If two processes share a common memory region, they usually want some
guarantees to allow safe access. This often includes:
- one side cannot overwrite data while the other reads it
- one side cannot shrink the buffer while the other accesses it
- one side cannot grow the buffer beyond previously set boundaries
If there is a trust-relationship between both parties, there is no need
for policy enforcement. However, if there's no trust relationship (eg.,
for general-purpose IPC) sharing memory-regions is highly fragile and
often not possible without local copies. Look at the following two
use-cases:
1) A graphics client wants to share its rendering-buffer with a
graphics-server. The memory-region is allocated by the client for
read/write access and a second FD is passed to the server. While
scanning out from the memory region, the server has no guarantee that
the client doesn't shrink the buffer at any time, requiring rather
cumbersome SIGBUS handling.
2) A process wants to perform an RPC on another process. To avoid huge
bandwidth consumption, zero-copy is preferred. After a message is
assembled in-memory and a FD is passed to the remote side, both sides
want to be sure that neither modifies this shared copy, anymore. The
source may have put sensible data into the message without a separate
copy and the target may want to parse the message inline, to avoid a
local copy.
While SIGBUS handling, POSIX mandatory locking and MAP_DENYWRITE provide
ways to achieve most of this, the first one is unproportionally ugly to
use in libraries and the latter two are broken/racy or even disabled due
to denial of service attacks.
This patch introduces the concept of SEALING. If you seal a file, a
specific set of operations is blocked on that file forever. Unlike locks,
seals can only be set, never removed. Hence, once you verified a specific
set of seals is set, you're guaranteed that no-one can perform the blocked
operations on this file, anymore.
An initial set of SEALS is introduced by this patch:
- SHRINK: If SEAL_SHRINK is set, the file in question cannot be reduced
in size. This affects ftruncate() and open(O_TRUNC).
- GROW: If SEAL_GROW is set, the file in question cannot be increased
in size. This affects ftruncate(), fallocate() and write().
- WRITE: If SEAL_WRITE is set, no write operations (besides resizing)
are possible. This affects fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE), mmap() and
write().
- SEAL: If SEAL_SEAL is set, no further seals can be added to a file.
This basically prevents the F_ADD_SEAL operation on a file and
can be set to prevent others from adding further seals that you
don't want.
The described use-cases can easily use these seals to provide safe use
without any trust-relationship:
1) The graphics server can verify that a passed file-descriptor has
SEAL_SHRINK set. This allows safe scanout, while the client is
allowed to increase buffer size for window-resizing on-the-fly.
Concurrent writes are explicitly allowed.
2) For general-purpose IPC, both processes can verify that SEAL_SHRINK,
SEAL_GROW and SEAL_WRITE are set. This guarantees that neither
process can modify the data while the other side parses it.
Furthermore, it guarantees that even with writable FDs passed to the
peer, it cannot increase the size to hit memory-limits of the source
process (in case the file-storage is accounted to the source).
The new API is an extension to fcntl(), adding two new commands:
F_GET_SEALS: Return a bitset describing the seals on the file. This
can be called on any FD if the underlying file supports
sealing.
F_ADD_SEALS: Change the seals of a given file. This requires WRITE
access to the file and F_SEAL_SEAL may not already be set.
Furthermore, the underlying file must support sealing and
there may not be any existing shared mapping of that file.
Otherwise, EBADF/EPERM is returned.
The given seals are _added_ to the existing set of seals
on the file. You cannot remove seals again.
The fcntl() handler is currently specific to shmem and disabled on all
files. A file needs to explicitly support sealing for this interface to
work. A separate syscall is added in a follow-up, which creates files that
support sealing. There is no intention to support this on other
file-systems. Semantics are unclear for non-volatile files and we lack any
use-case right now. Therefore, the implementation is specific to shmem.
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
commit 592acbf16821288ecdc4192c47e3774a4c48bb64 upstream.
