Piteball
/
android_kernel_samsung_msm8976
mirror of https://github.com/team-infusion-developers/android_kernel_samsung_msm8976.git
1
1
Fork 0
Code Issues Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into next 

Per pull request, for 3.5.
This commit is contained in:
James Morris 2012-05-22 11:21:06 +10:00
parent cffee16e8b c737f8284c
commit ff2bb047c4
33 changed files with 422 additions and 350 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
fs/open.c
View File

@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ static struct file *__dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
error = security_dentry_open(f, cred);
error = security_file_open(f, cred);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;

6
include/linux/lsm_audit.h
View File

@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ struct common_audit_data {
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD 8
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE 9
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY 10
struct task_struct *tsk;
union {
struct path path;
struct dentry *dentry;
@ -93,11 +92,6 @@ int ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb,
int ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto);
/* Initialize an LSM audit data structure. */
#define COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d, _t) \
{ memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct common_audit_data)); \
(_d)->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; }
void common_lsm_audit(struct common_audit_data *a,
void (*pre_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *),
void (*post_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *));

13
include/linux/security.h
View File

@ -640,10 +640,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* to receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC.
* @file contains the file structure being received.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
* Security hook for dentry
*
* @dentry_open
* @file_open
* Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon
* file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed
* since inode_permission.
@ -1498,7 +1495,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*file_send_sigiotask) (struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
int (*file_receive) (struct file *file);
int (*dentry_open) (struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
int (*file_open) (struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags);
void (*task_free) (struct task_struct *task);
@ -1757,7 +1754,7 @@ int security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file);
int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
@ -2228,8 +2225,8 @@ static inline int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
return 0;
}
static inline int security_dentry_open(struct file *file,
const struct cred *cred)
static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file,
const struct cred *cred)
{
return 0;
}

1
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
View File

@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <linux/cache.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <net/dst.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_STATISTICS

11
security/apparmor/audit.c
View File

@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = ca;
struct task_struct *tsk = sa->tsk ? sa->tsk : current;
struct task_struct *tsk = sa->aad->tsk ? sa->aad->tsk : current;
if (aa_g_audit_header) {
audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=");
@ -149,6 +149,12 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->name);
}
if (sa->aad->tsk) {
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
}
}
/**
@ -205,7 +211,8 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb);
if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, sa->tsk ? sa->tsk : current);
(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
sa->aad->tsk ? sa->aad->tsk : current);
if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
return complain_error(sa->aad->error);

4
security/apparmor/capability.c
View File

@ -65,10 +65,10 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, CAP);
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
sa.aad = &aad;
sa.tsk = task;
sa.u.cap = cap;
sa.aad->tsk = task;
sa.aad->op = OP_CAPABLE;
sa.aad->error = error;

2
security/apparmor/file.c
View File

@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
sa.aad = &aad;
aad.op = op,
aad.fs.request = request;

1
security/apparmor/include/audit.h
View File

@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
void *profile;
const char *name;
const char *info;
struct task_struct *tsk;
union {
void *target;
struct {

2
security/apparmor/ipc.c
View File

@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile,
{
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
sa.aad = &aad;
aad.op = OP_PTRACE;
aad.target = target;

2
security/apparmor/lib.c
View File

@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ void aa_info_message(const char *str)
if (audit_enabled) {
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
sa.aad = &aad;
aad.info = str;
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, NULL);

6
security/apparmor/lsm.c
View File

@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
AA_MAY_META_READ);
}
static int apparmor_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
struct aa_profile *profile;
@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
} else {
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
sa.aad = &aad;
aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
aad.info = name;
@ -640,9 +640,9 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
.path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod,
.path_chown = apparmor_path_chown,
.path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate,
.dentry_open = apparmor_dentry_open,
.inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr,
.file_open = apparmor_file_open,
.file_permission = apparmor_file_permission,
.file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security,
.file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security,

2
security/apparmor/policy.c
View File

@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ static int audit_policy(int op, gfp_t gfp, const char *name, const char *info,
{
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
sa.aad = &aad;
aad.op = op;
aad.name = name;

2
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
View File

@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *name,
struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
sa.aad = &aad;
if (e)
aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;

2
security/apparmor/resource.c
View File

@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
sa.aad = &aad;
aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT,
aad.rlim.rlim = resource;

4
security/capability.c
View File

@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static int cap_file_receive(struct file *file)
return 0;
}
static int cap_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
static int cap_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
return 0;
}
@ -956,7 +956,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_set_fowner);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_send_sigiotask);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_open);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_free);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank);

15
security/lsm_audit.c
View File

@ -213,12 +213,15 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
if (a->tsk)
tsk = a->tsk;
if (tsk && tsk->pid) {
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
}
/*
* To keep stack sizes in check force programers to notice if they
* start making this union too large! See struct lsm_network_audit
* as an example of how to deal with large data.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(a->u) > sizeof(void *)*2);
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
switch (a->type) {
case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE:

