2007-02-14 08:34:12 +00:00
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/*
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* /proc/sys support
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*/
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#include <linux/sysctl.h>
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#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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static struct dentry_operations proc_sys_dentry_operations;
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static const struct file_operations proc_sys_file_operations;
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2008-02-08 12:21:19 +00:00
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static const struct inode_operations proc_sys_inode_operations;
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2007-02-14 08:34:12 +00:00
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static void proc_sys_refresh_inode(struct inode *inode, struct ctl_table *table)
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{
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/* Refresh the cached information bits in the inode */
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if (table) {
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inode->i_uid = 0;
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inode->i_gid = 0;
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inode->i_mode = table->mode;
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if (table->proc_handler) {
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inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
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inode->i_nlink = 1;
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} else {
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inode->i_mode |= S_IFDIR;
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inode->i_nlink = 0; /* It is too hard to figure out */
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}
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}
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}
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static struct inode *proc_sys_make_inode(struct inode *dir, struct ctl_table *table)
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{
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struct inode *inode;
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struct proc_inode *dir_ei, *ei;
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int depth;
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inode = new_inode(dir->i_sb);
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if (!inode)
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goto out;
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/* A directory is always one deeper than it's parent */
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dir_ei = PROC_I(dir);
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depth = dir_ei->fd + 1;
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ei = PROC_I(inode);
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ei->fd = depth;
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inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
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inode->i_op = &proc_sys_inode_operations;
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inode->i_fop = &proc_sys_file_operations;
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2007-02-14 08:34:16 +00:00
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inode->i_flags |= S_PRIVATE; /* tell selinux to ignore this inode */
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2007-02-14 08:34:12 +00:00
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proc_sys_refresh_inode(inode, table);
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out:
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return inode;
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}
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static struct dentry *proc_sys_ancestor(struct dentry *dentry, int depth)
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{
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for (;;) {
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struct proc_inode *ei;
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ei = PROC_I(dentry->d_inode);
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if (ei->fd == depth)
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break; /* found */
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dentry = dentry->d_parent;
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}
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return dentry;
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}
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static struct ctl_table *proc_sys_lookup_table_one(struct ctl_table *table,
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struct qstr *name)
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{
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int len;
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for ( ; table->ctl_name || table->procname; table++) {
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if (!table->procname)
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continue;
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len = strlen(table->procname);
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if (len != name->len)
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continue;
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if (memcmp(table->procname, name->name, len) != 0)
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continue;
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/* I have a match */
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return table;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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static struct ctl_table *proc_sys_lookup_table(struct dentry *dentry,
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struct ctl_table *table)
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{
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struct dentry *ancestor;
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struct proc_inode *ei;
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int depth, i;
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ei = PROC_I(dentry->d_inode);
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depth = ei->fd;
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if (depth == 0)
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return table;
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for (i = 1; table && (i <= depth); i++) {
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ancestor = proc_sys_ancestor(dentry, i);
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table = proc_sys_lookup_table_one(table, &ancestor->d_name);
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if (table)
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table = table->child;
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}
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return table;
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}
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static struct ctl_table *proc_sys_lookup_entry(struct dentry *dparent,
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struct qstr *name,
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struct ctl_table *table)
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{
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table = proc_sys_lookup_table(dparent, table);
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if (table)
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table = proc_sys_lookup_table_one(table, name);
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return table;
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}
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static struct ctl_table *do_proc_sys_lookup(struct dentry *parent,
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struct qstr *name,
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struct ctl_table_header **ptr)
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{
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struct ctl_table_header *head;
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struct ctl_table *table = NULL;
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for (head = sysctl_head_next(NULL); head;
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head = sysctl_head_next(head)) {
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table = proc_sys_lookup_entry(parent, name, head->ctl_table);
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if (table)
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break;
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}
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*ptr = head;
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return table;
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}
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static struct dentry *proc_sys_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
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struct nameidata *nd)
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{
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struct ctl_table_header *head;
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struct inode *inode;
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struct dentry *err;
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struct ctl_table *table;
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err = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
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table = do_proc_sys_lookup(dentry->d_parent, &dentry->d_name, &head);
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if (!table)
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goto out;
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err = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
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inode = proc_sys_make_inode(dir, table);
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if (!inode)
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goto out;
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err = NULL;
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dentry->d_op = &proc_sys_dentry_operations;
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d_add(dentry, inode);
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out:
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sysctl_head_finish(head);
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return err;
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}
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sysctl: merge equal proc_sys_read and proc_sys_write
Many (most of) sysctls do not have a per-container sense. E.g.