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Change-Id: Ie670aab0f8f039ba6a1b258efe1ae440e0f544d9
unshared_obb was missing from show_options
bug: 133257717
Change-Id: I1bc49d1b4098052382a518540e5965e037aa39f1
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[haggertk: Backported to 3.4
- Use capable() instead of capable_wrt_inode_uidgid()]
CVE-2018-13405
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Change-Id: I89974ab06a8ad22496031dbfd2c5106b6e64a0b8
commit bc890a60247171294acc0bd67d211fa4b88d40ba upstream.
If there is a corupted file system where the claimed depth of the
extent tree is -1, this can cause a massive buffer overrun leading to
sadness.
This addresses CVE-2018-10877.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199417
Change-Id: Ideb3241c4f53894218c6c9c810d69f47c9ebc3ae
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: return -EIO instead of -EFSCORRUPTED]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Add mount option unshared_obb to not link the obb
folders of multiple users together.
Bug: 27915347
Test: mount with option. Check if altering one obb
alters the other
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Change-Id: I3956e06bd0a222b0bbb2768c9a8a8372ada85e1e
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Android/sandbox is treated the same as Android/data
Bug: 27915347
Test: ls -l /sdcard/Android/sandbox/*somepackage* after
creating the folder.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Change-Id: I7ef440a88df72198303c419e1f2f7c4657f9c170
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit 513f86d73855ce556ea9522b6bfd79f87356dc3a upstream.
If there an inode points to a block which is also some other type of
metadata block (such as a block allocation bitmap), the
buffer_verified flag can be set when it was validated as that other
metadata block type; however, it would make a really terrible external
attribute block. The reason why we use the verified flag is to avoid
constantly reverifying the block. However, it doesn't take much
overhead to make sure the magic number of the xattr block is correct,
and this will avoid potential crashes.
This addresses CVE-2018-10879.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200001
Change-Id: Iaffaa2ad3f74b4901e456d6c560976e4ec93aa2e
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit 5369a762c882c0b6e9599e4ebbb3a9ba9eee7e2d upstream.
In theory this should have been caught earlier when the xattr list was
verified, but in case it got missed, it's simple enough to add check
to make sure we don't overrun the xattr buffer.
This addresses CVE-2018-10879.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200001
Change-Id: Ib3eef201f697e999e5ad81b40a01d878835b5847
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Add inode parameter to ext4_xattr_set_entry() and update callers
- Return -EIO instead of -EFSCORRUPTED on error
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit 5012284700775a4e6e3fbe7eac4c543c4874b559 upstream.
Commit 8844618d8aa7: "ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is
valid" will complain if block group zero does not have the
EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED flag set. Unfortunately, this is not correct,
since a freshly created file system has this flag cleared. It gets
almost immediately after the file system is mounted read-write --- but
the following somewhat unlikely sequence will end up triggering a
false positive report of a corrupted file system:
mkfs.ext4 /dev/vdc
mount -o ro /dev/vdc /vdc
mount -o remount,rw /dev/vdc
Instead, when initializing the inode table for block group zero, test
to make sure that itable_unused count is not too large, since that is
the case that will result in some or all of the reserved inodes
getting cleared.
This fixes the failures reported by Eric Whiteney when running
generic/230 and generic/231 in the the nojournal test case.
Change-Id: Ifb67311b48382988fe9f52bc8eb5bb34307dfcff
Fixes: 8844618d8aa7 ("ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid")
Reported-by: Eric Whitney <enwlinux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit 8844618d8aa7a9973e7b527d038a2a589665002c upstream.
The bg_flags field in the block group descripts is only valid if the
uninit_bg or metadata_csum feature is enabled. We were not
consistently looking at this field; fix this.
Also block group #0 must never have uninitialized allocation bitmaps,
or need to be zeroed, since that's where the root inode, and other
special inodes are set up. Check for these conditions and mark the
file system as corrupted if they are detected.
