NULL to mix_pool_bytes last parameter]
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Without a bool string present, using "# CONFIG_DEVPORT is not set" in
defconfig files would not actually unset devport. This ensured that
/dev/port was always on, but there are reasons a user may wish to
disable it (smaller kernel, attack surface reduction) if it's not being
used. Adding a message here in order to make this user visible.
Bug: 36604779
Change-Id: Iab41b5c1ba44e9e52361fbfd8b1863b88eee417b
Signed-off-by: Max Bires <jbires@google.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Bug: 33301618
Even though cancel_delayed_work should cancel the worker thread
in some race condition it can fail and get scheduled.
To avoid this situation use cancel_delayed_work_sync.
Also rotator_lock mutex need not be unlocked while waiting for isr
as isr does not aquire this mutex for doing its operations.
It is after this unlock of mutex sometimes in race condition rotator
clock is getting disabled via the msm_rotator_rot_clk_work_f
Change-Id: I574aec489fe51ec0e5f7c215c9aba9bb0ec66ffa
Signed-off-by: Justin Philip <jphili@codeaurora.org>
Add support for MDP_YCBYCR_H2V1 interleaved YUV format in rotator
block.
Change-Id: I4bb192aaab1e72f6e5687ae222a5f9ea2c254bd4
Signed-off-by: Mayank Chopra <makchopra@codeaurora.org>
For 2-pass mode, we need to check for the fast YUV constraints
separately for both the 1st and 2nd pass. Make change to extend
the fast YUV invalid checker to 2-pass mode.
CRs-fixed: 504007
Change-Id: I7ef96ff29423fbd5cc454e8fd125b4bb1a9d59e1
Signed-off-by: Padmanabhan Komanduru <pkomandu@codeaurora.org>
With updated ION interface, ION_SECURE needs to be passed as a
separate flag. Also, 2-pass buffer for secure session needs to be
allocated from CP heap instead of non-secure heap.
CRs-fixed: 502038
Change-Id: I8c5f945dc4d90ce640872e2cd0505ac32e82011d
Signed-off-by: Padmanabhan Komanduru <pkomandu@codeaurora.org>
Add support for 2-pass rotator operation for downscaling
and 90 degree rotation when rotator operates in fast YUV
mode. 2-pass is supported for 420 H2V2 formats.
Change-Id: Ib8ce802a5a8aabe10c88422e3b8d82708c5b05d4
Signed-off-by: Padmanabhan Komanduru <pkomandu@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/2/4/831)
d07e22597d1d355 ("mm: mmap: add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR")
added the ability to choose from a range of values to use for entropy
count in generating the random offset to the mmap_base address. The
maximum value on this range was set to 32 bits for 64-bit x86 systems, but
this value could be increased further, requiring more than the 32 bits of
randomness provided by get_random_int(), as is already possible for arm64.
Add a new function: get_random_long() which more naturally fits with the
mmap usage of get_random_int() but operates exactly the same as
get_random_int().
Also, fix the shifting constant in mmap_rnd() to be an unsigned long so
that values greater than 31 bits generate an appropriate mask without
overflow. This is especially important on x86, as its shift instruction
uses a 5-bit mask for the shift operand, which meant that any value for
mmap_rnd_bits over 31 acts as a no-op and effectively disables mmap_base
randomization.
Finally, replace calls to get_random_int() with get_random_long() where
appropriate.
Bug: 26963541
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com>
Change-Id: Ie7552631b5db86f3482cf15e7dc916d89c1c502b
Clean cherry pick of 1d9de44e268d880cbe2d0bd3be1ef0661f93fd34.
If more than one application invokes getrandom(2) before the pool
is ready, then all bar one will be stuck forever because we use
wake_up_interruptible which wakes up a single task.
This patch replaces it with wake_up_all.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Bug: http://b/29621447
Change-Id: I5dfd7abac10898802f030e0a2af7110809283328
(cherry picked from commit 1d9de44e268d880cbe2d0bd3be1ef0661f93fd34)
Almost clean cherry pick of c6e9d6f388,
includes change made by merge 0891ad829d.
The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers. It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.
The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where
/dev/[u]random is not available. Since the fallback code is often not
well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode
entirely.
The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to
request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block
until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the
/dev/urandom entropy pool. Historically, the emphasis in the
/dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is
initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably
before the init scripts start execution.
