Commit 0b81d07790726 ("fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs
tree to fs/crypto") moved the f2fs crypto files to fs/crypto/ and
renamed the symbol prefixes from "f2fs_" to "fscrypt_" (and from "F2FS_"
to just "FS" for preprocessor symbols).
Because of the symbol renaming, it's a bit hard to see it as a file
move: use
git show -M30 0b81d07790726
to lower the rename detection to just 30% similarity and make git show
the files as renamed (the header file won't be shown as a rename even
then - since all it contains is symbol definitions, it looks almost
completely different).
Even with the renames showing as renames, the diffs are not all that
easy to read, since so much is just the renames. But Eric Biggers
noticed that it's not just all renames: the initialization of the
xts_tweak had been broken too, using the inode number rather than the
page offset.
That's not right - it makes the xfs_tweak the same for all pages of each
inode. It _might_ make sense to make the xfs_tweak contain both the
offset _and_ the inode number, but not just the inode number.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If many threads calls fsync with data writes, we don't need to flush every
bios having node page writes.
The f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback will flush its bios when the page is really
needed.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
The f2fs_setxattr() prototype for CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR=n has
been wrong for a long time, since 8ae8f1627f ("f2fs: support
xattr security labels"), but there have never been any callers,
so it did not matter.
Now, the function gets called from f2fs_ioc_keyctl(), which
causes a build failure:
fs/f2fs/file.c: In function 'f2fs_ioc_keyctl':
include/linux/stddef.h:7:14: error: passing argument 6 of 'f2fs_setxattr' makes integer from pointer without a cast [-Werror=int-conversion]
#define NULL ((void *)0)
^
fs/f2fs/file.c:1599:27: note: in expansion of macro 'NULL'
value, F2FS_KEY_SIZE, NULL, type);
^
In file included from ../fs/f2fs/file.c:29:0:
fs/f2fs/xattr.h:129:19: note: expected 'int' but argument is of type 'void *'
static inline int f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
^
fs/f2fs/file.c:1597:9: error: too many arguments to function 'f2fs_setxattr'
return f2fs_setxattr(inode, F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_KEY,
^
In file included from ../fs/f2fs/file.c:29:0:
fs/f2fs/xattr.h:129:19: note: declared here
static inline int f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
Thsi changes the prototype of the empty stub function to match
that of the actual implementation. This will not make the key
management work when F2FS_FS_XATTR is disabled, but it gets it
to build at least.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
During ->lookup, I_NEW state of inode was been cleared in f2fs_iget,
so in error path, we don't need to clear it again.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Just clean up opened code with existing function, no logic change.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
ra_node_page() is used to read ahead one node page. Comparing to regular
read, it's faster because it doesn't wait for IO completion.
But if it is called twice for reading the same block, and the IO request
from the first call hasn't been completed before the second call, the second
call will have to wait until the read is over.
Here use the code in __do_page_cache_readahead() to solve this problem.
It does nothing when someone else already puts the page in mapping. The
status of page should be assured by whoever puts it there.
This implement also prevents alteration of page reference count.
Signed-off-by: Fan li <fanofcode.li@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
This patch adds the renamed functions moved from the f2fs crypto files.
[Backporting to 3.10]
- Removed d_is_negative() in fscrypt_d_revalidate().
1. definitions for per-file encryption used by ext4 and f2fs.
2. crypto.c for encrypt/decrypt functions
a. IO preparation:
- fscrypt_get_ctx / fscrypt_release_ctx
b. before IOs:
- fscrypt_encrypt_page
- fscrypt_decrypt_page
- fscrypt_zeroout_range
c. after IOs:
- fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages
- fscrypt_pullback_bio_page
- fscrypt_restore_control_page
3. policy.c supporting context management.
