netfilter: xt_qtaguid: remove AID_* dependency for access control

qtaguid limits what can be done with /ctrl and /stats based on group
membership.
This changes removes AID_NET_BW_STATS and AID_NET_BW_ACCT, and picks
up the groups from the gid of the matching proc entry files.

Signed-off-by: JP Abgrall <jpa@google.com>
Change-Id: I42e477adde78a12ed5eb58fbc0b277cdaadb6f94
This commit is contained in:
JP Abgrall 2013-01-04 18:18:36 -08:00 committed by Arve Hjønnevåg
parent 1ab68f5441
commit e585d17670
1 changed files with 26 additions and 25 deletions

View File

@ -53,25 +53,22 @@ static unsigned int proc_stats_perms = S_IRUGO;
module_param_named(stats_perms, proc_stats_perms, uint, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
static struct proc_dir_entry *xt_qtaguid_ctrl_file;
#ifdef CONFIG_ANDROID_PARANOID_NETWORK
/* Everybody can write. But proc_ctrl_write_limited is true by default which
* limits what can be controlled. See the can_*() functions.
*/
static unsigned int proc_ctrl_perms = S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO;
#else
static unsigned int proc_ctrl_perms = S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR;
#endif
module_param_named(ctrl_perms, proc_ctrl_perms, uint, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
#ifdef CONFIG_ANDROID_PARANOID_NETWORK
#include <linux/android_aid.h>
static gid_t proc_stats_readall_gid = AID_NET_BW_STATS;
static gid_t proc_ctrl_write_gid = AID_NET_BW_ACCT;
#else
/* 0 means, don't limit anybody */
static gid_t proc_stats_readall_gid;
static gid_t proc_ctrl_write_gid;
#endif
module_param_named(stats_readall_gid, proc_stats_readall_gid, uint,
/* Limited by default, so the gid of the ctrl and stats proc entries
* will limit what can be done. See the can_*() functions.
*/
static bool proc_stats_readall_limited = true;
static bool proc_ctrl_write_limited = true;
module_param_named(stats_readall_limited, proc_stats_readall_limited, bool,
S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
module_param_named(ctrl_write_gid, proc_ctrl_write_gid, uint,
module_param_named(ctrl_write_limited, proc_ctrl_write_limited, bool,
S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
/*
@ -242,8 +239,9 @@ static struct qtaguid_event_counts qtu_events;
static bool can_manipulate_uids(void)
{
/* root pwnd */
return unlikely(!current_fsuid()) || unlikely(!proc_ctrl_write_gid)
|| in_egroup_p(proc_ctrl_write_gid);
return in_egroup_p(xt_qtaguid_ctrl_file->gid)
|| unlikely(!current_fsuid()) || unlikely(!proc_ctrl_write_limited)
|| unlikely(current_fsuid() == xt_qtaguid_ctrl_file->uid);
}
static bool can_impersonate_uid(uid_t uid)
@ -254,9 +252,10 @@ static bool can_impersonate_uid(uid_t uid)
static bool can_read_other_uid_stats(uid_t uid)
{
/* root pwnd */
return unlikely(!current_fsuid()) || uid == current_fsuid()
|| unlikely(!proc_stats_readall_gid)
|| in_egroup_p(proc_stats_readall_gid);
return in_egroup_p(xt_qtaguid_stats_file->gid)
|| unlikely(!current_fsuid()) || uid == current_fsuid()
|| unlikely(!proc_stats_readall_limited)
|| unlikely(current_fsuid() == xt_qtaguid_ctrl_file->uid);
}
static inline void dc_add_byte_packets(struct data_counters *counters, int set,
@ -2302,11 +2301,12 @@ static int ctrl_cmd_tag(const char *input)
}
CT_DEBUG("qtaguid: ctrl_tag(%s): "
"pid=%u tgid=%u uid=%u euid=%u fsuid=%u "
"in_group=%d in_egroup=%d\n",
"ctrl.gid=%u in_group()=%d in_egroup()=%d\n",
input, current->pid, current->tgid, current_uid(),
current_euid(), current_fsuid(),
in_group_p(proc_ctrl_write_gid),
in_egroup_p(proc_ctrl_write_gid));
xt_qtaguid_ctrl_file->gid,
in_group_p(xt_qtaguid_ctrl_file->gid),
in_egroup_p(xt_qtaguid_ctrl_file->gid));
if (argc < 4) {
uid = current_fsuid();
} else if (!can_impersonate_uid(uid)) {
@ -2598,10 +2598,11 @@ static int pp_stats_line(struct proc_print_info *ppi, int cnt_set)
&& !can_read_other_uid_stats(stat_uid)) {
CT_DEBUG("qtaguid: stats line: "
"%s 0x%llx %u: insufficient priv "
"from pid=%u tgid=%u uid=%u\n",
"from pid=%u tgid=%u uid=%u stats.gid=%u\n",
ppi->iface_entry->ifname,
get_atag_from_tag(tag), stat_uid,
current->pid, current->tgid, current_fsuid());
current->pid, current->tgid, current_fsuid(),
xt_qtaguid_stats_file->gid);
return 0;
}
if (ppi->item_index++ < ppi->items_to_skip)