(cherry pick from commit 4148c1f67a)
There is one other possible overrun in the lz4 code as implemented by
Linux at this point in time (which differs from the upstream lz4
codebase, but will get synced at in a future kernel release.) As
pointed out by Don, we also need to check the overflow in the data
itself.
While we are at it, replace the odd error return value with just a
"simple" -1 value as the return value is never used for anything other
than a basic "did this work or not" check.
Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com>
Reported-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bug: 24810447
Change-Id: If06c4719c0b6db3e3e9b693b50fa2218ed1f5078
(cherry pick from commit 206204a116)
Given some pathologically compressed data, lz4 could possibly decide to
wrap a few internal variables, causing unknown things to happen. Catch
this before the wrapping happens and abort the decompression.
Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bug: 24810447
Change-Id: Ie008fb8b69f1a1bbf40900fe2d49fff41e7d300b
(cherry pick from commit ee8a99bdb4)
The LZ4 code is listed as using the "BSD 2-Clause License".
Signed-off-by: Richard Laager <rlaager@wiktel.com>
Acked-by: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Cc: Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com>
Cc: Richard Yao <ryao@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
[ The 2-clause BSD can be just converted into GPL, but that's rude and
pointless, so don't do it - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Bug: 24810447
Change-Id: I332c38794d84d261092ff61a8e4d5d98b4666db8
LZ4 compression and decompression functions require different in
signedness input/output parameters: unsigned char for compression and
signed char for decompression.
Change decompression API to require "(const) unsigned char *".
Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Yann Collet <yann.collet.73@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patchset is for supporting LZ4 compression and the crypto API using
it.
As shown below, the size of data is a little bit bigger but compressing
speed is faster under the enabled unaligned memory access. We can use
lz4 de/compression through crypto API as well. Also, It will be useful
for another potential user of lz4 compression.
lz4 Compression Benchmark:
Compiler: ARM gcc 4.6.4
ARMv7, 1 GHz based board
Kernel: linux 3.4
Uncompressed data Size: 101 MB
Compressed Size compression Speed
LZO 72.1MB 32.1MB/s, 33.0MB/s(UA)
LZ4 75.1MB 30.4MB/s, 35.9MB/s(UA)
LZ4HC 59.8MB 2.4MB/s, 2.5MB/s(UA)
- UA: Unaligned memory Access support
- Latest patch set for LZO applied
This patch:
Add support for LZ4 compression in the Linux Kernel. LZ4 Compression APIs
for kernel are based on LZ4 implementation by Yann Collet and were changed
for kernel coding style.
LZ4 homepage : http://fastcompression.blogspot.com/p/lz4.html
LZ4 source repository : http://code.google.com/p/lz4/
svn revision : r90
Two APIs are added:
lz4_compress() support basic lz4 compression whereas lz4hc_compress()
support high compression or CPU performance get lower but compression
ratio get higher. Also, we require the pre-allocated working memory with
the defined size and destination buffer must be allocated with the size of
lz4_compressbound.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make lz4_compresshcctx() static]
Signed-off-by: Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com>
Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Bob Pearson <rpearson@systemfabricworks.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.hengli.com.au>
Cc: Yann Collet <yann.collet.73@gmail.com>
Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add support for LZ4 decompression in the Linux Kernel. LZ4 Decompression
APIs for kernel are based on LZ4 implementation by Yann Collet.
Benchmark Results(PATCH v3)
Compiler: Linaro ARM gcc 4.6.2
1. ARMv7, 1.5GHz based board
Kernel: linux 3.4
Uncompressed Kernel Size: 14MB
Compressed Size Decompression Speed
LZO 6.7MB 20.1MB/s, 25.2MB/s(UA)
LZ4 7.3MB 29.1MB/s, 45.6MB/s(UA)
2. ARMv7, 1.7GHz based board
Kernel: linux 3.7
Uncompressed Kernel Size: 14MB
Compressed Size Decompression Speed
LZO 6.0MB 34.1MB/s, 52.2MB/s(UA)
LZ4 6.5MB 86.7MB/s
- UA: Unaligned memory Access support
- Latest patch set for LZO applied
This patch set is for adding support for LZ4-compressed Kernel. LZ4 is a
very fast lossless compression algorithm and it also features an extremely
fast decoder [1].