This addresses CVE-2018-10876.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199403
Change-Id: I1c6c5c8d8221c365910e67da4877484bea1c9277
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait() and ext4_read_inode_bitmap() return
a pointer (NULL on error) instead of an error code
- Open-code sb_rdonly()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Calculate and verify the checksums of extended attribute blocks. This
only applies to separate EA blocks that are pointed to by
inode->i_file_acl (i.e. external EA blocks); the checksum lives in
the EA header.
Change-Id: I8c179ce546ec90ffa0d742ade06d846efb25a426
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Compute and verify the checksum of the inode bitmap; the checkum is
stored in the block group descriptor.
Change-Id: I394b900688aa0bba7f07276a9fc13fb4ab12fe79
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
This patch introduces to ext4 the ability to calculate and verify
inode checksums. This requires the use of a new ro compatibility flag
and some accompanying e2fsprogs patches to provide the relevant
features in tune2fs and e2fsck. The inode generation changes have
been integrated into this patch.
Change-Id: I0e35a4073959b30f635571baf711e51227600713
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Calculate and verify the superblock checksum. Since the UUID and
block group number are embedded in each copy of the superblock, we
need only checksum the entire block. Refactor some of the code to
eliminate open-coding of the checksum update call.
Change-Id: If8cc4a073839a83f8262a92e3456a36c53cfaa4f
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Obtain a reference to the cryptoapi and crc32c if we mount a
filesystem with metadata checksumming enabled.
Change-Id: Iac229ed7e440367ffee400a36e05907fb5ccc241
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Define flags and change structure definitions to allow checksumming of
ext4 metadata.
Change-Id: I2ddfa486982b704fa3e55ea1749f2a29adfcf024
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit e09463f220ca9a1a1ecfda84fcda658f99a1f12a upstream.
Do not set the b_modified flag in block's journal head should not
until after we're sure that jbd2_journal_dirty_metadat() will not
abort with an error due to there not being enough space reserved in
the jbd2 handle.
Otherwise, future attempts to modify the buffer may lead a large
number of spurious errors and warnings.
This addresses CVE-2018-10883.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200071
Change-Id: Id8501e9b600fb35003f6cb9951cc187c1ad5801f
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: Drop the added logging statement, as it's on
a code path that doesn't exist here]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit c37e9e013469521d9adb932d17a1795c139b36db upstream.
If there is a directory entry pointing to a system inode (such as a
journal inode), complain and declare the file system to be corrupted.
Also, if the superblock's first inode number field is too small,
refuse to mount the file system.
This addresses CVE-2018-10882.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200069
Change-Id: I44a41a7e71a3a1ff344fb33576d2dcd77e1ee326
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit da029c11e6b12f321f36dac8771e833b65cec962 upstream.
To avoid pathological stack usage or the need to special-case setuid
execs, just limit all arg stack usage to at most 75% of _STK_LIM (6MB).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: replaced code is slightly different]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CVE-2018-14634
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Change-Id: If678301ef4bfa8f7d54716a222768ee80330b3aa
The macro hides some control flow, making it easier
to run into bugs.
bug: 111642636
Change-Id: I37ec207c277d97c4e7f1e8381bc9ae743ad78435
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
[haggertk: Port: Account for changes introduced in
"ANDROID: sdcardfs: override credential for ioctl to lower fs"]
CVE-2018-9514
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit 22be37acce25d66ecf6403fc8f44df9c5ded2372 upstream.
Currently in ext4_valid_block_bitmap() we expect the bitmap to be
positioned anywhere between 0 and s_blocksize clusters, but that's
wrong because the bitmap can be placed anywhere in the block group. This
causes false positives when validating bitmaps on perfectly valid file
system layouts. Fix it by checking whether the bitmap is within the group
boundary.
