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Paul Moore 23a5a7a2da selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loaded 
commit f64410ec66 upstream.

This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes
the problem below:

  "If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a
   list of inodes to be initialized after policy load.  After policy
   load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry()
   on all inodes accessed before policy load.  In the case of inodes
   in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does:

     /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
     isec->sid = sbsec->sid;

     if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
             if (opt_dentry) {
                     isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...)
                     rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
                                               isec->sclass,
                                               &sid);
                     if (rc)
                             goto out_unlock;
                     isec->sid = sid;
             }
     }

   Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid()
   and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock.
   I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs.  Look
   for an alias of the inode.  If it can't be found, just leave the
   inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we
   should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..."

On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in
/proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were
accessed early in the boot), for example:

   # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
   system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax

However, with this patch in place we see the expected result:

   # ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
   system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax

Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2014-04-14 06:44:17 -07:00
..
apparmor lsm_audit: don't specify the audit pre/post callbacks in 'struct common_audit_data' 2012-04-03 09:49:59 -07:00
integrity Revert "ima: policy for RAMFS" 2013-11-29 10:50:34 -08:00
keys key: Fix resource leak 2013-03-28 12:12:27 -07:00
selinux selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loaded 2014-04-14 06:44:17 -07:00
smack Smack: move label list initialization 2012-04-18 12:02:28 +10:00
tomoyo usermodehelper: use UMH_WAIT_PROC consistently 2012-03-23 16:58:41 -07:00
yama Yama: handle 32-bit userspace prctl 2012-10-07 08:32:28 -07:00
capability.c security: create task_free security callback 2012-02-10 09:14:51 +11:00
commoncap.c security: fix compile error in commoncap.c 2012-04-19 12:56:39 +10:00
device_cgroup.c cgroup: remove cgroup_subsys argument from callbacks 2012-02-02 09:20:22 -08:00
inode.c securityfs: fix object creation races 2012-01-10 10:20:35 -05:00
Kconfig security: Yama LSM 2012-02-10 09:18:52 +11:00
lsm_audit.c lsm_audit: don't specify the audit pre/post callbacks in 'struct common_audit_data' 2012-04-03 09:49:59 -07:00
Makefile security: Yama LSM 2012-02-10 09:18:52 +11:00
min_addr.c
security.c security: trim security.h 2012-02-14 10:45:42 +11:00