kernel.print_fatal_signals, vm.panic_on_oom, net.core.netdev_budget and so on
and so forth. Besides, tuning then from inside a container is not even
secure. On the other hand, hiding them completely from the container's tasks
sometimes causes user-space to stop working.
When developing net sysctl, the common practice was to duplicate a table and
drop the write bits in table->mode, but this approach was not very elegant,
lead to excessive memory consumption and was not suitable in general.
Here's the alternative solution. To facilitate the per-container sysctls
ctl_table_root-s were introduced. Each root contains a list of
ctl_table_header-s that are visible to different namespaces. The idea of this
set is to add the permissions() callback on the ctl_table_root to allow ctl
root limit permissions to the same ctl_table-s.
The main user of this functionality is the net-namespaces code, but later this
will (should) be used by more and more namespaces, containers and control
groups.
Actually, this idea's core is in a single hunk in the third patch. First two
patches are cleanups for sysctl code, while the third one mostly extends the
arguments set of some sysctl functions.
This patch:
These ->read and ->write callbacks act in a very similar way, so merge these
paths to reduce the number of places to patch later and shrink the .text size
(a bit).
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:02:40 +00:00
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static ssize_t proc_sys_call_handler(struct file *filp, void __user *buf,
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size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int write)
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2007-02-14 08:34:12 +00:00
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{
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struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_dentry;
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struct ctl_table_header *head;
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struct ctl_table *table;
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2007-10-25 14:27:40 +00:00
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ssize_t error;
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size_t res;
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2007-02-14 08:34:12 +00:00
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table = do_proc_sys_lookup(dentry->d_parent, &dentry->d_name, &head);
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/* Has the sysctl entry disappeared on us? */
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error = -ENOENT;
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if (!table)
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goto out;
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/* Has the sysctl entry been replaced by a directory? */
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error = -EISDIR;
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if (!table->proc_handler)
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goto out;
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/*
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* At this point we know that the sysctl was not unregistered
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* and won't be until we finish.
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*/
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error = -EPERM;
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sysctl: merge equal proc_sys_read and proc_sys_write
Many (most of) sysctls do not have a per-container sense. E.g.
kernel.print_fatal_signals, vm.panic_on_oom, net.core.netdev_budget and so on
and so forth. Besides, tuning then from inside a container is not even
secure. On the other hand, hiding them completely from the container's tasks
sometimes causes user-space to stop working.
When developing net sysctl, the common practice was to duplicate a table and
drop the write bits in table->mode, but this approach was not very elegant,
lead to excessive memory consumption and was not suitable in general.
Here's the alternative solution. To facilitate the per-container sysctls
ctl_table_root-s were introduced. Each root contains a list of
ctl_table_header-s that are visible to different namespaces. The idea of this
set is to add the permissions() callback on the ctl_table_root to allow ctl
root limit permissions to the same ctl_table-s.
The main user of this functionality is the net-namespaces code, but later this
will (should) be used by more and more namespaces, containers and control
groups.
Actually, this idea's core is in a single hunk in the third patch. First two
patches are cleanups for sysctl code, while the third one mostly extends the
arguments set of some sysctl functions.
This patch:
These ->read and ->write callbacks act in a very similar way, so merge these
paths to reduce the number of places to patch later and shrink the .text size
(a bit).
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:02:40 +00:00
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if (sysctl_perm(table, write ? MAY_WRITE : MAY_READ))
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2007-02-14 08:34:12 +00:00
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goto out;
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/* careful: calling conventions are nasty here */
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res = count;
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sysctl: merge equal proc_sys_read and proc_sys_write
Many (most of) sysctls do not have a per-container sense. E.g.
kernel.print_fatal_signals, vm.panic_on_oom, net.core.netdev_budget and so on
and so forth. Besides, tuning then from inside a container is not even
secure. On the other hand, hiding them completely from the container's tasks
sometimes causes user-space to stop working.