But we have five of decompressors already and one question which does
arise, however, is that of where do we stop adding new ones? This issue
had been discussed and came to the conclusion [2].
Russell King said that we should have:
- one decompressor which is the fastest
- one decompressor for the highest compression ratio
- one popular decompressor (eg conventional gzip)
If we have a replacement one for one of these, then it should do exactly
that: replace it.
The benchmark shows that an 8% increase in image size vs a 66% increase
in decompression speed compared to LZO(which has been known as the
fastest decompressor in the Kernel). Therefore the "fast but may not be
small" compression title has clearly been taken by LZ4 [3].
[1] http://code.google.com/p/lz4/
[2] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kbuild.devel/9157
[3] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kbuild.devel/9347
LZ4 homepage: http://fastcompression.blogspot.com/p/lz4.html
LZ4 source repository: http://code.google.com/p/lz4/
Signed-off-by: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Yann Collet <yann.collet.73@gmail.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Florian Fainelli <florian@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Clean cherry pick of commit 4af712e8df.
The Tausworthe PRNG is initialized at late_initcall time. At that time the
entropy pool serving get_random_bytes is not filled sufficiently. This
patch adds an additional reseeding step as soon as the nonblocking pool
gets marked as initialized.
On some machines it might be possible that late_initcall gets called after
the pool has been initialized. In this situation we won't reseed again.
(A call to prandom_seed_late blocks later invocations of early reseed
attempts.)
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Bug: http://b/29621447
Change-Id: I4d20e60b5df16228f3a3699d16ed2b1dddcceb2b
(cherry picked from commit 4af712e8df)
Clean cherry pick of commmit 6d31920246.
The current Tausworthe PRNG is never reseeded with truly random data after
the first attempt in late_initcall. As this PRNG is used for some critical
random data as e.g. UDP port randomization we should try better and reseed
the PRNG once in a while with truly random data from get_random_bytes().
When we reseed with prandom_seed we now make also sure to throw the first
output away. This suffices the reseeding procedure.
The delay calculation is based on a proposal from Eric Dumazet.
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Bug: http://b/29621447
Change-Id: I990d00f4a29a56a22357cec1c17477c4721054ae
(cherry picked from commit 6d31920246)
[ Upstream commit 51c37a70aa ]
For properly initialising the Tausworthe generator [1], we have
a strict seeding requirement, that is, s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15.
Commit 697f8d0348 ("random32: seeding improvement") introduced
a __seed() function that imposes boundary checks proposed by the
errata paper [2] to properly ensure above conditions.
However, we're off by one, as the function is implemented as:
"return (x < m) ? x + m : x;", and called with __seed(X, 1),
__seed(X, 7), __seed(X, 15). Thus, an unwanted seed of 1, 7, 15
would be possible, whereas the lower boundary should actually
be of at least 2, 8, 16, just as GSL does. Fix this, as otherwise
an initialization with an unwanted seed could have the effect
that Tausworthe's PRNG properties cannot not be ensured.
Note that this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel.
[1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps
[2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps
Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa.
Change-Id: I9c63774e7a0cd5d747469b11b8769867484f36f9
Fixes: 697f8d0348 ("random32: seeding improvement")
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Add functions to get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes.
The difference from get_random_bytes() is that it generates pseudo-random
numbers by prandom_u32(). It doesn't consume the entropy pool, and the
sequence is reproducible if the same rnd_state is used. So it is suitable
for generating random bytes for testing.
