android_kernel_samsung_msm8976/fs/crypto/fname.c

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/*
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* This contains functions for filename crypto management
*
* Copyright (C) 2015, Google, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2015, Motorola Mobility
*
* Written by Uday Savagaonkar, 2014.
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* Modified by Jaegeuk Kim, 2015.
*
* This has not yet undergone a rigorous security audit.
*/
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#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
/**
* fname_crypt_complete() - completion callback for filename crypto
* @req: The asynchronous cipher request context
* @res: The result of the cipher operation
*/
static void fname_crypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int res)
{
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struct fscrypt_completion_result *ecr = req->data;
if (res == -EINPROGRESS)
return;
ecr->res = res;
complete(&ecr->completion);
}
/**
* fname_encrypt() - encrypt a filename
*
* The caller must have allocated sufficient memory for the @oname string.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
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static int fname_encrypt(struct inode *inode,
const struct qstr *iname, struct fscrypt_str *oname)
{
struct ablkcipher_request *req = NULL;
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DECLARE_FS_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr);
struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
int res = 0;
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char iv[FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE];
struct scatterlist sg;
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int padding = 4 << (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK);
unsigned int lim;
unsigned int cryptlen;
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lim = inode->i_sb->s_cop->max_namelen(inode);
if (iname->len <= 0 || iname->len > lim)
return -EIO;
/*
* Copy the filename to the output buffer for encrypting in-place and
* pad it with the needed number of NUL bytes.
*/
cryptlen = max_t(unsigned int, iname->len, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
cryptlen = round_up(cryptlen, padding);
cryptlen = min(cryptlen, lim);
memcpy(oname->name, iname->name, iname->len);
memset(oname->name + iname->len, 0, cryptlen - iname->len);
/* Initialize the IV */
memset(iv, 0, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* Set up the encryption request */
req = ablkcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
if (!req) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
"%s: ablkcipher_request_alloc() failed\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ablkcipher_request_set_callback(req,
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
fname_crypt_complete, &ecr);
sg_init_one(&sg, oname->name, cryptlen);
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, cryptlen, iv);
/* Do the encryption */
res = crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(req);
if (res == -EINPROGRESS || res == -EBUSY) {
/* Request is being completed asynchronously; wait for it */
wait_for_completion(&ecr.completion);
res = ecr.res;
}
ablkcipher_request_free(req);
if (res < 0) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
"%s: Error (error code %d)\n", __func__, res);
return res;
}
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oname->len = cryptlen;
return 0;
}
/**
* fname_decrypt() - decrypt a filename
*
* The caller must have allocated sufficient memory for the @oname string.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
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static int fname_decrypt(struct inode *inode,
const struct fscrypt_str *iname,
struct fscrypt_str *oname)
{
struct ablkcipher_request *req = NULL;
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DECLARE_FS_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr);
struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
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struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
struct crypto_ablkcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
int res = 0;
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char iv[FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned lim;
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lim = inode->i_sb->s_cop->max_namelen(inode);
if (iname->len <= 0 || iname->len > lim)
return -EIO;
/* Allocate request */
req = ablkcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
if (!req) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
"%s: crypto_request_alloc() failed\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ablkcipher_request_set_callback(req,
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
fname_crypt_complete, &ecr);
/* Initialize IV */
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memset(iv, 0, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* Create decryption request */
sg_init_one(&src_sg, iname->name, iname->len);
sg_init_one(&dst_sg, oname->name, oname->len);
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, iname->len, iv);
res = crypto_ablkcipher_decrypt(req);
if (res == -EINPROGRESS || res == -EBUSY) {
wait_for_completion(&ecr.completion);
res = ecr.res;
}
ablkcipher_request_free(req);
if (res < 0) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
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"%s: Error (error code %d)\n", __func__, res);
return res;
}
oname->len = strnlen(oname->name, iname->len);
return 0;
}
static const char *lookup_table =
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+,";
/**
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* digest_encode() -
*
* Encodes the input digest using characters from the set [a-zA-Z0-9_+].
* The encoded string is roughly 4/3 times the size of the input string.
*/
static int digest_encode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
{
int i = 0, bits = 0, ac = 0;
char *cp = dst;
while (i < len) {
ac += (((unsigned char) src[i]) << bits);
bits += 8;
do {
*cp++ = lookup_table[ac & 0x3f];
ac >>= 6;
bits -= 6;
} while (bits >= 6);
i++;
}
if (bits)
*cp++ = lookup_table[ac & 0x3f];
return cp - dst;
}
static int digest_decode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
{
int i = 0, bits = 0, ac = 0;
const char *p;
char *cp = dst;
while (i < len) {
p = strchr(lookup_table, src[i]);
if (p == NULL || src[i] == 0)
return -2;
ac += (p - lookup_table) << bits;
bits += 6;
if (bits >= 8) {
*cp++ = ac & 0xff;
ac >>= 8;
bits -= 8;
}
i++;
}
if (ac)
return -1;
return cp - dst;
}
u32 fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const struct inode *inode, u32 ilen)
{
int padding = 32;
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struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
if (ci)
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padding = 4 << (ci->ci_flags & FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK);
ilen = max(ilen, (u32)FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
return round_up(ilen, padding);
}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size);
/**
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* fscrypt_fname_crypto_alloc_obuff() -
*
* Allocates an output buffer that is sufficient for the crypto operation
* specified by the context and the direction.