a. For ioctls:
- fscrypt_process_policy
- fscrypt_get_policy
b. For context permission
- fscrypt_has_permitted_context
- fscrypt_inherit_context
4. keyinfo.c to handle permissions
- fscrypt_get_encryption_info
- fscrypt_free_encryption_info
5. fname.c to support filename encryption
a. general wrapper functions
- fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr
- fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk
- fscrypt_setup_filename
- fscrypt_free_filename
b. specific filename handling functions
- fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer
- fscrypt_fname_free_buffer
6. Makefile and Kconfig
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ildar Muslukhov <ildarm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Uday Savagaonkar <savagaon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Conflicts:
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
fs/f2fs/inode.c
fs/f2fs/super.c
include/linux/fs.h
Change-Id: I162f3562aed66e7e377ec38714fae96c651fbdd7
f2fs_lock_all() calls down_write_nest_lock() to acquire a rw_sem and check
a mutex, but down_write_nest_lock() is designed for two rw_sem accoring to the
comment in include/linux/rwsem.h. And, other than f2fs, it is just called in
mm/mmap.c with two rwsem.
So, it looks it is used wrongly by f2fs. And, it causes the below compile
warning on -rt kernel too.
In file included from fs/f2fs/xattr.c:25:0:
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h: In function 'f2fs_lock_all':
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:962:34: warning: passing argument 2 of 'down_write_nest_lock' from incompatible pointer type [-Wincompatible-pointer-types]
f2fs_down_write(&sbi->cp_rwsem, &sbi->cp_mutex);
^
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:27:55: note: in definition of macro 'f2fs_down_write'
#define f2fs_down_write(x, y) down_write_nest_lock(x, y)
^
In file included from include/linux/rwsem.h:22:0,
from fs/f2fs/xattr.c:21:
include/linux/rwsem_rt.h:138:20: note: expected 'struct rw_semaphore *' but argument is of type 'struct mutex *'
static inline void down_write_nest_lock(struct rw_semaphore *sem,
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao2.yu@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
If f2fs was corrupted with missing dot dentries in root dirctory,
it needs to recover them after fsck.f2fs set F2FS_INLINE_DOTS flag
in directory inode when fsck.f2fs detects missing dot dentries.
Signed-off-by: Xue Liu <liuxueliu.liu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yong Sheng <shengyong1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao2.yu@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Change-Id: I4b2a3ed665543728451c21465fb90ec89f739135
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Change-Id: I9f03d0c10a5f6a55a0320be1227f9fbf7cc1ea12
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
Change-Id: I5196dbe7ca4d358d6c5777a07ea8bbbb96ce1619
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fix two bugs caused by merging anon vma_naming, a typo in
mempolicy.c and a bad merge in sys.c.
Change-Id: Ia4ced447d50573e68195e95ea2f2b4d9456b8a90
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
hrtimer_cancel() waits for the completion from the callback, thus it
must not be called inside the callback itself. This was already a
problem in the past with ALSA hrtimer driver, and the early commit
[fcfdebe707: ALSA: hrtimer - Fix lock-up] tried to address it.
However, the previous fix is still insufficient: it may still cause a
lockup when the ALSA timer instance reprograms itself in its callback.
Then it invokes the start function even in snd_timer_interrupt() that
is called in hrtimer callback itself, results in a CPU stall. This is
no hypothetical problem but actually triggered by syzkaller fuzzer.
This patch tries to fix the issue again. Now we call
hrtimer_try_to_cancel() at both start and stop functions so that it
won't fall into a deadlock, yet giving some chance to cancel the queue
if the functions have been called outside the callback. The proper
hrtimer_cancel() is called in anyway at closing, so this should be
enough.
Change-Id: Id6224b2a3ade0d217e891e6af09744df4d0b2e5c
Reported-and-tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Conflicts:
Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
fs/pipe.c
include/linux/sched.h
Change-Id: Ic7c678af18129943e16715fdaa64a97a7f0854be
A slave timer instance might be still accessible in a racy way while
operating the master instance as it lacks of locking. Since the
master operation is mostly protected with timer->lock, we should cope
with it while changing the slave instance, too. Also, some linked
lists (active_list and ack_list) of slave instances aren't unlinked
immediately at stopping or closing, and this may lead to unexpected
accesses.
This patch tries to address these issues. It adds spin lock of
timer->lock (either from master or slave, which is equivalent) in a
few places. For avoiding a deadlock, we ensure that the global
slave_active_lock is always locked at first before each timer lock.
Also, ack and active_list of slave instances are properly unlinked at
snd_timer_stop() and snd_timer_close().