Change-Id: Iabb55fae5043dd7dad8ceb4537e0a8e14436231e
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com>
Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This renames all random32 functions to have 'prandom_' prefix as follows:
void prandom_seed(u32 seed); /* rename from srandom32() */
u32 prandom_u32(void); /* rename from random32() */
void prandom_seed_state(struct rnd_state *state, u64 seed);
/* rename from prandom32_seed() */
u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state);
/* rename from prandom32() */
The purpose of this renaming is to prevent some kernel developers from
assuming that prandom32() and random32() might imply that only
prandom32() was the one using a pseudo-random number generator by
prandom32's "p", and the result may be a very embarassing security
exposure. This concern was expressed by Theodore Ts'o.
And furthermore, I'm going to introduce new functions for getting the
requested number of pseudo-random bytes. If I continue to use both
prandom32 and random32 prefixes for these functions, the confusion
is getting worse.
As a result of this renaming, "prandom_" is the common prefix for
pseudo-random number library.
Currently, srandom32() and random32() are preserved because it is
difficult to rename too many users at once.
Change-Id: I8c4118c9356d1917048ea435f32b68e20d04b577
Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Robert Love <robert.w.love@intel.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Cc: David Laight <david.laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Artem Bityutskiy <dedekind1@gmail.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently CONFIG_TIMER_STATS exposes process information across namespaces:
kernel/time/timer_list.c print_timer():
SEQ_printf(m, ", %s/%d", tmp, timer->start_pid);
/proc/timer_list:
#11: <0000000000000000>, hrtimer_wakeup, S:01, do_nanosleep, cron/2570
Given that the tracer can give the same information, this patch entirely
removes CONFIG_TIMER_STATS.
Change-Id: I46f71dd592c2d241aacb1bfe7165c07254bc4298
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Xing Gao <xgao01@email.wm.edu>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jessica Frazelle <me@jessfraz.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170208192659.GA32582@beast
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
haggertk: Backported to 3.4
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit 1f35d04a02a652f14566f875aef3a6f2af4cb77b upstream.
The iomap[] array has PCIM_IOMAP_MAX (6) elements and not
DEVICE_COUNT_RESOURCE (16). This bug was found using a static checker.
It may be that the "if (!(mask & (1 << i)))" check means we never
actually go past the end of the array in real life.
Fixes: ec04b07584 ('iomap: implement pcim_iounmap_regions()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit 2528a8b8f457d7432552d0e2b6f0f4046bb702f4 upstream.
bitmap_parselist("", &mask, nmaskbits) will erroneously set bit zero in
the mask. The same bug is visible in cpumask_parselist() since it is
layered on top of the bitmask code, e.g. if you boot with "isolcpus=",
you will actually end up with cpu zero isolated.
The bug was introduced in commit 4b060420a5 ("bitmap, irq: add
smp_affinity_list interface to /proc/irq") when bitmap_parselist() was
generalized to support userspace as well as kernelspace.
Fixes: 4b060420a5 ("bitmap, irq: add smp_affinity_list interface to /proc/irq")
Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit 9ce357795ef208faa0d59894d9d119a7434e37f3 upstream.
Fixed commit added from64to32 under _#ifndef do_csum_ but used it
under _#ifndef csum_tcpudp_nofold_, breaking some builds (Fengguang's
robot reported TILEGX's). Move from64to32 under the latter.
Fixes: 150ae0e94634 ("lib/checksum.c: fix carry in csum_tcpudp_nofold")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Karl Beldan <karl.beldan@rivierawaves.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit 150ae0e94634714b23919f0c333fee28a5b199d5 upstream.
The carry from the 64->32bits folding was dropped, e.g with:
saddr=0xFFFFFFFF daddr=0xFF0000FF len=0xFFFF proto=0 sum=1,
csum_tcpudp_nofold returned 0 instead of 1.
Signed-off-by: Karl Beldan <karl.beldan@rivierawaves.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit 6cdae7416a upstream.
The iteration logic of idr_get_next() is borrowed mostly verbatim from
idr_for_each(). It walks down the tree looking for the slot matching
the current ID. If the matching slot is not found, the ID is
incremented by the distance of single slot at the given level and
repeats.