The problem can be reproduced using the following
mkfs -t ext3 -E stride=256 /dev/vdb1
mount /dev/vdb1 /mnt/test
cd /mnt/test
wget https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/linux-4.16.3.tar.xz
tar xf linux-4.16.3.tar.xz
This will result in the warnings in the logs
EXT4-fs error (device vdb1): ext4_validate_block_bitmap:399: comm tar: bg 84: block 2774529: invalid block bitmap
[ Changed slightly for clarity and to not drop a overflow test -- TYT ]
Change-Id: I273c2632a22d946ad88bee30f97eec255a885fa1
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reported-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Fixes: 7dac4a1726a9 ("ext4: add validity checks for bitmap block numbers")
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit 7dac4a1726a9c64a517d595c40e95e2d0d135f6f upstream.
An privileged attacker can cause a crash by mounting a crafted ext4
image which triggers a out-of-bounds read in the function
ext4_valid_block_bitmap() in fs/ext4/balloc.c.
This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-1093.
Change-Id: I7b3fceeae8c822b91af12ac13108e7c6d748e547
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199181
BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1560782
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- In ext4_valid_block_bitmap(), goto err_out on error
- In ext4_read_{block,inode}_bitmap(), return NULL on error
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit e674e5cbd0942b42a12106ac0be8330f4301bef4 upstream.
On a bigalloc,^flex_bg filesystem, the ext4_valid_block_bitmap
function fails to convert from blocks to clusters when spot-checking
the validity of the bitmap block that we've just read from disk. This
causes ext4 to think that the bitmap is garbage, which results in the
block group being taken offline when it's not necessary. Add in the
necessary EXT4_B2C() calls to perform the conversions.
Change-Id: I2d35b2cf655a7797ee1916c1d6ff4a93b6eae1f9
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit 8e4b5eae5decd9dfe5a4ee369c22028f90ab4c44 upstream.
If the root directory has an i_links_count of zero, then when the file
system is mounted, then when ext4_fill_super() notices the problem and
tries to call iput() the root directory in the error return path,
ext4_evict_inode() will try to free the inode on disk, before all of
the file system structures are set up, and this will result in an OOPS
caused by a NULL pointer dereference.
This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-1092.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199179https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1560777
Change-Id: I6f9180af19ceaaee76b86c27497385d94531954b
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Use EIO instead of EFSCORRUPTED
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
sdcardfs_mkdir() calls check_min_free_space(). When reserved_mb is not zero, a negative dentry will be passed to
ext4_statfs() at last and ext4_statfs() will crash. The parent dentry is positive. So we use the parent dentry to
check free space.
Change-Id: I80ab9623fe59ba911f4cc9f0e029a1c6f7ee421b
Signed-off-by: Lianjun Huang <huanglianjun@vivo.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
After d_revalidate returns 0, the vfs will call
d_invalidate, which will call d_drop itself, along
with other cleanup.
Bug: 78262592
Change-Id: Idbb30e008c05d62edf2217679cb6a5517d8d1a2c
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Bug: 77923821
Change-Id: I1705bfd146009561d2d1da5f0e6a342ec6932a1c
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
d_make_root will call iput on failure, so we
shouldn't try to do that ourselves.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Bug: 77923821
Change-Id: I1abb4afb0f894ab917b7c6be8c833676f436beb7
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
When an sdcardfs dentry is destroyed, it may not yet
have its fsdata initialized. It must be checked before
we try to access the paths in its private data.
Additionally, when cleaning up the superblock after
a failure, we don't have our sb private data, so
check for that case.
Bug: 77923821
Change-Id: I89caf6e121ed86480b42024664453fe0031bbcf3
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
page allocated in fuse_dentry_canonical_path to be handled in
fuse_dev_do_write is allocated using __get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL).
This may not return a page with data filled with 0. Now this
page may not have a null terminator at all.
If this happens and userspace fuse daemon screws up by passing a string
to kernel which is not NULL terminated (or did not fill anything),
then inside fuse driver in kernel when we try to do
strlen(fuse_dev_write->kern_path->getname_kernel)
on that page data -> it may give us issue with kernel paging request.
