Merge "netfilter: x_tables: validate e->target_offset early"

This commit is contained in:
Linux Build Service Account 2016-09-27 05:00:09 -07:00 committed by Gerrit - the friendly Code Review server
commit 9ae0217aa6
3 changed files with 24 additions and 27 deletions

View File

@ -470,14 +470,12 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
return 1;
}
static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name)
static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp)) {
duprintf("arp_tables: arp check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) > e->next_offset)
return -EINVAL;
@ -518,10 +516,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size)
struct xt_target *target;
int ret;
ret = check_entry(e, name);
if (ret)
return ret;
t = arpt_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_ARP, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
@ -566,6 +560,7 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit ||
@ -581,6 +576,10 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@ -1239,7 +1238,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
}
/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e, name);
ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e);
if (ret)
return ret;

View File

@ -564,14 +564,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
}
static int
check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name)
check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip)) {
duprintf("ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
e->next_offset)
@ -661,10 +659,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
ret = check_entry(e, name);
if (ret)
return ret;
j = 0;
mtpar.net = net;
mtpar.table = name;
@ -728,6 +722,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit ||
@ -743,6 +738,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@ -1504,7 +1503,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
}
/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e, name);
ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e);
if (ret)
return ret;

View File

@ -574,14 +574,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
}
static int
check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name)
check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6)) {
duprintf("ip_tables: ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
e->next_offset)
@ -672,10 +670,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
ret = check_entry(e, name);
if (ret)
return ret;
j = 0;
mtpar.net = net;
mtpar.table = name;
@ -739,6 +733,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
@ -754,6 +749,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@ -1516,7 +1515,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
}
/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e, name);
ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e);
if (ret)
return ret;