4
security/security.c
View File

@ -701,11 +701,11 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
return security_ops->file_receive(file);
}
int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
int ret;
ret = security_ops->dentry_open(file, cred);
ret = security_ops->file_open(file, cred);
if (ret)
return ret;

130
security/selinux/avc.c
View File

@ -65,14 +65,8 @@ struct avc_cache {
};
struct avc_callback_node {
int (*callback) (u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 perms,
u32 *out_retained);
int (*callback) (u32 event);
u32 events;
u32 ssid;
u32 tsid;
u16 tclass;
u32 perms;
struct avc_callback_node *next;
};
@ -436,9 +430,9 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ",
ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->tclass,
ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->audited);
ad->selinux_audit_data->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass,
ad->selinux_audit_data->audited);
audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
}
@ -452,25 +446,23 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
{
struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
audit_log_format(ab, " ");
avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->ssid,
ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->tsid,
ad->selinux_audit_data->slad->tclass);
avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
}
/* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
struct common_audit_data *a,
unsigned flags)
{
struct common_audit_data stack_data;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct selinux_late_audit_data slad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad;
if (!a) {
a = &stack_data;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
a->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
}
/*
@ -484,104 +476,34 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
(flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK))
return -ECHILD;
slad.tclass = tclass;
slad.requested = requested;
slad.ssid = ssid;
slad.tsid = tsid;
slad.audited = audited;
slad.denied = denied;
sad.tclass = tclass;
sad.requested = requested;
sad.ssid = ssid;
sad.tsid = tsid;
sad.audited = audited;
sad.denied = denied;
a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
a->selinux_audit_data->slad = &slad;
common_lsm_audit(a, avc_audit_pre_callback, avc_audit_post_callback);
return 0;
}
/**
* avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @requested: requested permissions
* @avd: access vector decisions
* @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
* @a: auxiliary audit data
* @flags: VFS walk flags
*
* Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
* with the policy. This function is typically called by
* avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be
* called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit()
* in order to separate the permission check from the auditing.
* For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must
* be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
* before calling the auditing code.
*/
inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a,
unsigned flags)
{
u32 denied, audited;
denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
if (unlikely(denied)) {
audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
/*
* a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in
* this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
* the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
* permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the
* actual permissions that were denied. As an example lets
* assume:
*
* denied == READ
* avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
* selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
*
* We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
* permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
* ACCESS
*/
if (a &&
a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny &&
!(a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
audited = 0;
} else if (result)
audited = denied = requested;
else
audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
if (likely(!audited))
return 0;
return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
requested, audited, denied,
a, flags);
}
/**
* avc_add_callback - Register a callback for security events.
* @callback: callback function
* @events: security events
* @ssid: source security identifier or %SECSID_WILD
* @tsid: target security identifier or %SECSID_WILD
* @tclass: target security class
* @perms: permissions
*
* Register a callback function for events in the set @events
* related to the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid)
* and the permissions @perms, interpreting
* @perms based on @tclass. Returns %0 on success or
* -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory exists to add the callback.
* Register a callback function for events in the set @events.
* Returns %0 on success or -%ENOMEM if insufficient memory
* exists to add the callback.
*/
int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 perms,
u32 *out_retained),
u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 perms)
int __init avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events)
{
struct avc_callback_node *c;
int rc = 0;
c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_ATOMIC);
c = kmalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!c) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
@ -589,9 +511,6 @@ int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
c->callback = callback;
c->events = events;
c->ssid = ssid;
c->tsid = tsid;
c->perms = perms;
c->next = avc_callbacks;
avc_callbacks = c;
out:
@ -731,8 +650,7 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
/* save the first error encountered for the return
value and continue processing the callbacks */
if (!rc)

