diff --git a/Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.txt b/Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.txt
index 7f531ad83285..d86adcdae420 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.txt
+++ b/Documentation/networking/dns_resolver.txt
@@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ implemented in the module can be called after doing:
      If _expiry is non-NULL, the expiry time (TTL) of the result will be
      returned also.
 
+The kernel maintains an internal keyring in which it caches looked up keys.
+This can be cleared by any process that has the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability by
+the use of KEYCTL_KEYRING_CLEAR on the keyring ID.
+
 
 ===============================
 READING DNS KEYS FROM USERSPACE
diff --git a/Documentation/security/00-INDEX b/Documentation/security/00-INDEX
index 99b85d39751c..eeed1de546d4 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/00-INDEX
+++ b/Documentation/security/00-INDEX
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ SELinux.txt
 	- how to get started with the SELinux security enhancement.
 Smack.txt
 	- documentation on the Smack Linux Security Module.
+Yama.txt
+	- documentation on the Yama Linux Security Module.
 apparmor.txt
 	- documentation on the AppArmor security extension.
 credentials.txt
diff --git a/Documentation/security/Yama.txt b/Documentation/security/Yama.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a9511f179069
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/security/Yama.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+Yama is a Linux Security Module that collects a number of system-wide DAC
+security protections that are not handled by the core kernel itself. To
+select it at boot time, specify "security=yama" (though this will disable
+any other LSM).
+
+Yama is controlled through sysctl in /proc/sys/kernel/yama:
+
+- ptrace_scope
+
+==============================================================
+
+ptrace_scope:
+
+As Linux grows in popularity, it will become a larger target for
+malware. One particularly troubling weakness of the Linux process
+interfaces is that a single user is able to examine the memory and
+running state of any of their processes. For example, if one application
+(e.g. Pidgin) was compromised, it would be possible for an attacker to
+attach to other running processes (e.g. Firefox, SSH sessions, GPG agent,
+etc) to extract additional credentials and continue to expand the scope
+of their attack without resorting to user-assisted phishing.
+
+This is not a theoretical problem. SSH session hijacking
+(http://www.storm.net.nz/projects/7) and arbitrary code injection
+(http://c-skills.blogspot.com/2007/05/injectso.html) attacks already
+exist and remain possible if ptrace is allowed to operate as before.
+Since ptrace is not commonly used by non-developers and non-admins, system
+builders should be allowed the option to disable this debugging system.
+
+For a solution, some applications use prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, ...) to
+specifically disallow such ptrace attachment (e.g. ssh-agent), but many
+do not. A more general solution is to only allow ptrace directly from a
+parent to a child process (i.e. direct "gdb EXE" and "strace EXE" still
+work), or with CAP_SYS_PTRACE (i.e. "gdb --pid=PID", and "strace -p PID"
+still work as root).
+
+For software that has defined application-specific relationships
+between a debugging process and its inferior (crash handlers, etc),
+prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, pid, ...) can be used. An inferior can declare which
+other process (and its descendents) are allowed to call PTRACE_ATTACH
+against it. Only one such declared debugging process can exists for
+each inferior at a time. For example, this is used by KDE, Chromium, and
+Firefox's crash handlers, and by Wine for allowing only Wine processes
+to ptrace each other. If a process wishes to entirely disable these ptrace
+restrictions, it can call prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY, ...)
+so that any otherwise allowed process (even those in external pid namespaces)
+may attach.
+
+The sysctl settings are:
+
+0 - classic ptrace permissions: a process can PTRACE_ATTACH to any other
+    process running under the same uid, as long as it is dumpable (i.e.
+    did not transition uids, start privileged, or have called
+    prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE...) already).
+
+1 - restricted ptrace: a process must have a predefined relationship
+    with the inferior it wants to call PTRACE_ATTACH on. By default,
+    this relationship is that of only its descendants when the above
+    classic criteria is also met. To change the relationship, an
+    inferior can call prctl(PR_SET_PTRACER, debugger, ...) to declare
+    an allowed debugger PID to call PTRACE_ATTACH on the inferior.
+
+The original children-only logic was based on the restrictions in grsecurity.
+
+==============================================================
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
index fcbe7a703405..787717091421 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
@@ -554,6 +554,10 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
      process must have write permission on the keyring, and it must be a
      keyring (or else error ENOTDIR will result).
 
+     This function can also be used to clear special kernel keyrings if they
+     are appropriately marked if the user has CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability.  The
+     DNS resolver cache keyring is an example of this.
+
 
  (*) Link a key into a keyring:
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
index 7fc75e47e6d0..a048199ce866 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
 menuconfig TCG_TPM
 	tristate "TPM Hardware Support"
 	depends on HAS_IOMEM
-	depends on EXPERIMENTAL
 	select SECURITYFS
 	---help---
 	  If you have a TPM security chip in your system, which
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index 32362cf35b8d..ad7c7320dd1b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -1221,12 +1221,13 @@ ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	ret_size = atomic_read(&chip->data_pending);
 	atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
 	if (ret_size > 0) {	/* relay data */
+		ssize_t orig_ret_size = ret_size;
 		if (size < ret_size)
 			ret_size = size;
 
 		mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
 		rc = copy_to_user(buf, chip->data_buffer, ret_size);
-		memset(chip->data_buffer, 0, ret_size);
+		memset(chip->data_buffer, 0, orig_ret_size);
 		if (rc)
 			ret_size = -EFAULT;
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 010547138281..b1c5280ac159 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ struct tpm_vendor_specific {
 	wait_queue_head_t int_queue;
 };
 
+#define TPM_VID_INTEL    0x8086
+
 struct tpm_chip {
 	struct device *dev;	/* Device stuff */
 
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
index 70fac9abb0e2..d2a70cae76df 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c
@@ -367,7 +367,12 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf1
 	};
 	size_t len = sizeof(cmd_getticks);
-	int rem_itpm = itpm;
+	bool rem_itpm = itpm;
+	u16 vendor = ioread16(chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_DID_VID(0));
+
+	/* probe only iTPMS */
+	if (vendor != TPM_VID_INTEL)
+		return 0;
 
 	itpm = 0;
 
@@ -390,9 +395,6 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip)
 out:
 	itpm = rem_itpm;
 	tpm_tis_ready(chip);
-	/* some TPMs need a break here otherwise they will not work
-	 * correctly on the immediately subsequent command */
-	msleep(chip->vendor.timeout_b);
 	release_locality(chip, chip->vendor.locality, 0);
 
 	return rc;
@@ -508,7 +510,7 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, resource_size_t start,
 			resource_size_t len, unsigned int irq)
 {
 	u32 vendor, intfcaps, intmask;
-	int rc, i, irq_s, irq_e;
+	int rc, i, irq_s, irq_e, probe;
 	struct tpm_chip *chip;
 
 	if (!(chip = tpm_register_hardware(dev, &tpm_tis)))
@@ -538,11 +540,12 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, resource_size_t start,
 		 vendor >> 16, ioread8(chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_RID(0)));
 
 	if (!itpm) {
-		itpm = probe_itpm(chip);
-		if (itpm < 0) {
+		probe = probe_itpm(chip);
+		if (probe < 0) {
 			rc = -ENODEV;
 			goto out_err;
 		}
+		itpm = (probe == 0) ? 0 : 1;
 	}
 
 	if (itpm)
diff --git a/drivers/net/macvtap.c b/drivers/net/macvtap.c
index 58dc117a8d78..0427c6561c84 100644
--- a/drivers/net/macvtap.c
+++ b/drivers/net/macvtap.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/wait.h>
 #include <linux/cdev.h>
+#include <linux/idr.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
index 501b27c18145..1c6f700f5faa 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/completion.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/idr.h>
 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
 #include <scsi/scsi_device.h>
 #include <scsi/iscsi_proto.h>
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c
index 38cb7ce8469e..1ee33a8c3fab 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/idr.h>
 #include <scsi/iscsi_proto.h>
 #include <target/target_core_base.h>
 #include <target/target_core_fabric.h>
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
index c1b254487388..3cc1b251ca08 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
@@ -556,6 +556,7 @@ init_cifs_idmap(void)
 