The implementation assumes that during the whole iteration id is aligned
to the layer boundaries of the level closest to the leaf, which is true
for all iterations starting from zero or an existing element and thus is
fine for idr_for_each().
However, idr_get_next() may be given any point and if the starting id
hits in the middle of a non-existent layer, increment to the next layer
will end up skipping the same offset into it. For example, an IDR with
IDs filled between [64, 127] would look like the following.
[ 0 64 ... ]
/----/ |
| |
NULL [ 64 ... 127 ]
If idr_get_next() is called with 63 as the starting point, it will try
to follow down the pointer from 0. As it is NULL, it will then try to
proceed to the next slot in the same level by adding the slot distance
at that level which is 64 - making the next try 127. It goes around the
loop and finds and returns 127 skipping [64, 126].
Note that this bug also triggers in idr_for_each_entry() loop which
deletes during iteration as deletions can make layers go away leaving
the iteration with unaligned ID into missing layers.
Fix it by ensuring proceeding to the next slot doesn't carry over the
unaligned offset - ie. use round_up(id + 1, slot_distance) instead of
id += slot_distance.
Bug: 19665182
Bug: 18069309
Bug: 19236185
Change-Id: Iddd4b6fb27c39d7607bc778fc00bafe6ec289478
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ea5d05b34a upstream.
If __bitmap_shift_left() or __bitmap_shift_right() are asked to shift by
a multiple of BITS_PER_LONG, they will try to shift a long value by
BITS_PER_LONG bits which is undefined. Change the functions to avoid
the undefined shift.
Coverity id: 1192175
Coverity id: 1192174
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit d4c5efdb97 upstream.
zatimend has reported that in his environment (3.16/gcc4.8.3/corei7)
memset() calls which clear out sensitive data in extract_{buf,entropy,
entropy_user}() in random driver are being optimized away by gcc.
Add a helper memzero_explicit() (similarly as explicit_bzero() variants)
that can be used in such cases where a variable with sensitive data is
being cleared out in the end. Other use cases might also be in crypto
code. [ I have put this into lib/string.c though, as it's always built-in
and doesn't need any dependencies then. ]
Fixes kernel bugzilla: 82041
Reported-by: zatimend@hotmail.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[lizf: Backported to 3.4:
- adjust context
- another memset() in extract_buf() needs to be converted]
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit 72cf90124e upstream.
This fix ensures that we never meet an integer overflow while adding
255 while parsing a variable length encoding. It works differently from
commit 206a81c ("lzo: properly check for overruns") because instead of
ensuring that we don't overrun the input, which is tricky to guarantee
due to many assumptions in the code, it simply checks that the cumulated
number of 255 read cannot overflow by bounding this number.
The MAX_255_COUNT is the maximum number of times we can add 255 to a base
count without overflowing an integer. The multiply will overflow when
multiplying 255 by more than MAXINT/255. The sum will overflow earlier
depending on the base count. Since the base count is taken from a u8
and a few bits, it is safe to assume that it will always be lower than
or equal to 2*255, thus we can always prevent any overflow by accepting
two less 255 steps.
This patch also reduces the CPU overhead and actually increases performance
by 1.1% compared to the initial code, while the previous fix costs 3.1%
(measured on x86_64).
The fix needs to be backported to all currently supported stable kernels.
Reported-by: Willem Pinckaers <willem@lekkertech.net>
Cc: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit af958a38a6 upstream.
This reverts commit 206a81c ("lzo: properly check for overruns").
As analysed by Willem Pinckaers, this fix is still incomplete on
certain rare corner cases, and it is easier to restart from the
original code.
Reported-by: Willem Pinckaers <willem@lekkertech.net>
Cc: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
commit c75b53af2f upstream.
