Daniel Borkmann d6f5498856 net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data ... [ Upstream commit b5c37fe6e2 ] On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do with e.g. auth keys when released. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>		2013-02-14 10:49:06 -08:00
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associola.c
auth.c
bind_addr.c
chunk.c	sctp: fix -ENOMEM result with invalid user space pointer in sendto() syscall	2013-01-11 09:06:27 -08:00
command.c
debug.c
endpointola.c	net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data	2013-02-14 10:49:06 -08:00
input.c
inqueue.c
ipv6.c
Kconfig
Makefile
objcnt.c
output.c
outqueue.c	sctp: refactor sctp_outq_teardown to insure proper re-initalization	2013-02-14 10:49:05 -08:00
primitive.c
probe.c
proc.c
protocol.c
sm_make_chunk.c
sm_sideeffect.c	sctp: fix call to SCTP_CMD_PROCESS_SACK in sctp_cmd_interpreter()	2012-11-17 13:16:13 -08:00
sm_statefuns.c
sm_statetable.c
socket.c	net: sctp: sctp_setsockopt_auth_key: use kzfree instead of kfree	2013-02-14 10:49:05 -08:00
ssnmap.c
sysctl.c
transport.c
tsnmap.c
ulpevent.c
ulpqueue.c