 	/* instruct request_key() to use this special keyring as a cache for
 	 * the results it looks up */
+	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR, &keyring->flags);
 	cred->thread_keyring = keyring;
 	cred->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
 	root_cred = cred;
diff --git a/fs/nfs/client.c b/fs/nfs/client.c
index 31778f74357d..d4f772ebd1ef 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/client.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/client.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include <linux/inet.h>
 #include <linux/in6.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/idr.h>
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/nfs_xdr.h>
 #include <linux/sunrpc/bc_xprt.h>
diff --git a/fs/nfs/idmap.c b/fs/nfs/idmap.c
index 2c05f1991e1e..a1bbf7780dfc 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/idmap.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/idmap.c
@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ int nfs_idmap_init(void)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto failed_put_key;
 
+	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR, &keyring->flags);
 	cred->thread_keyring = keyring;
 	cred->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
 	id_resolver_cache = cred;
diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
index a6b62173d4c3..67bbf6e4e197 100644
--- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
+++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@
 #include <linux/poll.h>
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 static const struct dentry_operations proc_sys_dentry_operations;
diff --git a/fs/quota/dquot.c b/fs/quota/dquot.c
index 46741970371b..8b4f12b33f57 100644
--- a/fs/quota/dquot.c
+++ b/fs/quota/dquot.c
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/kmod.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
index 6277ec6cb60a..d90e900a8a0e 100644
--- a/fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/super.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
 #include <linux/rculist_bl.h>
 #include <linux/cleancache.h>
+#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 5253471cd2ea..1600ebf717a7 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ struct key {
 #define KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA	3	/* set if key consumes quota */
 #define KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT	4	/* set if key is being constructed in userspace */
 #define KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE	5	/* set if key is negative */
+#define KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR	6	/* set if key can be cleared by root without permission */
 
 	/* the description string
 	 * - this is used to match a key against search criteria
diff --git a/include/linux/prctl.h b/include/linux/prctl.h
index 7ddc7f1b480f..a0413ac3abe8 100644
--- a/include/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/prctl.h
@@ -114,4 +114,11 @@
 # define PR_SET_MM_START_BRK		6
 # define PR_SET_MM_BRK			7
 
+/*
+ * Set specific pid that is allowed to ptrace the current task.
+ * A value of 0 mean "no process".
+ */
+#define PR_SET_PTRACER 0x59616d61
+# define PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY ((unsigned long)-1)
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c8949385e56e..673afbb8238a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -22,22 +22,36 @@
 #ifndef __LINUX_SECURITY_H
 #define __LINUX_SECURITY_H
 
-#include <linux/fs.h>
-#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
-#include <linux/binfmts.h>
-#include <linux/dcache.h>
-#include <linux/signal.h>
-#include <linux/resource.h>
-#include <linux/sem.h>
-#include <linux/shm.h>
-#include <linux/mm.h> /* PAGE_ALIGN */
-#include <linux/msg.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/key.h>
-#include <linux/xfrm.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/xattr.h>
-#include <net/flow.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+
+struct linux_binprm;
+struct cred;
+struct rlimit;
+struct siginfo;
+struct sem_array;
+struct sembuf;
+struct kern_ipc_perm;
+struct audit_context;
+struct super_block;
+struct inode;
+struct dentry;
+struct file;
+struct vfsmount;
+struct path;
+struct qstr;
+struct nameidata;
+struct iattr;
+struct fown_struct;
+struct file_operations;
+struct shmid_kernel;
+struct msg_msg;
+struct msg_queue;
+struct xattr;
+struct xfrm_sec_ctx;
+struct mm_struct;
 
 /* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
 #define SECURITY_NAME_MAX	10
@@ -49,6 +63,7 @@
 struct ctl_table;
 struct audit_krule;
 struct user_namespace;
+struct timezone;
 
 /*
  * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
@@ -131,18 +146,6 @@ struct request_sock;
 #define LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP	4
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
-/*
- * If a hint addr is less than mmap_min_addr change hint to be as
- * low as possible but still greater than mmap_min_addr
- */
-static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)
-{
-	hint &= PAGE_MASK;
-	if (((void *)hint != NULL) &&
-	    (hint < mmap_min_addr))
-		return PAGE_ALIGN(mmap_min_addr);
-	return hint;
-}
 extern int mmap_min_addr_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 				 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
 #endif
@@ -651,6 +654,10 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
  *	@clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_free:
+ *	@task task being freed
+ *	Handle release of task-related resources. (Note that this can be called
+ *	from interrupt context.)
  * @cred_alloc_blank:
  *	@cred points to the credentials.
  *	@gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
@@ -1493,6 +1500,7 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*dentry_open) (struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
 
 	int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags);
+	void (*task_free) (struct task_struct *task);
 	int (*cred_alloc_blank) (struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
 	void (*cred_free) (struct cred *cred);
 	int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1674,9 +1682,7 @@ int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry);
 int security_syslog(int type);
 int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
-int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages);
 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
-int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages);
 int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@@ -1752,6 +1758,7 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
 int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
 int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
+void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
@@ -1896,25 +1903,11 @@ static inline int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts,
 	return cap_settime(ts, tz);
 }
 
-static inline int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
-{
-	WARN_ON(current->mm == NULL);
-	return cap_vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages);
-}
-
 static inline int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
-	WARN_ON(mm == NULL);
 	return cap_vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
 }
 
-static inline int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages)
-{
-	/* If current->mm is a kernel thread then we will pass NULL,
-	   for this specific case that is fine */
-	return cap_vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages);
-}
-
 static inline int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	return cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
@@ -2245,6 +2238,9 @@ static inline int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{ }
+
 static inline int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/include/net/sock.h b/include/net/sock.h
index f84be9ed6110..04bc0b30e9e9 100644
--- a/include/net/sock.h
+++ b/include/net/sock.h
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@
 #include <linux/memcontrol.h>
 #include <linux/res_counter.h>
 #include <linux/static_key.h>
+#include <linux/aio.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 
 #include <linux/filter.h>
 #include <linux/rculist_nulls.h>
diff --git a/ipc/msgutil.c b/ipc/msgutil.c
index 5652101cdac0..26143d377c95 100644
--- a/ipc/msgutil.c
+++ b/ipc/msgutil.c
@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/ipc.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
 #include <linux/ipc_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
 #include "util.h"
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 5791612a4045..97b36eeca4c9 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
 #include <linux/init_task.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
 
 #if 0
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 0ed15fed579f..7ad335c3045a 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #include <linux/hw_breakpoint.h>
 #include <linux/oom.h>
 #include <linux/writeback.h>
+#include <linux/shm.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index c4f38a849436..26a7138bb849 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
 	WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->usage));
 	WARN_ON(tsk == current);
 
+	security_task_free(tsk);
 	exit_creds(tsk);
 	delayacct_tsk_free(tsk);
 	put_signal_struct(tsk->signal);
@@ -355,7 +356,7 @@ static int dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct mm_struct *oldmm)
 		charge = 0;
 		if (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_ACCOUNT) {
 			unsigned int len = (mpnt->vm_end - mpnt->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-			if (security_vm_enough_memory(len))
+			if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(oldmm, len)) /* sic */
 				goto fail_nomem;
 			charge = len;
 		}
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index a35cb8dbd8c4..503d6426126d 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/init_task.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
 