I use btree from 3.14-rc2 in my own module. When the btree module is
removed, a warning arises:
kmem_cache_destroy btree_node: Slab cache still has objects
CPU: 13 PID: 9150 Comm: rmmod Tainted: GF O 3.14.0-rc2 #1
Hardware name: Inspur NF5270M3/NF5270M3, BIOS CHEETAH_2.1.3 09/10/2013
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x49/0x5d
kmem_cache_destroy+0xcf/0xe0
btree_module_exit+0x10/0x12 [btree]
SyS_delete_module+0x198/0x1f0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
The cause is that it doesn't release the last btree node, when height = 1
and fill = 1.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded test of NULL]
Signed-off-by: Minfei Huang <huangminfei@ucloud.cn>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@logfs.org>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 206a81c184 upstream.
The lzo decompressor can, if given some really crazy data, possibly
overrun some variable types. Modify the checking logic to properly
detect overruns before they happen.
Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com>
Tested-by: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8b975bd3f9 upstream.
This commit updates the kernel LZO code to the current upsteam version
which features a significant speed improvement - benchmarking the Calgary
and Silesia test corpora typically shows a doubled performance in
both compression and decompression on modern i386/x86_64/powerpc machines.
Signed-off-by: Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer <markus@oberhumer.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b6bec26cea upstream.
Rename the source file to match the function name and thereby
also make room for a possible future even slightly faster
"non-safe" decompressor version.
Signed-off-by: Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer <markus@oberhumer.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit bfc5184b69 ]
Any process is able to send netlink messages with leftover bytes.
Make the warning rate-limited to prevent too much log spam.
The warning is supposed to help find userspace bugs, so print the
triggering command name to implicate the buggy program.
[v2: Use pr_warn_ratelimited instead of printk_ratelimited.]
Signed-off-by: Michal Schmidt <mschmidt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 8b7b932434 ]
nla_strcmp compares the string length plus one, so it's implicitly
including the nul-termination in the comparison.
int nla_strcmp(const struct nlattr *nla, const char *str)
{
int len = strlen(str) + 1;
...
d = memcmp(nla_data(nla), str, len);
However, if NLA_STRING is used, userspace can send us a string without
the nul-termination. This is a problem since the string
comparison will not match as the last byte may be not the
nul-termination.
Fix this by skipping the comparison of the nul-termination if the
attribute data is nul-terminated. Suggested by Thomas Graf.
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 326cf0f0f3 upstream.
Most functions in idr fail to deal with the high bits when the idr
tree grows to the maximum height.
* idr_get_empty_slot() stops growing idr tree once the depth reaches
MAX_IDR_LEVEL - 1, which is one depth shallower than necessary to
cover the whole range. The function doesn't even notice that it
didn't grow the tree enough and ends up allocating the wrong ID
given sufficiently high @starting_id.
For example, on 64 bit, if the starting id is 0x7fffff01,
idr_get_empty_slot() will grow the tree 5 layer deep, which only
covers the 30 bits and then proceed to allocate as if the bit 30
wasn't specified. It ends up allocating 0x3fffff01 without the bit
30 but still returns 0x7fffff01.
* __idr_remove_all() will not remove anything if the tree is fully
grown.
* idr_find() can't find anything if the tree is fully grown.
* idr_for_each() and idr_get_next() can't iterate anything if the tree
is fully grown.
Fix it by introducing idr_max() which returns the maximum possible ID
given the depth of tree and replacing the id limit checks in all
affected places.
As the idr_layer pointer array pa[] needs to be 1 larger than the
maximum depth, enlarge pa[] arrays by one.
While this plugs the discovered issues, the whole code base is
horrible and in desparate need of rewrite. It's fragile like hell,
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Adjust context
- s/MAX_IDR_LEVEL/MAX_LEVEL/; s/MAX_IDR_SHIFT/MAX_ID_SHIFT/
- Drop change to idr_alloc()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Qiang Huang <h.huangqiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3715c5309f upstream.
When using ALT+SysRq+Q all the pointers are replaced with "pK-error" like
this:
[23153.208033] .base: pK-error
with echo h > /proc/sysrq-trigger it works:
[23107.776363] .base: ffff88023e60d540
The intent behind this behavior was to return "pK-error" in cases where
the %pK format specifier was used in interrupt context, because the
CAP_SYSLOG check wouldn't be meaningful. Clearly this should only apply
when kptr_restrict is actually enabled though.