258
security/selinux/hooks.c
View File

@ -1420,16 +1420,13 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct av_decision avd;
u16 sclass;
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
int rc;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.tsk = current;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
ad.u.cap = cap;
switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
@ -1488,20 +1485,6 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
}
static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
struct inode *inode,
u32 perms,
unsigned flags)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
ad.u.inode = inode;
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
}
/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
pathname if needed. */
@ -1511,11 +1494,9 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
ad.u.dentry = dentry;
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
}
@ -1528,11 +1509,9 @@ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
{
struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
ad.u.path = *path;
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
}
@ -1551,13 +1530,11 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
int rc;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
ad.u.path = file->f_path;
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
if (sid != fsec->sid) {
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
@ -1587,7 +1564,6 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
u32 sid, newsid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
int rc;
dsec = dir->i_security;
@ -1596,9 +1572,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
sid = tsec->sid;
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
ad.u.dentry = dentry;
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
@ -1643,7 +1618,6 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
{
struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
u32 av;
int rc;
@ -1651,9 +1625,8 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
dsec = dir->i_security;
isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
ad.u.dentry = dentry;
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
av = DIR__SEARCH;
av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
@ -1688,7 +1661,6 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
{
struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
u32 av;
int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
@ -1699,8 +1671,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
@ -1986,7 +1957,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
int rc;
@ -2032,8 +2002,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return rc;
}
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
@ -2123,8 +2092,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
struct files_struct *files)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
struct tty_struct *tty;
struct fdtable *fdt;
@ -2136,21 +2103,17 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
struct inode *inode;
/* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
file may belong to another process and we are only
interested in the inode-based check here. */
file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
struct tty_file_private, list);
file = file_priv->file;
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode,
FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) {
if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
drop_tty = 1;
}
}
spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
tty_kref_put(tty);
@ -2160,10 +2123,6 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
no_tty();
/* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
for (;;) {
unsigned long set, i;
@ -2500,7 +2459,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
int rc;
rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
@ -2511,8 +2469,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
return 0;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
}
@ -2521,10 +2478,8 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
}
@ -2684,14 +2639,35 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na
return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
}
static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
unsigned flags)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
int rc;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
ad.u.inode = inode;
rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
audited, denied, &ad, flags);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 perms;
bool from_access;
unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
u32 sid;
struct av_decision avd;
int rc, rc2;
u32 audited, denied;
from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
@ -2700,22 +2676,34 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
if (!mask)
return 0;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.inode = inode;
validate_creds(cred);
if (from_access)
ad.selinux_audit_data->auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
sid = cred_sid(cred);
isec = inode->i_security;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
&denied);
if (likely(!audited))
return rc;
rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags);
if (rc2)
return rc2;
return rc;
}
static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
__u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
/* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
@ -2729,7 +2717,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
av |= FILE__OPEN;
return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
}
static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
@ -2771,7 +2762,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
int rc = 0;
@ -2785,8 +2775,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EPERM;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
ad.u.dentry = dentry;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
@ -2796,8 +2785,25 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
if (rc == -EINVAL) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
size_t audit_size;
const char *str;
/* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
* context contains a nul and we should audit that */
str = value;
if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
audit_size = size - 1;
else
audit_size = size;
ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
audit_log_end(ab);
return rc;
}
rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
}
if (rc)
@ -2977,7 +2983,7 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
/* No change since dentry_open check. */
/* No change since file_open check. */
return 0;
return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
@ -3236,15 +3242,13 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
}
static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct file_security_struct *fsec;
struct inode *inode;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
fsec = file->f_security;
isec = inode->i_security;
isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
/*
* Save inode label and policy sequence number
* at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
@ -3262,7 +3266,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
* new inode label or new policy.
* This check is not redundant - do not remove.
*/
return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0);
return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file));
}
/* task security operations */
@ -3381,12 +3385,10 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
u32 sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
sid = task_sid(current);
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
@ -3759,15 +3761,13 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
{
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
return 0;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->sk = sk;
@ -3847,7 +3847,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
char *addrp;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
@ -3874,8 +3873,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
snum, &sid);
if (err)
goto out;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net->family = family;
@ -3909,8 +3907,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
if (err)
goto out;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net->family = family;
@ -3945,7 +3942,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
@ -3971,8 +3967,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
@ -4064,12 +4059,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
int err;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->sk = other;
@ -4098,11 +4091,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
@ -4140,12 +4131,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
char *addrp;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
ad.u.net->family = family;
@ -4175,7 +4164,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
u16 family = sk->sk_family;
u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
char *addrp;
u8 secmark_active;
@ -4200,8 +4188,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
return 0;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
ad.u.net->family = family;
@ -4539,7 +4526,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
char *addrp;
u32 peer_sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
u8 secmark_active;
u8 netlbl_active;
@ -4557,8 +4543,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
return NF_DROP;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
ad.u.net->family = family;
@ -4648,7 +4633,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
char *addrp;
u8 proto;
@ -4657,8 +4641,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
sksec = sk->sk_security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
ad.u.net->family = family;
@ -4683,7 +4666,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
u32 peer_sid;
struct sock *sk;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
char *addrp;
u8 secmark_active;
@ -4730,8 +4712,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
ad.u.net->family = family;
@ -4849,13 +4830,11 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = ipc_perms->security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
@ -4876,7 +4855,6 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
@ -4886,8 +4864,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@ -4908,13 +4885,11 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@ -4954,7 +4929,6 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct msg_security_struct *msec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
@ -4975,8 +4949,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
return rc;
}
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
/* Can this process write to the queue? */
@ -5001,15 +4974,13 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct msg_security_struct *msec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = task_sid(target);
int rc;
isec = msq->q_perm.security;
msec = msg->security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
@ -5025,7 +4996,6 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
@ -5035,8 +5005,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@ -5057,13 +5026,11 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@ -5121,7 +5088,6 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
int rc;
@ -5131,8 +5097,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@ -5153,13 +5118,11 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
{
struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@ -5339,8 +5302,23 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
}
error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
size_t audit_size;
/* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
* context contains a nul and we should audit that */
if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
audit_size = size - 1;
else
audit_size = size;
ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
audit_log_end(ab);
return error;
}
error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
&sid);
}
@ -5600,7 +5578,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
.file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
.dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
.file_open = selinux_file_open,
.task_create = selinux_task_create,
.cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,