 #include <asm/tlb.h>
 #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index f487f257e05e..11d53046b905 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
 #include <linux/oom.h>
 #include <linux/kmod.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index da15a79b1441..39a68ddf38bd 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -935,6 +935,19 @@ void vm_stat_account(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags,
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
 
+/*
+ * If a hint addr is less than mmap_min_addr change hint to be as
+ * low as possible but still greater than mmap_min_addr
+ */
+static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)
+{
+	hint &= PAGE_MASK;
+	if (((void *)hint != NULL) &&
+	    (hint < mmap_min_addr))
+		return PAGE_ALIGN(mmap_min_addr);
+	return hint;
+}
+
 /*
  * The caller must hold down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem).
  */
@@ -1235,7 +1248,7 @@ munmap_back:
 	 */
 	if (accountable_mapping(file, vm_flags)) {
 		charged = len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-		if (security_vm_enough_memory(charged))
+		if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, charged))
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		vm_flags |= VM_ACCOUNT;
 	}
@@ -2180,7 +2193,7 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
 	if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	if (security_vm_enough_memory(len >> PAGE_SHIFT))
+	if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, len >> PAGE_SHIFT))
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/* Can we just expand an old private anonymous mapping? */
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index f437d054c3bf..142ef4a1f480 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
 		if (!(oldflags & (VM_ACCOUNT|VM_WRITE|VM_HUGETLB|
 						VM_SHARED|VM_NORESERVE))) {
 			charged = nrpages;
-			if (security_vm_enough_memory(charged))
+			if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, charged))
 				return -ENOMEM;
 			newflags |= VM_ACCOUNT;
 		}
diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
index 87bb8393e7d2..db8d983b5a7d 100644
--- a/mm/mremap.c
+++ b/mm/mremap.c
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static struct vm_area_struct *vma_to_resize(unsigned long addr,
 
 	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_ACCOUNT) {
 		unsigned long charged = (new_len - old_len) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-		if (security_vm_enough_memory(charged))
+		if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, charged))
 			goto Efault;
 		*p = charged;
 	}
diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
index b7e195571862..78307d5c5bd9 100644
--- a/mm/shmem.c
+++ b/mm/shmem.c
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static inline struct shmem_sb_info *SHMEM_SB(struct super_block *sb)
 static inline int shmem_acct_size(unsigned long flags, loff_t size)
 {
 	return (flags & VM_NORESERVE) ?
-		0 : security_vm_enough_memory_kern(VM_ACCT(size));
+		0 : security_vm_enough_memory_mm(current->mm, VM_ACCT(size));
 }
 
 static inline void shmem_unacct_size(unsigned long flags, loff_t size)
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static inline void shmem_unacct_size(unsigned long flags, loff_t size)
 static inline int shmem_acct_block(unsigned long flags)
 {
 	return (flags & VM_NORESERVE) ?
-		security_vm_enough_memory_kern(VM_ACCT(PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)) : 0;
+		security_vm_enough_memory_mm(current->mm, VM_ACCT(PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)) : 0;
 }
 
 static inline void shmem_unacct_blocks(unsigned long flags, long pages)
diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c
index 00a962caab1a..6bf67ab6e469 100644
--- a/mm/swapfile.c
+++ b/mm/swapfile.c
@@ -1563,6 +1563,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(swapoff, const char __user *, specialfile)
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	BUG_ON(!current->mm);
+
 	pathname = getname(specialfile);
 	err = PTR_ERR(pathname);
 	if (IS_ERR(pathname))
@@ -1590,7 +1592,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(swapoff, const char __user *, specialfile)
 		spin_unlock(&swap_lock);
 		goto out_dput;
 	}
-	if (!security_vm_enough_memory(p->pages))
+	if (!security_vm_enough_memory_mm(current->mm, p->pages))
 		vm_unacct_memory(p->pages);
 	else {
 		err = -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
index fa000d26dc60..c73bba326d70 100644
--- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
+++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ static int __init init_dns_resolver(void)
 
 	/* instruct request_key() to use this special keyring as a cache for
 	 * the results it looks up */
+	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR, &keyring->flags);
 	cred->thread_keyring = keyring;
 	cred->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
 	dns_resolver_cache = cred;
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 51bd5a0b69ae..ccc61f8006b2 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
 source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
 source security/apparmor/Kconfig
+source security/yama/Kconfig
 
 source security/integrity/Kconfig
 
@@ -196,6 +197,7 @@ choice
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA
 	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 
 	help
@@ -214,6 +216,9 @@ choice
 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
 		bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
 
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
+		bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y
+
 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 		bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
 
@@ -225,6 +230,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
 	default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
 	default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
 	default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
 	default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 
 endmenu
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index a5e502f8a05b..c26c81e92571 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)	+= selinux
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)        += tomoyo
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)	+= apparmor
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama
 
 # always enable default capabilities
 obj-y					+= commoncap.o
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)			+= lsm_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)		+= apparmor/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
 
 # Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 2dafe50a2e25..806bd19af7f2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
 # to
 #    [1] = "dac_override",
 quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN     $@
-cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
 	sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e '/CAP_FS_MASK/d' \
 	-e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
 	echo "};" >> $@
@@ -28,25 +28,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
 #    [RLIMIT_STACK] = "stack",
 #
 # and build a second integer table (with the second sed cmd), that maps
-# RLIMIT defines to the order defined in asm-generic/resource.h  Thi is
+# RLIMIT defines to the order defined in asm-generic/resource.h  This is
 # required by policy load to map policy ordering of RLIMITs to internal
 # ordering for architectures that redefine an RLIMIT.
 # Transforms lines from
 #    #define RLIMIT_STACK		3	/* max stack size */
 # to
 # RLIMIT_STACK, 
+#
+# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define RLIMIT_FSIZE        1   /* Maximum filesize */
+#    #define RLIMIT_STACK		3	/* max stack size */
+# to
+# #define AA_FS_RLIMIT_MASK "fsize stack"
 quiet_cmd_make-rlim = GEN     $@
-cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
+	> $@ ;\
 	sed $< >> $@ -r -n \
 	    -e 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+)).*/[\1] = "\L\2",/p';\
 	echo "};" >> $@ ;\
-	echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ;\
+	echo "static const int rlim_map[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" >> $@ ;\
 	sed -r -n "s/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]+).*/\1,/p" $< >> $@ ;\
-	echo "};" >> $@
+	echo "};" >> $@ ; \
+	echo -n '\#define AA_FS_RLIMIT_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
+	sed -r -n 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+).*/\L\1/p' $< | \
+	    tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
 
 $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
 $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
-$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h
+$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
+			    $(src)/Makefile
 	$(call cmd,make-caps)
-$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h
+$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h \
+		      $(src)/Makefile
 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index e39df6d43779..16c15ec6f670 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -18,12 +18,14 @@
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/context.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/resource.h"
 
 /**
  * aa_simple_write_to_buffer - common routine for getting policy from user
@@ -142,38 +144,166 @@ static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_remove = {
 	.llseek = default_llseek,
 };
 
+static int aa_fs_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file = seq->private;
+
+	if (!fs_file)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (fs_file->v_type) {
+	case AA_FS_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
+		seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", fs_file->v.boolean ? "yes" : "no");
+		break;
+	case AA_FS_TYPE_STRING:
+		seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", fs_file->v.string);
+		break;
+	case AA_FS_TYPE_U64:
+		seq_printf(seq, "%#08lx\n", fs_file->v.u64);
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Ignore unpritable entry types. */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int aa_fs_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return single_open(file, aa_fs_seq_show, inode->i_private);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops = {
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.open		= aa_fs_seq_open,
+	.read		= seq_read,
+	.llseek		= seq_lseek,
+	.release	= single_release,
+};
+
 /** Base file system setup **/
 