This is because changing /dev/urandom reads to block represents an
interface change that could potentially break userspace which is not
acceptable. In practice, on most x86 desktop and server systems, in
general the entropy pool can be initialized before it is needed (and
in modern kernels, we will printk a warning message if not). However,
on an embedded system, this may not be the case. And so with this new
interface, we can provide the functionality of blocking until the
urandom pool has been initialized. Any userspace program which uses
this new functionality must take care to assure that if it is used
during the boot process, that it will not cause the init scripts or
other portions of the system startup to hang indefinitely.
SYNOPSIS
#include <linux/random.h>
int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf
with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user
space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other
cryptographic uses. It should not be used for Monte Carlo
simulations or other programs/algorithms which are doing
probabilistic sampling.
If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool. The
/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient
entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned.
If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will
either block, or return an error with errno set to EAGAIN if
the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags.
If the GRND_RANDOM bit is not set, then the /dev/urandom pool
will be used. Unlike using read(2) to fetch data from
/dev/urandom, if the urandom pool has not been sufficiently
initialized, getrandom(2) will block (or return -1 with the
errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags).
The getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD can be emulated using
the following function:
int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int ret;
if (buflen > 256)
goto failure;
ret = getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret == buflen)
return 0;
failure:
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
RETURN VALUE
On success, the number of bytes that was filled in the buf is
returned. This may not be all the bytes requested by the
caller via buflen if insufficient entropy was present in the
/dev/random pool, or if the system call was interrupted by a
signal.
On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.
ERRORS
EINVAL An invalid flag was passed to getrandom(2)
EFAULT buf is outside the accessible address space.
EAGAIN The requested entropy was not available, and
getentropy(2) would have blocked if the
GRND_NONBLOCK flag was not set.
EINTR While blocked waiting for entropy, the call was
interrupted by a signal handler; see the description
of how interrupted read(2) calls on "slow" devices
are handled with and without the SA_RESTART flag
in the signal(7) man page.
NOTES
For small requests (buflen <= 256) getrandom(2) will not
return EINTR when reading from the urandom pool once the
entropy pool has been initialized, and it will return all of
the bytes that have been requested. This is the recommended
way to use getrandom(2), and is designed for compatibility
with OpenBSD's getentropy() system call.
However, if you are using GRND_RANDOM, then getrandom(2) may
block until the entropy accounting determines that sufficient
environmental noise has been gathered such that getrandom(2)
will be operating as a NRBG instead of a DRBG for those people
who are working in the NIST SP 800-90 regime. Since it may
block for a long time, these guarantees do *not* apply. The
user may want to interrupt a hanging process using a signal,
so blocking until all of the requested bytes are returned
would be unfriendly.
For this reason, the user of getrandom(2) MUST always check
the return value, in case it returns some error, or if fewer
bytes than requested was returned. In the case of
!GRND_RANDOM and small request, the latter should never
happen, but the careful userspace code (and all crypto code
should be careful) should check for this anyway!
Finally, unless you are doing long-term key generation (and
perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using
GRND_RANDOM. The cryptographic algorithms used for
/dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be
sufficient for all purposes. The disadvantage of GRND_RANDOM
is that it can block, and the increased complexity required to
deal with partially fulfilled getrandom(2) requests.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zach Brown <zab@zabbo.net>
Bug: http://b/29621447
Change-Id: I189ba74070dd6d918b0fdf83ff30bb74ec0f7556
(cherry picked from commit 4af712e8df)
[flex1911]: backport to 3.4
Clean cherry pick of commit 4af712e8df.
The Tausworthe PRNG is initialized at late_initcall time. At that time the
entropy pool serving get_random_bytes is not filled sufficiently. This
patch adds an additional reseeding step as soon as the nonblocking pool
gets marked as initialized.
On some machines it might be possible that late_initcall gets called after
the pool has been initialized. In this situation we won't reseed again.
(A call to prandom_seed_late blocks later invocations of early reseed
attempts.)
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Bug: http://b/29621447
Change-Id: I4d20e60b5df16228f3a3699d16ed2b1dddcceb2b
(cherry picked from commit 4af712e8df)
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Change-Id: I27594af6146e7643217e3babcfd088592b7dbd4b
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Fix the following NULL pointer dereferences in character drivers.