When developing net sysctl, the common practice was to duplicate a table and
drop the write bits in table->mode, but this approach was not very elegant,
lead to excessive memory consumption and was not suitable in general.
Here's the alternative solution. To facilitate the per-container sysctls
ctl_table_root-s were introduced. Each root contains a list of
ctl_table_header-s that are visible to different namespaces. The idea of this
set is to add the permissions() callback on the ctl_table_root to allow ctl
root limit permissions to the same ctl_table-s.
The main user of this functionality is the net-namespaces code, but later this
will (should) be used by more and more namespaces, containers and control
groups.
Actually, this idea's core is in a single hunk in the third patch. First two
patches are cleanups for sysctl code, while the third one mostly extends the
arguments set of some sysctl functions.
This patch:
These ->read and ->write callbacks act in a very similar way, so merge these
paths to reduce the number of places to patch later and shrink the .text size
(a bit).
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:02:40 +00:00
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error = table->proc_handler(table, write, filp, buf, &res, ppos);
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2007-02-14 08:34:12 +00:00
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if (!error)
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error = res;
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out:
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sysctl_head_finish(head);
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return error;
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}
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|
sysctl: merge equal proc_sys_read and proc_sys_write
Many (most of) sysctls do not have a per-container sense. E.g.
kernel.print_fatal_signals, vm.panic_on_oom, net.core.netdev_budget and so on
and so forth. Besides, tuning then from inside a container is not even
secure. On the other hand, hiding them completely from the container's tasks
sometimes causes user-space to stop working.
When developing net sysctl, the common practice was to duplicate a table and
drop the write bits in table->mode, but this approach was not very elegant,
lead to excessive memory consumption and was not suitable in general.
Here's the alternative solution. To facilitate the per-container sysctls
ctl_table_root-s were introduced. Each root contains a list of
ctl_table_header-s that are visible to different namespaces. The idea of this
set is to add the permissions() callback on the ctl_table_root to allow ctl
root limit permissions to the same ctl_table-s.
The main user of this functionality is the net-namespaces code, but later this
will (should) be used by more and more namespaces, containers and control
groups.
Actually, this idea's core is in a single hunk in the third patch. First two
patches are cleanups for sysctl code, while the third one mostly extends the
arguments set of some sysctl functions.
This patch:
These ->read and ->write callbacks act in a very similar way, so merge these
paths to reduce the number of places to patch later and shrink the .text size
(a bit).
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:02:40 +00:00
|
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static ssize_t proc_sys_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
|
2007-02-14 08:34:12 +00:00
|
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size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
sysctl: merge equal proc_sys_read and proc_sys_write
Many (most of) sysctls do not have a per-container sense. E.g.
kernel.print_fatal_signals, vm.panic_on_oom, net.core.netdev_budget and so on
and so forth. Besides, tuning then from inside a container is not even
secure. On the other hand, hiding them completely from the container's tasks
sometimes causes user-space to stop working.
When developing net sysctl, the common practice was to duplicate a table and
drop the write bits in table->mode, but this approach was not very elegant,
lead to excessive memory consumption and was not suitable in general.
Here's the alternative solution. To facilitate the per-container sysctls
ctl_table_root-s were introduced. Each root contains a list of
ctl_table_header-s that are visible to different namespaces. The idea of this
set is to add the permissions() callback on the ctl_table_root to allow ctl
root limit permissions to the same ctl_table-s.
The main user of this functionality is the net-namespaces code, but later this
will (should) be used by more and more namespaces, containers and control
groups.
Actually, this idea's core is in a single hunk in the third patch. First two
patches are cleanups for sysctl code, while the third one mostly extends the
arguments set of some sysctl functions.
This patch:
These ->read and ->write callbacks act in a very similar way, so merge these
paths to reduce the number of places to patch later and shrink the .text size
(a bit).
