ALSA: control: Hardening for potential Spectre v1

commit 088e861edffb84879cf0c0d1b02eda078c3a0ffe upstream.

As recently Smatch suggested, a few places in ALSA control core codes
may expand the array directly from the user-space value with
speculation:

  sound/core/control.c:1003 snd_ctl_elem_lock() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'
  sound/core/control.c:1031 snd_ctl_elem_unlock() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'
  sound/core/control.c:844 snd_ctl_elem_info() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'
  sound/core/control.c:891 snd_ctl_elem_read() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'
  sound/core/control.c:939 snd_ctl_elem_write() warn: potential spectre issue 'kctl->vd'

Although all these seem doing only the first load without further
reference, we may want to stay in a safer side, so hardening with
array_index_nospec() would still make sense.

In this patch, we put array_index_nospec() to the common
snd_ctl_get_ioff*() helpers instead of each caller.  These helpers are
also referred from some drivers, too, and basically all usages are to
calculate the array index from the user-space value, hence it's better
to cover there.

BugLink: https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152411496503418&w=2
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
This commit is contained in:
Takashi Iwai 2018-04-24 07:45:56 +02:00 committed by syphyr
parent 8b3b0cc293
commit 59ea496a22
1 changed files with 5 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
*
*/
#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include <sound/asound.h>
#define snd_kcontrol_chip(kcontrol) ((kcontrol)->private_data)
@ -135,12 +136,14 @@ int snd_ctl_unregister_ioctl_compat(snd_kctl_ioctl_func_t fcn);
static inline unsigned int snd_ctl_get_ioffnum(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct snd_ctl_elem_id *id)
{
return id->numid - kctl->id.numid;
unsigned int ioff = id->numid - kctl->id.numid;
return array_index_nospec(ioff, kctl->count);
}
static inline unsigned int snd_ctl_get_ioffidx(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct snd_ctl_elem_id *id)
{
return id->index - kctl->id.index;
unsigned int ioff = id->index - kctl->id.index;
return array_index_nospec(ioff, kctl->count);
}
static inline unsigned int snd_ctl_get_ioff(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct snd_ctl_elem_id *id)