Reported-by: Stevie Trujillo <stevie.trujillo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6583327c4d upstream.
Commit d61931d89b, "x86: Add optimized popcnt variants" introduced
compile flag -fcall-saved-rdi for lib/hweight.c. When combined with
options -fprofile-arcs and -O2, this flag causes gcc to generate
broken constructor code. As a result, a 64 bit x86 kernel compiled
with CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL=y prints message "gcov: could not create
file" and runs into sproadic BUGs during boot.
The gcc people indicate that these kinds of problems are endemic when
using ad hoc calling conventions. It is therefore best to treat any
file compiled with ad hoc calling conventions as an isolated
environment and avoid things like profiling or coverage analysis,
since those subsystems assume a "normal" calling conventions.
This patch avoids the bug by excluding lib/hweight.o from coverage
profiling.
Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/52F3A30C.7050205@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 51c37a70aa ]
For properly initialising the Tausworthe generator [1], we have
a strict seeding requirement, that is, s1 > 1, s2 > 7, s3 > 15.
Commit 697f8d0348 ("random32: seeding improvement") introduced
a __seed() function that imposes boundary checks proposed by the
errata paper [2] to properly ensure above conditions.
However, we're off by one, as the function is implemented as:
"return (x < m) ? x + m : x;", and called with __seed(X, 1),
__seed(X, 7), __seed(X, 15). Thus, an unwanted seed of 1, 7, 15
would be possible, whereas the lower boundary should actually
be of at least 2, 8, 16, just as GSL does. Fix this, as otherwise
an initialization with an unwanted seed could have the effect
that Tausworthe's PRNG properties cannot not be ensured.
Note that this PRNG is *not* used for cryptography in the kernel.
[1] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme.ps
[2] http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/myftp/papers/tausme2.ps
Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa.
Fixes: 697f8d0348 ("random32: seeding improvement")
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 312b4e2269 upstream.
Some setuid binaries will allow reading of files which have read
permission by the real user id. This is problematic with files which
use %pK because the file access permission is checked at open() time,
but the kptr_restrict setting is checked at read() time. If a setuid
binary opens a %pK file as an unprivileged user, and then elevates
permissions before reading the file, then kernel pointer values may be
leaked.
This happens for example with the setuid pppd application on Ubuntu 12.04:
$ head -1 /proc/kallsyms
00000000 T startup_32
$ pppd file /proc/kallsyms
pppd: In file /proc/kallsyms: unrecognized option 'c1000000'
This will only leak the pointer value from the first line, but other
setuid binaries may leak more information.
Fix this by adding a check that in addition to the current process having
CAP_SYSLOG, that effective user and group ids are equal to the real ids.
If a setuid binary reads the contents of a file which uses %pK then the
pointer values will be printed as NULL if the real user is unprivileged.
Update the sysctl documentation to reflect the changes, and also correct
the documentation to state the kptr_restrict=0 is the default.
This is a only temporary solution to the issue. The correct solution is
to do the permission check at open() time on files, and to replace %pK
with a function which checks the open() time permission. %pK uses in
printk should be removed since no sane permission check can be done, and
instead protected by using dmesg_restrict.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3d77b50c58 upstream.
Commit b1adaf65ba ("[SCSI] block: add sg buffer copy helper
functions") introduces two sg buffer copy helpers, and calls
flush_kernel_dcache_page() on pages in SG list after these pages are
written to.
Unfortunately, the commit may introduce a potential bug:
- Before sending some SCSI commands, kmalloc() buffer may be passed to
block layper, so flush_kernel_dcache_page() can see a slab page
finally
- According to cachetlb.txt, flush_kernel_dcache_page() is only called
on "a user page", which surely can't be a slab page.
- ARCH's implementation of flush_kernel_dcache_page() may use page
mapping information to do optimization so page_mapping() will see the
slab page, then VM_BUG_ON() is triggered.