-static struct dentry *aa_fs_dentry __initdata;
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_file[] = {
+	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "create read write exec append mmap_exec " \
+				  "link lock"),
+	{ }
+};
 
-static void __init aafs_remove(const char *name)
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
+	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hat",	1),
+	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hatv",	1),
+	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_onexec",	1),
+	AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_profile",	1),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+	AA_FS_DIR("domain",			aa_fs_entry_domain),
+	AA_FS_DIR("file",			aa_fs_entry_file),
+	AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",		VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+	AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",			aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_apparmor[] = {
+	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load),
+	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace),
+	AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove),
+	AA_FS_DIR("features", aa_fs_entry_features),
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry =
+	AA_FS_DIR("apparmor", aa_fs_entry_apparmor);
+
+/**
+ * aafs_create_file - create a file entry in the apparmor securityfs
+ * @fs_file: aa_fs_entry to build an entry for (NOT NULL)
+ * @parent: the parent dentry in the securityfs
+ *
+ * Use aafs_remove_file to remove entries created with this fn.
+ */
+static int __init aafs_create_file(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file,
+				   struct dentry *parent)
 {
-	struct dentry *dentry;
+	int error = 0;
 
-	dentry = lookup_one_len(name, aa_fs_dentry, strlen(name));
-	if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
-		securityfs_remove(dentry);
-		dput(dentry);
+	fs_file->dentry = securityfs_create_file(fs_file->name,
+						 S_IFREG | fs_file->mode,
+						 parent, fs_file,
+						 fs_file->file_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(fs_file->dentry)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(fs_file->dentry);
+		fs_file->dentry = NULL;
 	}
+	return error;
 }
 
 /**
- * aafs_create - create an entry in the apparmor filesystem
- * @name: name of the entry (NOT NULL)
- * @mask: file permission mask of the file
- * @fops: file operations for the file (NOT NULL)
+ * aafs_create_dir - recursively create a directory entry in the securityfs
+ * @fs_dir: aa_fs_entry (and all child entries) to build (NOT NULL)
+ * @parent: the parent dentry in the securityfs
  *
- * Used aafs_remove to remove entries created with this fn.
+ * Use aafs_remove_dir to remove entries created with this fn.
  */
-static int __init aafs_create(const char *name, umode_t mask,
-			      const struct file_operations *fops)
+static int __init aafs_create_dir(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_dir,
+				  struct dentry *parent)
 {
-	struct dentry *dentry;
+	int error;
+	struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file;
 
-	dentry = securityfs_create_file(name, S_IFREG | mask, aa_fs_dentry,
-					NULL, fops);
+	fs_dir->dentry = securityfs_create_dir(fs_dir->name, parent);
+	if (IS_ERR(fs_dir->dentry)) {
+		error = PTR_ERR(fs_dir->dentry);
+		fs_dir->dentry = NULL;
+		goto failed;
+	}
 
-	return IS_ERR(dentry) ? PTR_ERR(dentry) : 0;
+	for (fs_file = fs_dir->v.files; fs_file->name; ++fs_file) {
+		if (fs_file->v_type == AA_FS_TYPE_DIR)
+			error = aafs_create_dir(fs_file, fs_dir->dentry);
+		else
+			error = aafs_create_file(fs_file, fs_dir->dentry);
+		if (error)
+			goto failed;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+failed:
+	return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aafs_remove_file - drop a single file entry in the apparmor securityfs
+ * @fs_file: aa_fs_entry to detach from the securityfs (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void __init aafs_remove_file(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file)
+{
+	if (!fs_file->dentry)
+		return;
+
+	securityfs_remove(fs_file->dentry);
+	fs_file->dentry = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aafs_remove_dir - recursively drop a directory entry from the securityfs
+ * @fs_dir: aa_fs_entry (and all child entries) to detach (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void __init aafs_remove_dir(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_dir)
+{
+	struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file;
+
+	for (fs_file = fs_dir->v.files; fs_file->name; ++fs_file) {
+		if (fs_file->v_type == AA_FS_TYPE_DIR)
+			aafs_remove_dir(fs_file);
+		else
+			aafs_remove_file(fs_file);
+	}
+
+	aafs_remove_file(fs_dir);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -183,14 +313,7 @@ static int __init aafs_create(const char *name, umode_t mask,
  */
 void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void)
 {
-	if (aa_fs_dentry) {
-		aafs_remove(".remove");
-		aafs_remove(".replace");
-		aafs_remove(".load");
-
-		securityfs_remove(aa_fs_dentry);
-		aa_fs_dentry = NULL;
-	}
+	aafs_remove_dir(&aa_fs_entry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -207,25 +330,13 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void)
 	if (!apparmor_initialized)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (aa_fs_dentry) {
+	if (aa_fs_entry.dentry) {
 		AA_ERROR("%s: AppArmor securityfs already exists\n", __func__);
 		return -EEXIST;
 	}
 
-	aa_fs_dentry = securityfs_create_dir("apparmor", NULL);
-	if (IS_ERR(aa_fs_dentry)) {
-		error = PTR_ERR(aa_fs_dentry);
-		aa_fs_dentry = NULL;
-		goto error;
-	}
-
-	error = aafs_create(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load);
-	if (error)
-		goto error;
-	error = aafs_create(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace);
-	if (error)
-		goto error;
-	error = aafs_create(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove);
+	/* Populate fs tree. */
+	error = aafs_create_dir(&aa_fs_entry, NULL);
 	if (error)
 		goto error;
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index f3fafedd798a..5ff67776a5ad 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 
-const char *op_table[] = {
+const char *const op_table[] = {
 	"null",
 
 	"sysctl",
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ const char *op_table[] = {
 	"profile_remove"
 };
 
-const char *audit_mode_names[] = {
+const char *const audit_mode_names[] = {
 	"normal",
 	"quiet_denied",
 	"quiet",
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ const char *audit_mode_names[] = {
 	"all"
 };
 
-static char *aa_audit_type[] = {
+static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
 	"AUDIT",
 	"ALLOWED",
 	"DENIED",
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static char *aa_audit_type[] = {
 	"STATUS",
 	"ERROR",
 	"KILLED"
+	"AUTO"
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index c1e18ba5bdc0..7c69599a69e1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -372,13 +372,12 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	state = profile->file.start;
 
 	/* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */
-	error = aa_get_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, &buffer,
-			    &name);
+	error = aa_path_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, &buffer,
+			     &name, &info);
 	if (error) {
 		if (profile->flags &
 		    (PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR | PFLAG_UNCONFINED))
 			error = 0;
-		info = "Exec failed name resolution";
 		name = bprm->filename;
 		goto audit;
 	}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 7312db741219..3022c0f4f0db 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -173,8 +173,6 @@ static u32 map_old_perms(u32 old)
 	if (old & 0x40)	/* AA_EXEC_MMAP */
 		new |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
 
-	new |= AA_MAY_META_READ;
-
 	return new;
 }
 
@@ -212,6 +210,7 @@ static struct file_perms compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
 		perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state));
 		perms.xindex = dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state);
 	}
+	perms.allow |= AA_MAY_META_READ;
 