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:02:40 +00:00
|
|
|
return proc_sys_call_handler(filp, (void __user *)buf, count, ppos, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-02-14 08:34:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
sysctl: merge equal proc_sys_read and proc_sys_write
Many (most of) sysctls do not have a per-container sense. E.g.
kernel.print_fatal_signals, vm.panic_on_oom, net.core.netdev_budget and so on
and so forth. Besides, tuning then from inside a container is not even
secure. On the other hand, hiding them completely from the container's tasks
sometimes causes user-space to stop working.
When developing net sysctl, the common practice was to duplicate a table and
drop the write bits in table->mode, but this approach was not very elegant,
lead to excessive memory consumption and was not suitable in general.
Here's the alternative solution. To facilitate the per-container sysctls
ctl_table_root-s were introduced. Each root contains a list of
ctl_table_header-s that are visible to different namespaces. The idea of this
set is to add the permissions() callback on the ctl_table_root to allow ctl
root limit permissions to the same ctl_table-s.
The main user of this functionality is the net-namespaces code, but later this
will (should) be used by more and more namespaces, containers and control
groups.
Actually, this idea's core is in a single hunk in the third patch. First two
patches are cleanups for sysctl code, while the third one mostly extends the
arguments set of some sysctl functions.
This patch:
These ->read and ->write callbacks act in a very similar way, so merge these
paths to reduce the number of places to patch later and shrink the .text size
(a bit).
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Cc: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-29 08:02:40 +00:00
|
|
|
static ssize_t proc_sys_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
|
|
|
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return proc_sys_call_handler(filp, (void __user *)buf, count, ppos, 1);
|
2007-02-14 08:34:12 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int proc_sys_fill_cache(struct file *filp, void *dirent,
|
|
|
|
filldir_t filldir, struct ctl_table *table)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table_header *head;
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table *child_table = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *child, *dir = filp->f_path.dentry;
|
|
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
|
|
|
struct qstr qname;
|
|
|
|
ino_t ino = 0;
|
|
|
|
unsigned type = DT_UNKNOWN;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
qname.name = table->procname;
|
|
|
|
qname.len = strlen(table->procname);
|
|
|
|
qname.hash = full_name_hash(qname.name, qname.len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Suppress duplicates.
|
|
|
|
* Only fill a directory entry if it is the value that
|
|
|
|
* an ordinary lookup of that name returns. Hide all
|
|
|
|
* others.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If we ever cache this translation in the dcache
|
|
|
|
* I should do a dcache lookup first. But for now
|
|
|
|
* it is just simpler not to.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
child_table = do_proc_sys_lookup(dir, &qname, &head);
|
|
|
|
sysctl_head_finish(head);
|
|
|
|
if (child_table != table)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
child = d_lookup(dir, &qname);
|
|
|
|
if (!child) {
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *new;
|
|
|
|
new = d_alloc(dir, &qname);
|
|
|
|
if (new) {
|
|
|
|
inode = proc_sys_make_inode(dir->d_inode, table);
|
|
|
|
if (!inode)
|
|
|
|
child = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
new->d_op = &proc_sys_dentry_operations;
|
|
|
|
d_add(new, inode);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (child)
|
|
|
|
dput(new);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
child = new;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!child || IS_ERR(child) || !child->d_inode)
|
|
|
|
goto end_instantiate;
|
|
|
|
inode = child->d_inode;
|
|
|
|
if (inode) {
|
|
|
|
ino = inode->i_ino;
|
|
|
|
type = inode->i_mode >> 12;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dput(child);
|
|
|
|
end_instantiate:
|
|
|
|
if (!ino)
|
|
|
|
ino= find_inode_number(dir, &qname);
|
|
|
|
if (!ino)
|
|
|
|
ino = 1;
|
|
|
|
return filldir(dirent, qname.name, qname.len, filp->f_pos, ino, type);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int proc_sys_readdir(struct file *filp, void *dirent, filldir_t filldir)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_dentry;
|
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table_header *head = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table *table;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long pos;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -ENOTDIR;
|
|
|
|
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Avoid a switch here: arm builds fail with missing __cmpdi2 */
|
|
|
|
if (filp->f_pos == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (filldir(dirent, ".", 1, filp->f_pos,
|
|
|
|
inode->i_ino, DT_DIR) < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
filp->f_pos++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (filp->f_pos == 1) {
|
|
|
|
if (filldir(dirent, "..", 2, filp->f_pos,
|
|
|
|
parent_ino(dentry), DT_DIR) < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
filp->f_pos++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pos = 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* - Find each instance of the directory
|
|
|
|
* - Read all entries in each instance
|
|
|
|
* - Before returning an entry to user space lookup the entry
|
|
|
|
* by name and if I find a different entry don't return
|
|
|
|
* this one because it means it is a buried dup.