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address
------------[ cut here ]------------
<..>
PC is at strlen+0x10/0x90
LR is at getname_kernel+0x2c/0xf4
<..>
strlen+0x10/0x90
kern_path+0x28/0x4c
fuse_dev_do_write+0x5b8/0x694
fuse_dev_write+0x74/0x94
do_iter_readv_writev+0x80/0xb8
do_readv_writev+0xec/0x1cc
vfs_writev+0x54/0x64
SyS_writev+0x64/0xe4
el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
To avoid this we should ensure in case of FUSE_CANONICAL_PATH,
the page is null terminated.
Change-Id: I33ca7cc76b4472eaa982c67bb20685df451121f5
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@codeaurora.org>
Bug: 75984715
[Daniel - small edit, using args size ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
sdcardfs_name_match gets a 'name' argument from the underlying FS.
This need not be null terminated string.
So in sdcardfs_name_match -> qstr_case_eq -> we should use
str_n_case_eq.
This happens because few of the entries in lower level FS may not be
NULL terminated and may have some garbage characters passed while
doing sdcardfs_name_match.
For e.g.
# dmesg |grep Download
[ 103.646386] sdcardfs_name_match: q1->name=.nomedia, q1->len=8,
q2->name=Download\x17\x80\x03, q2->len=8
[ 104.021340] sdcardfs_name_match: q1->name=.nomedia, q1->len=8,
q2->name=Download\x17\x80\x03, q2->len=8
[ 105.196864] sdcardfs_name_match: q1->name=.nomedia, q1->len=8,
q2->name=Download\x17\x80\x03, q2->len=8
[ 109.113521] sdcardfs_name_match: q1->name=logs, q1->len=4,
q2->name=Download\x17\x80\x03, q2->len=8
Now when we try to create a directory with different case for a such
files. SDCARDFS creates a entry if it could not find the underlying
entry in it's dcache.
To reproduce:-
1. bootup the device wait for some time after sdcardfs mounting to
complete.
2. cd /storage/emulated/0
3. echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
4. mkdir download
We now start seeing two entries with name.
Download & download.
Change-Id: I976d92a220a607dd8cdb96c01c2041c5c2bc3326
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@codeaurora.org>
bug: 75987238
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
* This is the proper thing to do for filesystem drivers
Change-Id: I109b201d85e324cc0a72c3fcd09df4a3e1703042
Signed-off-by: Paul Keith <javelinanddart@gmail.com>
Without this patch when you delete an extension from configfs
it still exists in the hash table data structures and we are
unable to delete it or change it's group.
This happens because during deletion the key & value is taken from
extension_details, and was not properly set.
Fix it by this patch.
Change-Id: I7c20cb1ab4d99e6aceadcb5ef850f0bb47f18be8
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Bug: 73055997
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
* Samsung version G960USQU1ARBG with -lineage patches applied
Change-Id: I0432751926085aa249b377a418728854618929e5
Signed-off-by: Paul Keith <javelinanddart@gmail.com>
* It has diverged enough to add this to differentiate it
Change-Id: I5e43ee01c785acbc5292c6c115a4e083eeeb36a6
Signed-off-by: Paul Keith <javelinanddart@gmail.com>
When we call i_size_write, we must be holding i_mutex to avoid
possible lockups on 32 bit/SMP architectures. This is not
necessary on 64 bit architectures.
Change-Id: Ic3b946507c54d81b5c9046f9b57d25d4b0f9feef
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Bug: 73287721
[haggertk: Backport to 3.4. We don't have sdcardfs_write_iter()
or file_inode().]
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
David Herrmann
Al Viro
Kevin F. Haggerty
Chao Yu
Ethan Chen
Francescodario Cuzzocrea
Y-T-G
Sriram Rajagopalan
Daniel Rosenberg
Linus Torvalds
Theodore Ts'o
Darrick J. Wong
Kees Cook
Lukas Czerner
Darrick J. Wong
Lianjun Huang
Ritesh Harjani
Paul Keith