 	/* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */
 	if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x80000000)
@@ -279,22 +278,16 @@ int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
 	int error;
 
 	flags |= profile->path_flags | (S_ISDIR(cond->mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0);
-	error = aa_get_name(path, flags, &buffer, &name);
+	error = aa_path_name(path, flags, &buffer, &name, &info);
 	if (error) {
 		if (error == -ENOENT && is_deleted(path->dentry)) {
 			/* Access to open files that are deleted are
 			 * give a pass (implicit delegation)
 			 */
 			error = 0;
+			info = NULL;
 			perms.allow = request;
-		} else if (error == -ENOENT)
-			info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry";
-		else if (error == -ESTALE)
-			info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path";
-		else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG)
-			info = "Failed name lookup - name too long";
-		else
-			info = "Failed name lookup";
+		}
 	} else {
 		aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, name, cond,
 			     &perms);
@@ -365,12 +358,14 @@ int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 	lperms = nullperms;
 
 	/* buffer freed below, lname is pointer in buffer */
-	error = aa_get_name(&link, profile->path_flags, &buffer, &lname);
+	error = aa_path_name(&link, profile->path_flags, &buffer, &lname,
+			     &info);
 	if (error)
 		goto audit;
 
 	/* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */
-	error = aa_get_name(&target, profile->path_flags, &buffer2, &tname);
+	error = aa_path_name(&target, profile->path_flags, &buffer2, &tname,
+			     &info);
 	if (error)
 		goto audit;
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index df3649560818..40aedd9f73ea 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -19,6 +19,19 @@
 
 #include "match.h"
 
+/*
+ * Class of mediation types in the AppArmor policy db
+ */
+#define AA_CLASS_ENTRY		0
+#define AA_CLASS_UNKNOWN	1
+#define AA_CLASS_FILE		2
+#define AA_CLASS_CAP		3
+#define AA_CLASS_NET		4
+#define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS	5
+#define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN		6
+
+#define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
+
 /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
 extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
 extern bool aa_g_audit_header;
@@ -81,7 +94,7 @@ static inline unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
 						  unsigned int start)
 {
 	/* the null transition only needs the string's null terminator byte */
-	return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, start, "", 1);
+	return aa_dfa_next(dfa, start, 0);
 }
 
 static inline bool mediated_filesystem(struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
index cb1e93a114d7..7ea4769fab3f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
@@ -15,6 +15,50 @@
 #ifndef __AA_APPARMORFS_H
 #define __AA_APPARMORFS_H
 
+enum aa_fs_type {
+	AA_FS_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
+	AA_FS_TYPE_STRING,
+	AA_FS_TYPE_U64,
+	AA_FS_TYPE_FOPS,
+	AA_FS_TYPE_DIR,
+};
+
+struct aa_fs_entry;
+
+struct aa_fs_entry {
+	const char *name;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	umode_t mode;
+	enum aa_fs_type v_type;
+	union {
+		bool boolean;
+		char *string;
+		unsigned long u64;
+		struct aa_fs_entry *files;
+	} v;
+	const struct file_operations *file_ops;
+};
+
+extern const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops;
+
+#define AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN(_name, _value) \
+	{ .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \
+	  .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_BOOLEAN, .v.boolean = (_value), \
+	  .file_ops = &aa_fs_seq_file_ops }
+#define AA_FS_FILE_STRING(_name, _value) \
+	{ .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \
+	  .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_STRING, .v.string = (_value), \
+	  .file_ops = &aa_fs_seq_file_ops }
+#define AA_FS_FILE_U64(_name, _value) \
+	{ .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \
+	  .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_U64, .v.u64 = (_value), \
+	  .file_ops = &aa_fs_seq_file_ops }
+#define AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(_name, _mode, _fops) \
+	{ .name = (_name), .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_FOPS, \
+	  .mode = (_mode), .file_ops = (_fops) }
+#define AA_FS_DIR(_name, _value) \
+	{ .name = (_name), .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_DIR, .v.files = (_value) }
+
 extern void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void);
 
 #endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 1951786d32e9..4ba78c203af1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -25,11 +25,9 @@
 
 struct aa_profile;
 
-extern const char *audit_mode_names[];
+extern const char *const audit_mode_names[];
 #define AUDIT_MAX_INDEX 5
 
-#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO 0	/* auto choose audit message type */
-
 enum audit_mode {
 	AUDIT_NORMAL,		/* follow normal auditing of accesses */
 	AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED,	/* quiet all denied access messages */
@@ -45,10 +43,11 @@ enum audit_type {
 	AUDIT_APPARMOR_HINT,
 	AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS,
 	AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR,
-	AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL,
+	AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO
 };
 
-extern const char *op_table[];
+extern const char *const op_table[];
 enum aa_ops {
 	OP_NULL,
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index ab8c6d87f758..f98fd4701d80 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask)
 		index |= AA_X_NAME;
 	} else if (old_index == 3) {
 		index |= AA_X_NAME | AA_X_CHILD;
-	} else {
+	} else if (old_index) {
 		index |= AA_X_TABLE;
 		index |= old_index - 4;
 	}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
index a4a863997bd5..775843e7f984 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 			      const char *str, int len);
 unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 			  const char *str);
+unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
+			 const char c);
+
 void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref);
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/path.h b/security/apparmor/include/path.h
index 27b327a7fae5..286ac75dc88b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/path.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/path.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum path_flags {
 	PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED = 0x10000,	/* mediate deleted paths */
 };
 
-int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name);
+int aa_path_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer,
+		 const char **name, const char **info);
 
 #endif /* __AA_PATH_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index aeda5cf56904..bda4569fdd83 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 #include "file.h"
 #include "resource.h"
 
-extern const char *profile_mode_names[];
+extern const char *const profile_mode_names[];
 #define APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 3
 
 #define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile)	\
@@ -129,6 +129,17 @@ struct aa_namespace {
 	struct list_head sub_ns;
 };
 
+/* struct aa_policydb - match engine for a policy
+ * dfa: dfa pattern match
+ * start: set of start states for the different classes of data
+ */
+struct aa_policydb {
+	/* Generic policy DFA specific rule types will be subsections of it */
+	struct aa_dfa *dfa;
+	unsigned int start[AA_CLASS_LAST + 1];
+
+};
+
 /* struct aa_profile - basic confinement data
  * @base - base components of the profile (name, refcount, lists, lock ...)
  * @parent: parent of profile
@@ -143,6 +154,7 @@ struct aa_namespace {
  * @flags: flags controlling profile behavior
  * @path_flags: flags controlling path generation behavior
  * @size: the memory consumed by this profiles rules
+ * @policy: general match rules governing policy
  * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
  * @caps: capabilities for the profile
  * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
@@ -179,6 +191,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
 	u32 path_flags;
 	int size;
 
+	struct aa_policydb policy;
 	struct aa_file_rules file;
 	struct aa_caps caps;
 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
index 02baec732bb5..d3f4cf027957 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 #include <linux/resource.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+
 struct aa_profile;
 
 /* struct aa_rlimit - rlimit settings for the profile
@@ -32,6 +34,8 @@ struct aa_rlimit {
 	struct rlimit limits[RLIM_NLIMITS];
 };
 
+extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_rlimit[];
+
 int aa_map_resource(int resource);
 int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *,
 		      unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 94de6b4907c8..90971a8c3789 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -335,12 +335,12 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_dfa_next_state - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
+ * aa_dfa_match - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
  * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
  * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
  * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL)
  *
- * aa_dfa_next_state will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
  * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
  * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
  *
@@ -349,5 +349,79 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 			  const char *str)
 {
-	return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, start, str, strlen(str));
+	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	unsigned int state = start, pos;
+
+	if (state == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str) {
+			pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		while (*str) {
+			pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++;
+			if (check[pos] == state)
+				state = next[pos];
+			else
+				state = def[state];
+		}
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_next - step one character to the next state in the dfa
+ * @dfa: the dfa to tranverse (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: the state to start in
+ * @c: the input character to transition on
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match will step through the dfa by one input character @c
+ *
+ * Returns: state reach after input @c
+ */
+unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
+			  const char c)
+{
+	u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+	u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+	unsigned int pos;
+
+	/* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+	if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+		/* Equivalence class table defined */
+		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+
+		pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) c];
+		if (check[pos] == state)
+			state = next[pos];
+		else
+			state = def[state];
+	} else {
+		/* default is direct to next state */
+		pos = base[state] + (u8) c;
+		if (check[pos] == state)
+			state = next[pos];
+		else
+			state = def[state];
+	}
+
+	return state;
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
index 9d070a7c3ffc..2daeea4f9266 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/path.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
@@ -83,31 +83,29 @@ static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
 		struct path root;
 		get_fs_root(current->fs, &root);
 		res = __d_path(path, &root, buf, buflen);
-		if (res && !IS_ERR(res)) {
-			/* everything's fine */
-			*name = res;
-			path_put(&root);
-			goto ok;
-		}
 		path_put(&root);
-		connected = 0;
+	} else {
+		res = d_absolute_path(path, buf, buflen);
+		if (!our_mnt(path->mnt))
+			connected = 0;
 	}
 
-	res = d_absolute_path(path, buf, buflen);
-
-	*name = res;
 	/* handle error conditions - and still allow a partial path to
 	 * be returned.
 	 */
-	if (IS_ERR(res)) {
-		error = PTR_ERR(res);
-		*name = buf;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	if (!our_mnt(path->mnt))
+	if (!res || IS_ERR(res)) {
+		connected = 0;
+		res = dentry_path_raw(path->dentry, buf, buflen);
+		if (IS_ERR(res)) {
+			error = PTR_ERR(res);
+			*name = buf;
+			goto out;
+		};
+	} else if (!our_mnt(path->mnt))
 		connected = 0;
 
-ok:
+	*name = res;
+
 	/* Handle two cases:
 	 * 1. A deleted dentry && profile is not allowing mediation of deleted
 	 * 2. On some filesystems, newly allocated dentries appear to the
@@ -138,7 +136,7 @@ ok:
 			/* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting
 			 * with '/'
 			 */
-			error = -ESTALE;
+			error = -EACCES;
 			if (*res == '/')
 				*name = res + 1;
 		}
@@ -159,7 +157,7 @@ out:
  * Returns: %0 else error on failure
  */
 static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
-			      int size, char **name)
+			      int size, char **name, const char **info)
 {
 	int adjust = (flags & PATH_IS_DIR) ? 1 : 0;
 	int error = d_namespace_path(path, buffer, size - adjust, name, flags);
@@ -171,15 +169,27 @@ static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
 		 */
 		strcpy(&buffer[size - 2], "/");
 
+	if (info && error) {
+		if (error == -ENOENT)
+			*info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry";
+		else if (error == -ESTALE)
+			*info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path";
+		else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG)
+			*info = "Failed name lookup - name too long";
+		else
+			*info = "Failed name lookup";
+	}
+
 	return error;
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_get_name - compute the pathname of a file
+ * aa_path_name - compute the pathname of a file
  * @path: path the file  (NOT NULL)
  * @flags: flags controlling path name generation
  * @buffer: buffer that aa_get_name() allocated  (NOT NULL)
  * @name: Returns - the generated path name if !error (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: Returns - information on why the path lookup failed (MAYBE NULL)
  *
  * @name is a pointer to the beginning of the pathname (which usually differs
  * from the beginning of the buffer), or NULL.  If there is an error @name
@@ -192,7 +202,8 @@ static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
  *
  * Returns: %0 else error code if could retrieve name
  */
-int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name)
+int aa_path_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name,
+		 const char **info)
 {
 	char *buf, *str = NULL;
 	int size = 256;
@@ -206,7 +217,7 @@ int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name)
 		if (!buf)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		error = get_name_to_buffer(path, flags, buf, size, &str);
+		error = get_name_to_buffer(path, flags, buf, size, &str, info);
 		if (error != -ENAMETOOLONG)
 			break;
 
@@ -214,6 +225,7 @@ int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name)
 		size <<= 1;
 		if (size > aa_g_path_max)
 			return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+		*info = NULL;
 	}
 	*buffer = buf;
 	*name = str;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 4f0eadee78b8..906414383022 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
 /* root profile namespace */
 struct aa_namespace *root_ns;
 
-const char *profile_mode_names[] = {
+const char *const profile_mode_names[] = {
 	"enforce",
 	"complain",
 	"kill",
@@ -749,6 +749,7 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 
 	aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
+	aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
 
 	aa_put_profile(profile->replacedby);
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 741dd13e089b..25fd51edc8da 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
  * @new: profile if it has been allocated (MAYBE NULL)
  * @name: name of the profile being manipulated (MAYBE NULL)
  * @info: any extra info about the failure (MAYBE NULL)
- * @e: buffer position info (NOT NULL)
+ * @e: buffer position info
  * @error: error code
  *
  * Returns: %0 or error
@@ -95,7 +95,8 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *name,
 	struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
 	struct common_audit_data sa;
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
-	sa.aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
+	if (e)
+		sa.aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
 	sa.aad.iface.target = new;
 	sa.aad.name = name;
 	sa.aad.info = info;
@@ -468,7 +469,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
 	const char *name = NULL;
-	int error = -EPROTO;
+	int i, error = -EPROTO;
 	kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
 	u32 tmp;
 
@@ -554,11 +555,35 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
 			goto fail;
 		if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.extended.cap[1]), NULL))
 			goto fail;
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
 	}
 
 	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
 		goto fail;
 
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
+		/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
+		profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
+		if (IS_ERR(profile->policy.dfa)) {
+			error = PTR_ERR(profile->policy.dfa);
+			profile->policy.dfa = NULL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if (!unpack_u32(e, &profile->policy.start[0], "start"))
+			/* default start state */
+			profile->policy.start[0] = DFA_START;
+		/* setup class index */
+		for (i = AA_CLASS_FILE; i <= AA_CLASS_LAST; i++) {
+			profile->policy.start[i] =
+				aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
+					    profile->policy.start[0],
+					    i);
+		}
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+	}
+
 	/* get file rules */
 	profile->file.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
 	if (IS_ERR(profile->file.dfa)) {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
index a4136c10b1c6..72c25a4f2cfd 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/resource.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@
  */
 #include "rlim_names.h"
 
+struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_rlimit[] = {
+	AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_FS_RLIMIT_MASK),
+	{ }
+};
+
 /* audit callback for resource specific fields */
 static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 {
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 2f680eb02b59..5bb21b1c448c 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -358,6 +358,10 @@ static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void cap_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+}
+
 static int cap_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -954,6 +958,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_free);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 7ce191ea29a0..0cf4b53480a7 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/securebits.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
 
 /*
  * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 4f554f20dc97..35664fe6daa1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ config IMA
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_MD5
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
-	select TCG_TPM if !S390 && !UML
-	select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM
+	select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML
+	select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
 	help
 	  The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
 	  Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
index 2ad942fb1e23..21e96bf188df 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
@@ -61,6 +61,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
 		audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
 	}
-	audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index d45061d02fee..d8edff209bf3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
 	{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
@@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
 	if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
 		result = -EINVAL;
 
-	audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !!result);
+	audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 	return result;
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 0b3f5d72af1c..6523599e9ac0 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -388,11 +388,24 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
 	keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
+
+		/* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keyrings */
+		if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+			keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0);
+			if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref))
+				goto error;
+			if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR,
+				     &key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref)->flags))
+				goto clear;
+			goto error_put;
+		}
+
 		goto error;
 	}
 