|
|
|
|
* For sysctl this should only happen for directory entries.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for (head = sysctl_head_next(NULL); head; head = sysctl_head_next(head)) {
|
|
|
|
table = proc_sys_lookup_table(dentry, head->ctl_table);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!table)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (; table->ctl_name || table->procname; table++, pos++) {
|
|
|
|
/* Can't do anything without a proc name */
|
|
|
|
if (!table->procname)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pos < filp->f_pos)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (proc_sys_fill_cache(filp, dirent, filldir, table) < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
filp->f_pos = pos + 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
sysctl_head_finish(head);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* sysctl entries that are not writeable,
|
|
|
|
* are _NOT_ writeable, capabilities or not.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table_header *head;
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table *table;
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *dentry;
|
|
|
|
int mode;
|
|
|
|
int depth;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
head = NULL;
|
|
|
|
depth = PROC_I(inode)->fd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* First check the cached permissions, in case we don't have
|
|
|
|
* enough information to lookup the sysctl table entry.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
error = -EACCES;
|
|
|
|
mode = inode->i_mode;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (current->euid == 0)
|
|
|
|
mode >>= 6;
|
|
|
|
else if (in_group_p(0))
|
|
|
|
mode >>= 3;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((mode & mask & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC)) == mask)
|
|
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we can't get a sysctl table entry the permission
|
|
|
|
* checks on the cached mode will have to be enough.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!nd || !depth)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-15 03:34:32 +00:00
|
|
|
dentry = nd->path.dentry;
|
2007-02-14 08:34:12 +00:00
|
|
|
table = do_proc_sys_lookup(dentry->d_parent, &dentry->d_name, &head);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the entry does not exist deny permission */
|
|
|
|
error = -EACCES;
|
|
|
|
if (!table)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Use the permissions on the sysctl table entry */
|
|
|
|
error = sysctl_perm(table, mask);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
sysctl_head_finish(head);
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int proc_sys_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (attr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
|
2007-05-08 07:29:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!error)
|
|
|
|
error = inode_setattr(inode, attr);
|
2007-02-14 08:34:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* I'm lazy and don't distinguish between files and directories,
|
|
|
|
* until access time.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations proc_sys_file_operations = {
|
|
|
|
.read = proc_sys_read,
|
|
|
|
.write = proc_sys_write,
|
|
|
|
.readdir = proc_sys_readdir,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-08 12:21:19 +00:00
|
|
|
static const struct inode_operations proc_sys_inode_operations = {
|
2007-02-14 08:34:12 +00:00
|
|
|
.lookup = proc_sys_lookup,
|
|
|
|
.permission = proc_sys_permission,
|
|
|
|
.setattr = proc_sys_setattr,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int proc_sys_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table_header *head;
|
|
|
|
struct ctl_table *table;
|
|
|
|
table = do_proc_sys_lookup(dentry->d_parent, &dentry->d_name, &head);
|
|
|
|
proc_sys_refresh_inode(dentry->d_inode, table);
|
|
|
|
sysctl_head_finish(head);
|
|
|
|
return !!table;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct dentry_operations proc_sys_dentry_operations = {
|
|
|
|
.d_revalidate = proc_sys_revalidate,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct proc_dir_entry *proc_sys_root;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int proc_sys_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
proc_sys_root = proc_mkdir("sys", NULL);
|
|
|
|
proc_sys_root->proc_iops = &proc_sys_inode_operations;
|
|
|
|
proc_sys_root->proc_fops = &proc_sys_file_operations;
|
|
|
|
proc_sys_root->nlink = 0;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|