Last but not least, remove the superfluous call of _snd_timer_stop()
at removing slave links. This is a noop, and calling it may confuse
readers wrt locking. Further cleanup will follow in a later patch.
Actually we've got reports of use-after-free by syzkaller fuzzer, and
this hopefully fixes these issues.
Change-Id: I572878b909dda522dbedc84633414185802bc974
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
ALSA timer instance object has a couple of linked lists and they are
unlinked unconditionally at snd_timer_stop(). Meanwhile
snd_timer_interrupt() unlinks it, but it calls list_del() which leaves
the element list itself unchanged. This ends up with unlinking twice,
and it was caught by syzkaller fuzzer.
The fix is to use list_del_init() variant properly there, too.
Change-Id: I95e2ab06180dfe43fb6b7c2875a866b53ca245ce
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Change-Id: I8534867beeac111370017ef246adc17e23e1a3b1
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
The default kernel mapping for the pages allocated for the binder
buffers is never used. Set the __GFP_HIGHMEM flag when allocating
these pages so we don't needlessly use low memory pages that may
be required elsewhere.
Signed-off-by: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Pointer other_free is getting dereferenced without
performing proper NULL checks which may cause issue.
Do proper NULL checks at all points before dereferencing
it.
Change-Id: I88515703d64730e42598ab16136dcce4c18b099c
Signed-off-by: Susheel Khiani <skhiani@codeaurora.org>
An issue was observed when a userspace task exits.
The page which hits error here is the zero page.
In binder mmap, the whole of vma is not mapped.
On a task crash, when debuggerd reads the binder regions,
the unmapped areas fall to do_anonymous_page in handle_pte_fault,
due to the absence of a vm_fault handler. This results in
zero page being mapped. Later in zap_pte_range, vm_normal_page
returns zero page in the case of VM_MIXEDMAP and it results in the
error.
BUG: Bad page map in process mediaserver pte:9dff379f pmd:9bfbd831
page:c0ed8e60 count:1 mapcount:-1 mapping: (null) index:0x0
page flags: 0x404(referenced|reserved)
addr:40c3f000 vm_flags:10220051 anon_vma: (null) mapping:d9fe0764 index:fd
vma->vm_ops->fault: (null)
vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap: binder_mmap+0x0/0x274
CPU: 0 PID: 1463 Comm: mediaserver Tainted: G W 3.10.17+ #1
[<c001549c>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0x11c) from [<c001200c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c001200c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) from [<c0103d78>] (print_bad_pte+0x158/0x190)
[<c0103d78>] (print_bad_pte+0x158/0x190) from [<c01055f0>] (unmap_single_vma+0x2e4/0x598)
[<c01055f0>] (unmap_single_vma+0x2e4/0x598) from [<c010618c>] (unmap_vmas+0x34/0x50)
[<c010618c>] (unmap_vmas+0x34/0x50) from [<c010a9e4>] (exit_mmap+0xc8/0x1e8)
[<c010a9e4>] (exit_mmap+0xc8/0x1e8) from [<c00520f0>] (mmput+0x54/0xd0)
[<c00520f0>] (mmput+0x54/0xd0) from [<c005972c>] (do_exit+0x360/0x990)
[<c005972c>] (do_exit+0x360/0x990) from [<c0059ef0>] (do_group_exit+0x84/0xc0)
[<c0059ef0>] (do_group_exit+0x84/0xc0) from [<c0066de0>] (get_signal_to_deliver+0x4d4/0x548)
[<c0066de0>] (get_signal_to_deliver+0x4d4/0x548) from [<c0011500>] (do_signal+0xa8/0x3b8)
Add a vm_fault handler which returns VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, and prevents the
wrong fallback to do_anonymous_page.
Signed-off-by: Vinayak Menon <vinayakm.list@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If a thread or process exited while a reply, one-way transaction or
death notification was pending, the struct holding the pending work
was leaked.
Signed-off-by: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 012a45e3f4 upstream.
If a cpu is idle and starts an hrtimer which is not pinned on that
same cpu, the nohz code might target the timer to a different cpu.
In the case that we switch the cpu base of the timer we already have a
sanity check in place, which determines whether the timer is earlier
than the current leftmost timer on the target cpu. In that case we
enqueue the timer on the current cpu because we cannot reprogram the
clock event device on the target.