Aaro Koskinen reported the bug on ARM/kirkwood when DEBUG_VM is enabled,
and this patch fixes the bug by adding test of '!PageSlab(miter->page)'
before calling flush_kernel_dcache_page().
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Tested-by: Simon Baatz <gmbnomis@gmail.com>
Cc: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: FUJITA Tomonori <fujita.tomonori@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4b59e6c473 upstream.
On large systems with a lot of memory, walking all RAM to determine page
types may take a half second or even more.
In non-blockable contexts, the page allocator will emit a page allocation
failure warning unless __GFP_NOWARN is specified. In such contexts, irqs
are typically disabled and such a lengthy delay may even result in NMI
watchdog timeouts.
To fix this, suppress the page walk in such contexts when printing the
page allocation failure warning.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ac5a2962b0 upstream.
There is a race between klist_remove and klist_release. klist_remove
uses a local var waiter saved on stack. When klist_release calls
wake_up_process(waiter->process) to wake up the waiter, waiter might run
immediately and reuse the stack. Then, klist_release calls
list_del(&waiter->list) to change previous
wait data and cause prior waiter thread corrupt.
The patch fixes it against kernel 3.9.
Signed-off-by: wang, biao <biao.wang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a49b7e82ca upstream.
Anatol Pomozov identified a race condition that hits module unloading
and re-loading. To quote Anatol:
"This is a race codition that exists between kset_find_obj() and
kobject_put(). kset_find_obj() might return kobject that has refcount
equal to 0 if this kobject is freeing by kobject_put() in other
thread.
Here is timeline for the crash in case if kset_find_obj() searches for
an object tht nobody holds and other thread is doing kobject_put() on
the same kobject:
THREAD A (calls kset_find_obj()) THREAD B (calls kobject_put())
splin_lock()
atomic_dec_return(kobj->kref), counter gets zero here
... starts kobject cleanup ....
spin_lock() // WAIT thread A in kobj_kset_leave()
iterate over kset->list
atomic_inc(kobj->kref) (counter becomes 1)
spin_unlock()
spin_lock() // taken
// it does not know that thread A increased counter so it
remove obj from list
spin_unlock()
vfree(module) // frees module object with containing kobj
// kobj points to freed memory area!!
kobject_put(kobj) // OOPS!!!!
The race above happens because module.c tries to use kset_find_obj()
when somebody unloads module. The module.c code was introduced in
commit 6494a93d55fa"
Anatol supplied a patch specific for module.c that worked around the
problem by simply not using kset_find_obj() at all, but rather than make
a local band-aid, this just fixes kset_find_obj() to be thread-safe
using the proper model of refusing the get a new reference if the
refcount has already dropped to zero.
See examples of this proper refcount handling not only in the kref
documentation, but in various other equivalent uses of this pattern by
grepping for atomic_inc_not_zero().
[ Side note: the module race does indicate that module loading and
unloading is not properly serialized wrt sysfs information using the
module mutex. That may require further thought, but this is the
correct fix at the kobject layer regardless. ]
Reported-analyzed-and-tested-by: Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off requires everything to be given in terms
of bits. genpool no longer keeps track of everything in terms of bits
so the start address must be shifted before passing to
bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off. Without this, if the start address
is unaligned, the code will not take this into account.
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <lauraa@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit e8e5365f74e311f5e0dd2513d3321d081355d308)
Change-Id: I5eca13f181d50e6f9f8f39c7440c6619a8edc69a
Signed-off-by: Sudhir Sharma <sudsha@codeaurora.org>
Change the chunk allocation from kmalloc to vmalloc for
allocations greater than a page. This allows large
chunks to be allocated from physically non-contiguous
memory and increases the chance of the allocation
succeeding.
CRs-fixed: 387655
Signed-off-by: Shubhraprakash Das <sadas@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit e461457b134e55c3ca68b91b70b8796e3f3dba69)
Change-Id: I576fed3dd33fdfa9742f0c91bea72417c4f0086f
Signed-off-by: Sudhir Sharma <sudsha@codeaurora.org>
commit 6cdae7416a upstream.
