Kirill A. Shutemov 6a688d1c2e pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace ... commit ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce upstream. As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection, /proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do attacks. This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap. [1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html [ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now this is the simple model. - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com> [mancha: Backported to 3.10] Signed-off-by: mancha security <mancha1@zoho.com>		2015-04-14 17:34:02 +08:00
..
array.c	proc: pid/status: show all supplementary groups	2014-04-14 06:44:15 -07:00
base.c	fs/proc/base.c: fix GPF in /proc/$PID/map_files	2014-03-23 21:37:06 -07:00
cmdline.c
consoles.c
cpuinfo.c
devices.c
generic.c
inode.c	vfs,proc: guarantee unique inodes in /proc	2013-11-29 10:50:30 -08:00
internal.h
interrupts.c
Kconfig
kcore.c
kmsg.c
loadavg.c
Makefile
meminfo.c
mmu.c
namespaces.c
nommu.c
page.c
proc_devtree.c
proc_net.c
proc_sysctl.c
proc_tty.c
root.c
softirqs.c
stat.c	genirq: Prevent proc race against freeing of irq descriptors	2015-04-14 17:33:46 +08:00
task_mmu.c	pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace	2015-04-14 17:34:02 +08:00
task_nommu.c
uptime.c
version.c
vmcore.c