If the timers base is already the target CPU we do not have this
sanity check in place so we enqueue the timer as the leftmost timer in
the target cpus rb tree, but we cannot reprogram the clock event
device on the target cpu. So the timer expires late and subsequently
prevents the reprogramming of the target cpu clock event device until
the previously programmed event fires or a timer with an earlier
expiry time gets enqueued on the target cpu itself.
Add the same target check as we have for the switch base case and
start the timer on the current cpu if it would become the leftmost
timer on the target.
[ tglx: Rewrote subject and changelog ]
Change-Id: I18754822387ae503ec460f95203567c5b25597c0
Signed-off-by: Leon Ma <xindong.ma@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398847391-5994-1-git-send-email-xindong.ma@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
NULL pointer dereference can happen in cfq_choose_cfqg()
when there are no cfq groups to select other than the
current serving group. Prevent this by adding a NULL
check before dereferencing.
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
[<c02502cc>] (cfq_dispatch_requests+0x368/0x8c0) from
[<c0243f30>] (blk_peek_request+0x220/0x25c)
[<c0243f30>] (blk_peek_request+0x220/0x25c) from
[<c0243f74>] (blk_fetch_request+0x8/0x1c)
[<c0243f74>] (blk_fetch_request+0x8/0x1c) from
[<c041cedc>] (mmc_queue_thread+0x58/0x120)
[<c041cedc>] (mmc_queue_thread+0x58/0x120) from
[<c00ad310>] (kthread+0x84/0x90)
[<c00ad310>] (kthread+0x84/0x90) from
[<c000eeac>] (kernel_thread_exit+0x0/0x8)
CRs-Fixed: 416466
Change-Id: I1fab93a4334b53e1d7c5dcc8f93cff174bae0d5e
Signed-off-by: Sujit Reddy Thumma <sthumma@codeaurora.org>
Validating the value of backlight to be not more than the
max value and also ensuring that the backlight scale value
is not more than 1024, thereby ensuring that backlight
scaling factor is not more than 1
Change-Id: I6a6f4f0f0a8c272edcac5078276fb406ddee3e90
Signed-off-by: Krishna Chaitanya Parimi <cparimi@codeaurora.org>
[zhaoweiliew: Add bl_lvl argument for msm_fb_scale_bl in bl_workqueue_handler]
Signed-off-by: Zhao Wei Liew <zhaoweiliew@gmail.com>
Add appropriate null check for mfd data
structure before accessing it's members.
This prevents null pointer accesses in
the driver.
Change-Id: I5aae937f839e4f6ed8d5c5a4b54ab45f0ff07332
Signed-off-by: Krishna Chaitanya Parimi <cparimi@codeaurora.org>
Jakub reported while working with nlmon netlink sniffer that parts of
the inet_diag_sockid are not initialized when r->idiag_family != AF_INET6.
That is, fields of r->id.idiag_src[1 ... 3], r->id.idiag_dst[1 ... 3].
In fact, it seems that we can leak 6 * sizeof(u32) byte of kernel [slab]
memory through this. At least, in udp_dump_one(), we allocate a skb in ...
rep = nlmsg_new(sizeof(struct inet_diag_msg) + ..., GFP_KERNEL);
... and then pass that to inet_sk_diag_fill() that puts the whole struct
inet_diag_msg into the skb, where we only fill out r->id.idiag_src[0],
r->id.idiag_dst[0] and leave the rest untouched:
r->id.idiag_src[0] = inet->inet_rcv_saddr;
r->id.idiag_dst[0] = inet->inet_daddr;
struct inet_diag_msg embeds struct inet_diag_sockid that is correctly /
fully filled out in IPv6 case, but for IPv4 not.
So just zero them out by using plain memset (for this little amount of
bytes it's probably not worth the extra check for idiag_family == AF_INET).
Similarly, fix also other places where we fill that out.
[Upstream commit b1aac815c0]
Change-Id: Ief40178e5bc9b4e9c207607e4c05970371d1e6f8
Reported-by: Jakub Zawadzki <darkjames-ws@darkjames.pl>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Instead of checking whether the handle is valid, we check if journal
is enabled. This avoids taking the s_orphan_lock mutex in all cases
when there is no journal in use, including the error paths where
ext4_orphan_del() is called with a handle set to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Update epm_adc_psoc_show_in() to fix potential
dereference to adc_code used to store the
PSOC code data.