+clear:
 	ret = keyring_clear(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref));
-
+error_put:
 	key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
 error:
 	return ret;
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 1068cb1939b3..be7ecb2018dd 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -657,7 +657,8 @@ try_again:
 			goto error;
 
 		down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
-		if (cred->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) {
+		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
+			     &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
 			key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
 			key = NULL;
 		} else {
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d7542493454d..bf619ffc9a4d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 #include <linux/integrity.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <net/flow.h>
 
 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR	2
 
@@ -187,25 +189,11 @@ int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
 	return security_ops->settime(ts, tz);
 }
 
-int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
-{
-	WARN_ON(current->mm == NULL);
-	return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages);
-}
-
 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
-	WARN_ON(mm == NULL);
 	return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
 }
 
-int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages)
-{
-	/* If current->mm is a kernel thread then we will pass NULL,
-	   for this specific case that is fine */
-	return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages);
-}
-
 int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	return security_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
@@ -729,6 +717,11 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
 }
 
+void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	security_ops->task_free(task);
+}
+
 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	return security_ops->cred_alloc_blank(cred, gfp);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6a3683e28426..304929909375 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@
 #include <linux/syslog.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <linux/shm.h>
 
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index e8af5b0ba80f..cd667b4089a5 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <linux/shm.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include "smack.h"
 