The iteration logic of idr_get_next() is borrowed mostly verbatim from
idr_for_each(). It walks down the tree looking for the slot matching
the current ID. If the matching slot is not found, the ID is
incremented by the distance of single slot at the given level and
repeats.
The implementation assumes that during the whole iteration id is aligned
to the layer boundaries of the level closest to the leaf, which is true
for all iterations starting from zero or an existing element and thus is
fine for idr_for_each().
However, idr_get_next() may be given any point and if the starting id
hits in the middle of a non-existent layer, increment to the next layer
will end up skipping the same offset into it. For example, an IDR with
IDs filled between [64, 127] would look like the following.
[ 0 64 ... ]
/----/ |
| |
NULL [ 64 ... 127 ]
If idr_get_next() is called with 63 as the starting point, it will try
to follow down the pointer from 0. As it is NULL, it will then try to
proceed to the next slot in the same level by adding the slot distance
at that level which is 64 - making the next try 127. It goes around the
loop and finds and returns 127 skipping [64, 126].
Note that this bug also triggers in idr_for_each_entry() loop which
deletes during iteration as deletions can make layers go away leaving
the iteration with unaligned ID into missing layers.
Fix it by ensuring proceeding to the next slot doesn't carry over the
unaligned offset - ie. use round_up(id + 1, slot_distance) instead of
id += slot_distance.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If one has two spinlocks embedded in a structure that kallsyms
knows about and one of the spinlocks locks up we will print the
name of the containing structure instead of the address of the
lock. This is quite bad, so let's use %pS instead of %ps so we
get an offset into the symbol so we can determine which lock is
having problems.
Change-Id: If6fbb2eb2316b846d96da76c35fcfeadbef64401
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Fix NR_IPI to be 7 instead of 6 because both googly and core add
an IPI.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Conflicts:
arch/arm/Kconfig
arch/arm/common/Makefile
arch/arm/include/asm/hardware/cache-l2x0.h
arch/arm/mm/cache-l2x0.c
arch/arm/mm/mmu.c
include/linux/wakelock.h
kernel/power/Kconfig
kernel/power/Makefile
kernel/power/main.c
kernel/power/power.h
This commit adds a bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off() function which
works like bitmap_find_next_zero_area() function expect it allows an
offset to be specified when alignment is checked. This lets caller
request a bit such that its number plus the offset is aligned
according to the mask.
Change-Id: Ib0593cf578ed69ba4c51b1e102a1f8ea1aeb93e8
Signed-off-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Signed-off-by: Larry Bassel <lbassel@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5f2929128ae4db1a6577748c72437f102ed400a5)
Parts of it come from:
commit 7d7c53a7d691a6effc30e51b6a9855affad414f2
Author: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
AuthorDate: Wed Dec 15 21:34:23 2010 +0100
Commit: Larry Bassel <lbassel@codeaurora.org>
CommitDate: Tue Apr 26 15:22:13 2011 -0700
Change-Id: Ia6d45c3166de50258c5e7703b71003065d570221
Signed-off-by: Rohit Vaswani <rvaswani@codeaurora.org>
Add caller information to memory allocation calls and
create /sys/kernel/debug/mempool/map to show the current set of
allocations across all memory pools.
Change-Id: I0f3613158595a3a12837c46dfe500e2e3fea57b9
Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9081938c99b91c714316d6fa3a6618ab27789dc7)
Conflicts:
arch/arm/mach-msm/memory.c
allocate_contiguous_memory_nomap returns an unsigned long yet it
was returning errno codes for various failures. Replace all negative
errno codes with 0, which is what all the callers expect on error anyway.
Change-Id: I3f847f70e0d7fa947a3442f43a980b3ffb1bfd96
Signed-off-by: Jordan Crouse <jcrouse@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit f319151ecf9bdb51295ddbf6ac8385f63fd4ae70)