Change-Id: I7b68f50f89fd38f0ac32f1793720e1af3ef43022
Signed-off-by: Siddartha Mohanadoss <smohanad@codeaurora.org>
Fix the following NULL pointer dereferences in character drivers.
Null pointer 'pra' that comes from line 825 may be passed to function
and can be dereferenced there by passing argument 4 to function
'fastrpc_internal_invoke' at line 847.
drivers/char/adsprpc.c +847 | fastrpc_device_ioctl()
Null pointer 'rpra' that comes from line 672 may be passed
to function and can be dereferenced there by passing argument 2
to function 'inv_args' at line 702.
drivers/char/adsprpc.c +702 | fastrpc_internal_invoke()
Constant NULL may be dereferenced by passing argument 3 to
function 'diag_device_write' at line 165.
drivers/char/diag/diagfwd_hsic.c +165 | diag_hsic_read_complete_callback()
drivers/char/diag/diagfwd.c +585 | diag_device_write()
Change-Id: I30469575c30f3846b449b6c71522f7dfc10c5bc5
Signed-off-by: Binoy Jayan <bjayan@codeaurora.org>
Fix the following NULL pointer dereference issue.
Pointer '__p' returned from call to function 'smem_alloc' at line 84
may be NULL and will be dereferenced at line 85.
drivers/iommu/msm_iommu.c +85 | _msm_iommu_remote_spin_lock_init()
Change-Id: I3549e8dc6cb6b13518ced7d28186da74667c1cb6
Signed-off-by: Binoy Jayan <bjayan@codeaurora.org>
In function krait_pmu_disable_event, parameter hwc comes from
userspace and is untrusted.The function krait_clearpmu is called
after the function get_krait_evtinfo.
Function get_krait_evtinfo as parameter krait_evt_type variable
which is used to extract the groupcode(reg) which is bound to
KRAIT_MAX_L1_REG (is 3). After validation,one code path modifies
groupcode(reg):If this code path executes, groupcode(reg) can be
3,4, 5, or 6. In krait_clearpmu groupcode used to access array
krait_functions whose size is 3. Since groupcode can be 3,4,5,6
accessing array krait_functions lead to bufferoverlflow.
This change will validate groupcode not to exceed 3 .
Change-Id: I48c92adda137d8a074b4e1a367a468195a810ca1
CRs-fixed: 962450
Signed-off-by: Swetha Chikkaboraiah <schikk@codeaurora.org>
commit 71abdc15ad upstream.
When kswapd exits, it can end up taking locks that were previously held
by allocating tasks while they waited for reclaim. Lockdep currently
warns about this:
On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 06:06:34PM +0800, Gu Zheng wrote:
> inconsistent {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} -> {IN-RECLAIM_FS-R} usage.
> kswapd2/1151 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes:
> (&sig->group_rwsem){+++++?}, at: exit_signals+0x24/0x130
> {RECLAIM_FS-ON-W} state was registered at:
> mark_held_locks+0xb9/0x140
> lockdep_trace_alloc+0x7a/0xe0
> kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x37/0x240
> flex_array_alloc+0x99/0x1a0
> cgroup_attach_task+0x63/0x430
> attach_task_by_pid+0x210/0x280
> cgroup_procs_write+0x16/0x20
> cgroup_file_write+0x120/0x2c0
> vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0
> SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0
> tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
> irq event stamp: 49
> hardirqs last enabled at (49): _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x70
> hardirqs last disabled at (48): _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0xa0
> softirqs last enabled at (0): copy_process.part.24+0x627/0x15f0
> softirqs last disabled at (0): (null)
>
> other info that might help us debug this:
> Possible unsafe locking scenario:
>
> CPU0
> ----
> lock(&sig->group_rwsem);
> <Interrupt>
> lock(&sig->group_rwsem);
>
> *** DEADLOCK ***
>
> no locks held by kswapd2/1151.