 #define task_security(task)	(task_cred_xxx((task), security))
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/audit.c b/security/tomoyo/audit.c
index 5ca47ea3049f..7ef9fa3e37e0 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/audit.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/audit.c
@@ -446,11 +446,11 @@ void tomoyo_read_log(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
  * tomoyo_poll_log - Wait for an audit log.
  *
  * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
- * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table".
+ * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". Maybe NULL.
  *
  * Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM when ready to read an audit log.
  */
-int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+unsigned int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
 	if (tomoyo_log_count)
 		return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index c47d3ce6c733..8656b16eef7b 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ static int tomoyo_write_task(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
  *
  * @domainname: The name of domain.
  *
- * Returns 0.
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
  *
  * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
  */
@@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ static int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
 	name.name = domainname;
 	tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
 	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
-		return 0;
+		return -EINTR;
 	/* Is there an active domain? */
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
 		/* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
@@ -1164,15 +1164,16 @@ static int tomoyo_write_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 	bool is_select = !is_delete && tomoyo_str_starts(&data, "select ");
 	unsigned int profile;
 	if (*data == '<') {
+		int ret = 0;
 		domain = NULL;
 		if (is_delete)
-			tomoyo_delete_domain(data);
+			ret = tomoyo_delete_domain(data);
 		else if (is_select)
 			domain = tomoyo_find_domain(data);
 		else
 			domain = tomoyo_assign_domain(data, false);
 		head->w.domain = domain;
-		return 0;
+		return ret;
 	}
 	if (!domain)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -2111,7 +2112,7 @@ static struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain_by_qid
 	struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
 	spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_query_list, list) {
-		if (ptr->serial != serial || ptr->answer)
+		if (ptr->serial != serial)
 			continue;
 		domain = ptr->domain;
 		break;
@@ -2130,28 +2131,13 @@ static struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain_by_qid
  *
  * Waits for access requests which violated policy in enforcing mode.
  */
-static int tomoyo_poll_query(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+static unsigned int tomoyo_poll_query(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
-	struct list_head *tmp;
-	bool found = false;
-	u8 i;
-	for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
-		spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
-		list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) {
-			struct tomoyo_query *ptr =
-				list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list);
-			if (ptr->answer)
-				continue;
-			found = true;
-			break;
-		}
-		spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
-		if (found)
-			return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
-		if (i)
-			break;
-		poll_wait(file, &tomoyo_query_wait, wait);
-	}
+	if (!list_empty(&tomoyo_query_list))
+		return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
+	poll_wait(file, &tomoyo_query_wait, wait);
+	if (!list_empty(&tomoyo_query_list))
+		return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2175,8 +2161,6 @@ static void tomoyo_read_query(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 	spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
 	list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) {
 		struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list);
-		if (ptr->answer)
-			continue;
 		if (pos++ != head->r.query_index)
 			continue;
 		len = ptr->query_len;
@@ -2194,8 +2178,6 @@ static void tomoyo_read_query(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 	spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
 	list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) {
 		struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list);
-		if (ptr->answer)
-			continue;
 		if (pos++ != head->r.query_index)
 			continue;
 		/*
@@ -2243,8 +2225,10 @@ static int tomoyo_write_answer(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
 		struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list);
 		if (ptr->serial != serial)
 			continue;
-		if (!ptr->answer)
-			ptr->answer = answer;
+		ptr->answer = answer;
+		/* Remove from tomoyo_query_list. */
+		if (ptr->answer)
+			list_del_init(&ptr->list);
 		break;
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
@@ -2477,18 +2461,17 @@ int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
  * tomoyo_poll_control - poll() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
  *
  * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
- * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table".
+ * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". Maybe NULL.
  *
- * Waits for read readiness.
- * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query is handled by /usr/sbin/tomoyo-queryd and
- * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit is handled by /usr/sbin/tomoyo-auditd.
+ * Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM if ready to read/write,
+ * POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM otherwise.
  */
-int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+unsigned int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
 	struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
-	if (!head->poll)
-		return -ENOSYS;
-	return head->poll(file, wait);
+	if (head->poll)
+		return head->poll(file, wait) | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
+	return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 9512222d5581..30fd98369700 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ struct tomoyo_acl_param {
 struct tomoyo_io_buffer {
 	void (*read) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
 	int (*write) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
-	int (*poll) (struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+	unsigned int (*poll) (struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
 	/* Exclusive lock for this structure.   */
 	struct mutex io_sem;
 	char __user *read_user_buf;
@@ -981,8 +981,8 @@ int tomoyo_path_number_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path,
 			    unsigned long number);
 int tomoyo_path_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path,
 		     const char *target);
-int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
-int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+unsigned int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+unsigned int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
 int tomoyo_socket_bind_permission(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 				  int addr_len);
 int tomoyo_socket_connect_permission(struct socket *sock,
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
index bee09d062057..fe00cdfd0267 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
@@ -199,30 +199,32 @@ int tomoyo_mount_permission(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
 	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) {
 		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT];
 		flags &= ~MS_REMOUNT;
-	}
-	if (flags & MS_MOVE) {
-		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE];
-		flags &= ~MS_MOVE;
-	}
-	if (flags & MS_BIND) {
+	} else if (flags & MS_BIND) {
 		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND];
 		flags &= ~MS_BIND;
-	}
-	if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE) {
-		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE];
-		flags &= ~MS_UNBINDABLE;
-	}
-	if (flags & MS_PRIVATE) {
-		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE];
-		flags &= ~MS_PRIVATE;
-	}
-	if (flags & MS_SLAVE) {
-		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE];
-		flags &= ~MS_SLAVE;
-	}
-	if (flags & MS_SHARED) {
+	} else if (flags & MS_SHARED) {
+		if (flags & (MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED];
 		flags &= ~MS_SHARED;
+	} else if (flags & MS_PRIVATE) {
+		if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE];
+		flags &= ~MS_PRIVATE;
+	} else if (flags & MS_SLAVE) {
+		if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE];
+		flags &= ~MS_SLAVE;
+	} else if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE) {
+		if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE];
+		flags &= ~MS_UNBINDABLE;
+	} else if (flags & MS_MOVE) {
+		type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE];
+		flags &= ~MS_MOVE;
 	}
 	if (!type)
 		type = "<NULL>";
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
index 482b2a5f48f0..8592f2fc6ebb 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
@@ -157,9 +157,10 @@ static int tomoyo_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
  * tomoyo_poll - poll() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
  *
  * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
- * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table".
+ * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". Maybe NULL.
  *
- * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ * Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM if ready to read/write,
+ * POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM otherwise.
  */
 static unsigned int tomoyo_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..51d6709d8bbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+config SECURITY_YAMA
+	bool "Yama support"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	select SECURITYFS
+	select SECURITY_PATH
+	default n
+	help
+	  This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
+	  system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary
+	  access controls. Currently available is ptrace scope restriction.
+	  Further information can be found in Documentation/security/Yama.txt.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/yama/Makefile b/security/yama/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8b5e06588456
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/yama/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) := yama.o
+
+yama-y := yama_lsm.o
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..573723843a04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+/*
+ * Yama Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Canonical, Ltd.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 The Chromium OS Authors.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+
+static int ptrace_scope = 1;
+
+/* describe a ptrace relationship for potential exception */
+struct ptrace_relation {
+	struct task_struct *tracer;
+	struct task_struct *tracee;
+	struct list_head node;
+};
+
+static LIST_HEAD(ptracer_relations);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ptracer_relations_lock);
+
+/**
+ * yama_ptracer_add - add/replace an exception for this tracer/tracee pair
+ * @tracer: the task_struct of the process doing the ptrace
+ * @tracee: the task_struct of the process to be ptraced
+ *
+ * Each tracee can have, at most, one tracer registered. Each time this
+ * is called, the prior registered tracer will be replaced for the tracee.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if relationship was added, -ve on error.
+ */
+static int yama_ptracer_add(struct task_struct *tracer,
+			    struct task_struct *tracee)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct ptrace_relation *added;
+	struct ptrace_relation *entry, *relation = NULL;
+
+	added = kmalloc(sizeof(*added), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!added)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(entry, &ptracer_relations, node)
+		if (entry->tracee == tracee) {
+			relation = entry;
+			break;
+		}
+	if (!relation) {
+		relation = added;
+		relation->tracee = tracee;
+		list_add(&relation->node, &ptracer_relations);
+	}
+	relation->tracer = tracer;
+
+	spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+	if (added != relation)
+		kfree(added);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_ptracer_del - remove exceptions related to the given tasks
+ * @tracer: remove any relation where tracer task matches
+ * @tracee: remove any relation where tracee task matches
+ */
+static void yama_ptracer_del(struct task_struct *tracer,
+			     struct task_struct *tracee)
+{
+	struct ptrace_relation *relation, *safe;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(relation, safe, &ptracer_relations, node)
+		if (relation->tracee == tracee ||
+		    (tracer && relation->tracer == tracer)) {
+			list_del(&relation->node);
+			kfree(relation);
+		}
+	spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_task_free - check for task_pid to remove from exception list
+ * @task: task being removed
+ */
+static void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	yama_ptracer_del(task, task);
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_task_prctl - check for Yama-specific prctl operations
+ * @option: operation
+ * @arg2: argument
+ * @arg3: argument
+ * @arg4: argument
+ * @arg5: argument
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -ve on error.  -ENOSYS is returned when Yama
+ * does not handle the given option.
+ */
+static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+			   unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct task_struct *myself = current;
+
+	rc = cap_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+	if (rc != -ENOSYS)
+		return rc;
+
+	switch (option) {
+	case PR_SET_PTRACER:
+		/* Since a thread can call prctl(), find the group leader
+		 * before calling _add() or _del() on it, since we want
+		 * process-level granularity of control. The tracer group
+		 * leader checking is handled later when walking the ancestry
+		 * at the time of PTRACE_ATTACH check.
+		 */
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		if (!thread_group_leader(myself))
+			myself = rcu_dereference(myself->group_leader);
+		get_task_struct(myself);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		if (arg2 == 0) {
+			yama_ptracer_del(NULL, myself);
+			rc = 0;
+		} else if (arg2 == PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY) {
+			rc = yama_ptracer_add(NULL, myself);
+		} else {
+			struct task_struct *tracer;
+
+			rcu_read_lock();
+			tracer = find_task_by_vpid(arg2);
+			if (tracer)
+				get_task_struct(tracer);
+			else
+				rc = -EINVAL;
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+
+			if (tracer) {
+				rc = yama_ptracer_add(tracer, myself);
+				put_task_struct(tracer);
+			}
+		}
+
+		put_task_struct(myself);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * task_is_descendant - walk up a process family tree looking for a match
+ * @parent: the process to compare against while walking up from child
+ * @child: the process to start from while looking upwards for parent
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if child is a descendant of parent, 0 if not.
+ */
+static int task_is_descendant(struct task_struct *parent,
+			      struct task_struct *child)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct task_struct *walker = child;
+
+	if (!parent || !child)
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (!thread_group_leader(parent))
+		parent = rcu_dereference(parent->group_leader);
+	while (walker->pid > 0) {
+		if (!thread_group_leader(walker))
+			walker = rcu_dereference(walker->group_leader);
+		if (walker == parent) {
+			rc = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		walker = rcu_dereference(walker->real_parent);
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ptracer_exception_found - tracer registered as exception for this tracee
+ * @tracer: the task_struct of the process attempting ptrace
+ * @tracee: the task_struct of the process to be ptraced
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if tracer has is ptracer exception ancestor for tracee.
+ */
+static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer,
+				   struct task_struct *tracee)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct ptrace_relation *relation;
+	struct task_struct *parent = NULL;
+	bool found = false;
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (!thread_group_leader(tracee))
+		tracee = rcu_dereference(tracee->group_leader);
+	list_for_each_entry(relation, &ptracer_relations, node)
+		if (relation->tracee == tracee) {
+			parent = relation->tracer;
+			found = true;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	if (found && (parent == NULL || task_is_descendant(parent, tracer)))
+		rc = 1;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_ptrace_access_check - validate PTRACE_ATTACH calls
+ * @child: task that current task is attempting to ptrace
+ * @mode: ptrace attach mode
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
+ */
+static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+				    unsigned int mode)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	/* If standard caps disallows it, so does Yama.  We should
+	 * only tighten restrictions further.
+	 */
+	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */
+	if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH &&
+	    ptrace_scope &&
+	    !task_is_descendant(current, child) &&
+	    !ptracer_exception_found(current, child) &&
+	    !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+		rc = -EPERM;
+
+	if (rc) {
+		char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
+		printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE "ptrace of non-child"
+			" pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n",
+			child->pid,
+			get_task_comm(name, current),
+			current->pid);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
+	.name =			"yama",
+
+	.ptrace_access_check =	yama_ptrace_access_check,
+	.task_prctl =		yama_task_prctl,
+	.task_free =		yama_task_free,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static int zero;
+static int one = 1;
+
+struct ctl_path yama_sysctl_path[] = {
+	{ .procname = "kernel", },
+	{ .procname = "yama", },
+	{ }
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table yama_sysctl_table[] = {
+	{
+		.procname       = "ptrace_scope",
+		.data           = &ptrace_scope,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+		.mode           = 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1         = &zero,
+		.extra2         = &one,
+	},
+	{ }
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+
+static __init int yama_init(void)
+{
+	if (!security_module_enable(&yama_ops))
+		return 0;
+
+	printk(KERN_INFO "Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
+
+	if (register_security(&yama_ops))
+		panic("Yama: kernel registration failed.\n");
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+	if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table))
+		panic("Yama: sysctl registration failed.\n");
+#endif
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+security_initcall(yama_init);