*/
int fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(const struct inode *inode,
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u32 ilen, struct fscrypt_str *crypto_str)
{
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unsigned int olen = fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(inode, ilen);
crypto_str->len = olen;
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if (olen < FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE * 2)
olen = FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE * 2;
/*
* Allocated buffer can hold one more character to null-terminate the
* string
*/
crypto_str->name = kmalloc(olen + 1, GFP_NOFS);
if (!(crypto_str->name))
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer);
/**
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* fscrypt_fname_crypto_free_buffer() -
*
* Frees the buffer allocated for crypto operation.
*/
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void fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(struct fscrypt_str *crypto_str)
{
if (!crypto_str)
return;
kfree(crypto_str->name);
crypto_str->name = NULL;
}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_free_buffer);
/**
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* fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr() - converts a filename from disk space to user
* space
*
* The caller must have allocated sufficient memory for the @oname string.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
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int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(struct inode *inode,
u32 hash, u32 minor_hash,
const struct fscrypt_str *iname,
struct fscrypt_str *oname)
{
const struct qstr qname = FSTR_TO_QSTR(iname);
char buf[24];
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if (fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(&qname)) {
oname->name[0] = '.';
oname->name[iname->len - 1] = '.';
oname->len = iname->len;
return 0;
}
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if (iname->len < FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE)
return -EUCLEAN;
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if (inode->i_crypt_info)
return fname_decrypt(inode, iname, oname);
if (iname->len <= FS_FNAME_CRYPTO_DIGEST_SIZE) {
oname->len = digest_encode(iname->name, iname->len,
oname->name);
return 0;
}
if (hash) {
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memcpy(buf, &hash, 4);
memcpy(buf + 4, &minor_hash, 4);
} else {
memset(buf, 0, 8);
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}
memcpy(buf + 8, iname->name + iname->len - 16, 16);
oname->name[0] = '_';
oname->len = 1 + digest_encode(buf, 24, oname->name + 1);
return 0;
}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr);
/**
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* fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk() - converts a filename from user space to disk
* space
*
* The caller must have allocated sufficient memory for the @oname string.
*
* Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure
*/
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int fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk(struct inode *inode,
const struct qstr *iname,
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struct fscrypt_str *oname)
{
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if (fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(iname)) {
oname->name[0] = '.';
oname->name[iname->len - 1] = '.';
oname->len = iname->len;
return 0;
}
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if (inode->i_crypt_info)
return fname_encrypt(inode, iname, oname);
/*
* Without a proper key, a user is not allowed to modify the filenames
* in a directory. Consequently, a user space name cannot be mapped to
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* a disk-space name
*/
return -ENOKEY;
}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk);
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int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,
int lookup, struct fscrypt_name *fname)
{
int ret = 0, bigname = 0;
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memset(fname, 0, sizeof(struct fscrypt_name));
fname->usr_fname = iname;
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if (!dir->i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted(dir) ||
fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot(iname)) {
fname->disk_name.name = (unsigned char *)iname->name;
fname->disk_name.len = iname->len;
return 0;
}
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become "locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently. This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse. This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead, an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely. This change is not expected to break any applications. In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations --- waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations, and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed. This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them. Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode") Change-Id: Ic805c3b7cd391aedef3495214057fc1ca64b9acf Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
2017-02-21 23:07:11 +00:00
ret = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(dir);
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if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
return ret;
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if (dir->i_crypt_info) {
ret = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(dir, iname->len,
&fname->crypto_buf);
if (ret)
return ret;
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ret = fname_encrypt(dir, iname, &fname->crypto_buf);
if (ret)
goto errout;
fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
return 0;
}
if (!lookup)
return -ENOKEY;
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/*
* We don't have the key and we are doing a lookup; decode the
* user-supplied name
*/
if (iname->name[0] == '_')
bigname = 1;
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if ((bigname && (iname->len != 33)) || (!bigname && (iname->len > 43)))
return -ENOENT;
fname->crypto_buf.name = kmalloc(32, GFP_KERNEL);
if (fname->crypto_buf.name == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
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ret = digest_decode(iname->name + bigname, iname->len - bigname,
fname->crypto_buf.name);
if (ret < 0) {
ret = -ENOENT;
goto errout;
}
fname->crypto_buf.len = ret;
if (bigname) {
memcpy(&fname->hash, fname->crypto_buf.name, 4);
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memcpy(&fname->minor_hash, fname->crypto_buf.name + 4, 4);
} else {
fname->disk_name.name = fname->crypto_buf.name;
fname->disk_name.len = fname->crypto_buf.len;
}
return 0;
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errout:
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fscrypt_fname_free_buffer(&fname->crypto_buf);
return ret;
}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_setup_filename);
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void fscrypt_free_filename(struct fscrypt_name *fname)
{
kfree(fname->crypto_buf.name);
fname->crypto_buf.name = NULL;
fname->usr_fname = NULL;
fname->disk_name.name = NULL;
}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_free_filename);