>
> stack backtrace:
> CPU: 30 PID: 1151 Comm: kswapd2 Not tainted 3.10.39+ #4
> Call Trace:
> dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
> print_usage_bug+0x1f7/0x208
> mark_lock+0x21d/0x2a0
> __lock_acquire+0x52a/0xb60
> lock_acquire+0xa2/0x140
> down_read+0x51/0xa0
> exit_signals+0x24/0x130
> do_exit+0xb5/0xa50
> kthread+0xdb/0x100
> ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
This is because the kswapd thread is still marked as a reclaimer at the
time of exit. But because it is exiting, nobody is actually waiting on
it to make reclaim progress anymore, and it's nothing but a regular
thread at this point. Be tidy and strip it of all its powers
(PF_MEMALLOC, PF_SWAPWRITE, PF_KSWAPD, and the lockdep reclaim state)
before returning from the thread function.
Change-Id: I51cc36b913919dbaeb56322d7afe71e0c36f36bc
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reported-by: Gu Zheng <guz.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 60cefed485 upstream.
Kswapd does not in all places have the same criteria for a balanced
zone. Zones are only being reclaimed when their high watermark is
breached, but compaction checks loop over the zonelist again when the
zone does not meet the low watermark plus two times the size of the
allocation. This gets kswapd stuck in an endless loop over a small
zone, like the DMA zone, where the high watermark is smaller than the
compaction requirement.
Add a function, zone_balanced(), that checks the watermark, and, for
higher order allocations, if compaction has enough free memory. Then
use it uniformly to check for balanced zones.
This makes sure that when the compaction watermark is not met, at least
reclaim happens and progress is made - or the zone is declared
unreclaimable at some point and skipped entirely.
Change-Id: I28fd1de8628aa7e799cbc11e313e8d8f3e2df977
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reported-by: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Reported-by: Johannes Hirte <johannes.hirte@fem.tu-ilmenau.de>
Reported-by: Tomas Racek <tracek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Johannes Hirte <johannes.hirte@fem.tu-ilmenau.de>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[hq: Backported to 3.4: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Qiang Huang <h.huangqiang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b0a8cc58e6 upstream.
In kswapd(), set current->reclaim_state to NULL before returning, as
current->reclaim_state holds reference to variable on kswapd()'s stack.
In rare cases, while returning from kswapd() during memory offlining,
__free_slab() and freepages() can access the dangling pointer of
current->reclaim_state.
Change-Id: I49f69977895442b3a8328c9c39877369b4554ba5
Signed-off-by: Takamori Yamaguchi <takamori.yamaguchi@jp.sony.com>
Signed-off-by: Aaditya Kumar <aaditya.kumar@ap.sony.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fe35004fbf upstream.
Sometimes we'd like to avoid swapping out anonymous memory. In
particular, avoid swapping out pages of important process or process
groups while there is a reasonable amount of pagecache on RAM so that we
can satisfy our customers' requirements.
OTOH, we can control how aggressive the kernel will swap memory pages with
/proc/sys/vm/swappiness for global and
/sys/fs/cgroup/memory/memory.swappiness for each memcg.
But with current reclaim implementation, the kernel may swap out even if
we set swappiness=0 and there is pagecache in RAM.
This patch changes the behavior with swappiness==0. If we set
swappiness==0, the kernel does not swap out completely (for global reclaim
until the amount of free pages and filebacked pages in a zone has been
reduced to something very very small (nr_free + nr_filebacked < high
watermark)).
Change-Id: Ibb357f534711e73838bca037bed7532bbf4d2728
Signed-off-by: Satoru Moriya <satoru.moriya@hds.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1c7e7f6c07 upstream.
Offlining memory may block forever, waiting for kswapd() to wake up
because kswapd() does not check the event kthread->should_stop before
sleeping.
The proper pattern, from Documentation/memory-barriers.txt, is:
--- waker ---
event_indicated = 1;
wake_up_process(event_daemon);
--- sleeper ---
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (event_indicated)
break;
schedule();
}
set_current_state() may be wrapped by:
prepare_to_wait();
In the kswapd() case, event_indicated is kthread->should_stop.
=== offlining memory (waker) ===
kswapd_stop()
kthread_stop()
kthread->should_stop = 1
wake_up_process()
wait_for_completion()
=== kswapd_try_to_sleep (sleeper) ===
kswapd_try_to_sleep()
prepare_to_wait()
.