Null pointer 'pra' that comes from line 825 may be passed to function
and can be dereferenced there by passing argument 4 to function
'fastrpc_internal_invoke' at line 847.
drivers/char/adsprpc.c +847 | fastrpc_device_ioctl()
Null pointer 'rpra' that comes from line 672 may be passed
to function and can be dereferenced there by passing argument 2
to function 'inv_args' at line 702.
drivers/char/adsprpc.c +702 | fastrpc_internal_invoke()
Constant NULL may be dereferenced by passing argument 3 to
function 'diag_device_write' at line 165.
drivers/char/diag/diagfwd_hsic.c +165 | diag_hsic_read_complete_callback()
drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.c +585 | diag_device_write()
Change-Id: I30469575c30f3846b449b6c71522f7dfc10c5bc5
Signed-off-by: Binoy Jayan <bjayan@codeaurora.org>
Add check in order to fix possible integer underflow
during HDLC encoding which may lead to buffer
overflow. Also added check for packet length to
avoid buffer overflow.
Bug: 28767796
Change-Id: Ic91b5ee629066f013022ea139b4a23ec661aa77a
Signed-off-by: Mohit Aggarwal <maggarwa@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Lin <yualin@google.com>
At certain point in diag driver there can be integer underflow
thus can lead to memory leak. Added a safeguard for that.
Bug: 28750726
Change-Id: I8cc6a8336cd2c5c88c49748c0be2df1696894f2b
Signed-off-by: Yuan Lin <yualin@google.com>
Check for invalid parameters passed in user invocation
and validate the return values using appropriate macros.
Bug: 28767593
Change-Id: I9a067f2ab151084b46e9d4d5fb945320a27bb7ba
Signed-off-by: Yuan Lin <yualin@google.com>
Diag driver holds on to the socket process task structure even
after signaling the process to exit. This patch clears the internal
handle after signaling.
bug: 28803962
Change-Id: I642fb595fc2caebc6f2f5419efed4fb560e4e4db
Signed-off-by: Ravi Aravamudhan <aravamud@codeaurora.org>
Added checks for DCI request packets to be greater than the minimum
packet length. We would drop the request and print an error otherwise.
CRs-Fixed: 483310
Bug: 28767589
Change-Id: Ib7a713be3d6f5a6e0ec3ac280aebd800058447c7
Signed-off-by: Ravi Aravamudhan <aravamud@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Lin <yualin@google.com>
At certain point in diag driver there can be integer overflow
thus can lead to memory leak. Added a safegaurd for it.
Bug: 28769912
Change-Id: Ib7070218b9ea7a1b9efca02b4c456ad9501085cd
Signed-off-by: Katish Paran <kparan@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Lin <yualin@google.com>
At certain point in diag driver there can be integer underflow
and thus can lead to memory leak. Bound checks are placed to
ensure correct behavior of condition statements.
Bug: 28768146
Change-Id: I87b57a8b5f32886ada7725f1e8c97cc93de112ec
Signed-off-by: Katish Paran <kparan@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Lin <yualin@google.com>
commit 8b572a4200828b4e75cc22ed2f494b58d5372d65 upstream.
In needs_ilk_vtd_wa(), we pass in the GPU device but compared it against
the ids for the mobile GPU and the mobile host bridge. That latter is
impossible and so likely was just a typo for the desktop GPU device id
(which is also buggy).
Fixes commit da88a5f7f7
Author: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Date: Wed Feb 13 09:31:53 2013 +0000
drm/i915: Disable WC PTE updates to w/a buggy IOMMU on ILK
Reported-by: Ting-Wei Lan <lantw44@gmail.com>
Bugzilla: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=91127
References: https://bugzilla.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60391
Signed-off-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit e21404dc0a upstream.
Loading ipmi_si module while bmc is disconnected, we found the timeout
is longer than 5 secs. Actually it takes about 3 mins and 20
secs.(HZ=250)
error message as below:
Dec 12 19:08:59 linux kernel: IPMI BT: timeout in RD_WAIT [ ] 1 retries left
Dec 12 19:08:59 linux kernel: BT: write 4 bytes seq=0x01 03 18 00 01
[...]
Dec 12 19:12:19 linux kernel: IPMI BT: timeout in RD_WAIT [ ]
Dec 12 19:12:19 linux kernel: failed 2 retries, sending error response
Dec 12 19:12:19 linux kernel: IPMI: BT reset (takes 5 secs)
Dec 12 19:12:19 linux kernel: IPMI BT: flag reset [ ]
Function wait_for_msg_done() use schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1) to
sleep 1 tick, so we should subtract jiffies_to_usecs(1) instead of 100
usecs from timeout.
Reported-by: Hu Shiyuan <hushiyuan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit eeb8a7e8bb123e84daeef84f5a2eab99ad2839a2 upstream.
when multiport is off, virtio console invokes config access from irq
context, config access is blocking on s390.
Fix this up by scheduling work from config irq - similar to what we do
for multiport configs.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
[lizf: Backported to 3.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