.
schedule()
.
.
finish_wait()
The schedule() needs to be protected by a test of kthread->should_stop,
which is wrapped by kthread_should_stop().
Reproducer:
Do heavy file I/O in background.
Do a memory offline/online in a tight loop
Change-Id: I3fcff189649427eb33ebf6c8753c1fed2cf0d687
Signed-off-by: Aaditya Kumar <aaditya.kumar@ap.sony.com>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e48982734e upstream.
Commit 6457474624 ("vmscan: detect mapped file pages used only once")
made mapped pages have another round in inactive list because they might
be just short lived and so we could consider them again next time. This
heuristic helps to reduce pressure on the active list with a streaming
IO worklods.
This patch fixes a regression introduced by this commit for heavy shmem
based workloads because unlike Anon pages, which are excluded from this
heuristic because they are usually long lived, shmem pages are handled
as a regular page cache.
This doesn't work quite well, unfortunately, if the workload is mostly
backed by shmem (in memory database sitting on 80% of memory) with a
streaming IO in the background (backup - up to 20% of memory). Anon
inactive list is full of (dirty) shmem pages when watermarks are hit.
Shmem pages are kept in the inactive list (they are referenced) in the
first round and it is hard to reclaim anything else so we reach lower
scanning priorities very quickly which leads to an excessive swap out.
Let's fix this by excluding all swap backed pages (they tend to be long
lived wrt. the regular page cache anyway) from used-once heuristic and
rather activate them if they are referenced.
The customer's workload is shmem backed database (80% of RAM) and they
are measuring transactions/s with an IO in the background (20%).
Transactions touch more or less random rows in the table. The
transaction rate fell by a factor of 3 (in the worst case) because of
commit 64574746. This patch restores the previous numbers.
Change-Id: Id6696030f349217d40d22cd8c17b3ffad1c4253f
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
If we try to rmmod the driver for an interface while sockets with
setsockopt(JOIN_ANYCAST) are alive, some refcounts aren't cleaned up
and we get stuck on:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for ens3 to become free. Usage count = 1
If we LEAVE_ANYCAST/close everything before rmmod'ing, there is no
problem.
We need to perform a cleanup similar to the one for multicast in
addrconf_ifdown(how == 1).
BUG: 18902601
Change-Id: I6d51aed5755eb5738fcba91950e7773a1c985d2e
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[Backported from android-3.10 86a47ad60de5221c3869821d3552dcd1c89199f5]
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
ip_rt_put/ip6_rt_put call is missed after route lookup routine.
So if lookup returns ok, rtable leak will happen.
Change-Id: Ica137043879b4305b70401cf7e8efda24405e3ff
Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <liping.zhang@spreadtrum.com>
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
semaphore instead of before.
I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <pthread.h>
void *thr0(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
keyctl_revoke(key);
return 0;
}
void *thr1(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
char buffer[16];
keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
return 0;
}
int main()
{
key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
pthread_t th[5];
pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_join(th[0], 0);
pthread_join(th[1], 0);
pthread_join(th[2], 0);
pthread_join(th[3], 0);
return 0;
}
Build as:
cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
Run as:
while keyctl-race; do :; done
as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
summarised as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
[<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
[<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
Change-Id: Id4a5e47860162f62c94bb66728ca9e712f9d89c2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
commit 878d7439d0 upstream.
Commit 29c00b4a1d (rcu: Add event-tracing for RCU callback
invocation) added a regression in rcu_do_batch()
Under stress, RCU is supposed to allow to process all items in queue,
instead of a batch of 10 items (blimit), but an integer overflow makes
the effective limit being 1. So, unless there is frequent idle periods
(during which RCU ignores batch limits), RCU can be forced into a
state where it cannot keep up with the callback-generation rate,
eventually resulting in OOM.
This commit therefore converts a few variables in rcu_do_batch() from
int to long to fix this problem, along with the module parameters
controlling the batch limits.
Change-Id: I6d6dcb94d2a31f0cf00d3121a7b92e49aa7ab108
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Add a new helper f2fs_flush_merged_bios to clean up redundant codes.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao2.yu@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