100
security/selinux/include/avc.h
View File

@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ struct avc_cache_stats {
/*
* We only need this data after we have decided to send an audit message.
*/
struct selinux_late_audit_data {
struct selinux_audit_data {
u32 ssid;
u32 tsid;
u16 tclass;
@ -59,29 +59,87 @@ struct selinux_late_audit_data {
int result;
};
/*
* We collect this at the beginning or during an selinux security operation
*/
struct selinux_audit_data {
/*
* auditdeny is a bit tricky and unintuitive. See the
* comments in avc.c for it's meaning and usage.
*/
u32 auditdeny;
struct selinux_late_audit_data *slad;
};
/*
* AVC operations
*/
void __init avc_init(void);
int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct av_decision *avd,
int result,
struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags);
static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested,
struct av_decision *avd,
int result,
u32 auditdeny,
u32 *deniedp)
{
u32 denied, audited;
denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
if (unlikely(denied)) {
audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
/*
* auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in
* this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
* the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
* permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the
* actual permissions that were denied. As an example lets
* assume:
*
* denied == READ
* avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
* auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
*
* We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
* permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
* ACCESS
*/
if (auditdeny && !(auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
audited = 0;
} else if (result)
audited = denied = requested;
else
audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
*deniedp = denied;
return audited;
}
int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
struct common_audit_data *a,
unsigned flags);
/**
* avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @requested: requested permissions
* @avd: access vector decisions
* @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
* @a: auxiliary audit data
* @flags: VFS walk flags
*
* Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
* with the policy. This function is typically called by
* avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be
* called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit()
* in order to separate the permission check from the auditing.
* For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must
* be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
* before calling the auditing code.
*/
static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct av_decision *avd,
int result,
struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags)
{
u32 audited, denied;
audited = avc_audit_required(requested, avd, result, 0, &denied);
if (likely(!audited))
return 0;
return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
requested, audited, denied,
a, flags);
}
#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
@ -112,11 +170,7 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE 64
#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE 128
int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 perms,
u32 *out_retained),
u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 perms);
int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);
/* Exported to selinuxfs */
int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page);

4
security/selinux/include/security.h
View File

@ -31,13 +31,15 @@
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY 24
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS 25
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS 26
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS 27
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE 28
/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
#else
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE
#endif
/* Mask for just the mount related flags */

6
security/selinux/netif.c
View File

@ -252,8 +252,7 @@ static void sel_netif_flush(void)
spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
}
static int sel_netif_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
static int sel_netif_avc_callback(u32 event)
{
if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
sel_netif_flush();
@ -292,8 +291,7 @@ static __init int sel_netif_init(void)
register_netdevice_notifier(&sel_netif_netdev_notifier);
err = avc_add_callback(sel_netif_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
err = avc_add_callback(sel_netif_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
if (err)
panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);

6
security/selinux/netnode.c
View File

@ -297,8 +297,7 @@ static void sel_netnode_flush(void)
spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
}
static int sel_netnode_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
static int sel_netnode_avc_callback(u32 event)
{
if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
sel_netnode_flush();
@ -320,8 +319,7 @@ static __init int sel_netnode_init(void)
sel_netnode_hash[iter].size = 0;
}
ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netnode_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netnode_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
if (ret != 0)
panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret);

6
security/selinux/netport.c
View File

@ -234,8 +234,7 @@ static void sel_netport_flush(void)
spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
}
static int sel_netport_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
static int sel_netport_avc_callback(u32 event)
{
if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
sel_netport_flush();
@ -257,8 +256,7 @@ static __init int sel_netport_init(void)
sel_netport_hash[iter].size = 0;
}
ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netport_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
ret = avc_add_callback(sel_netport_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
if (ret != 0)
panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", ret);

11
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
View File

@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policy_ops = {
.read = sel_read_policy,
.mmap = sel_mmap_policy,
.release = sel_release_policy,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
};
static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
@ -1232,6 +1233,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
kfree(bool_pending_names[i]);
kfree(bool_pending_names);
kfree(bool_pending_values);
bool_num = 0;
bool_pending_names = NULL;
bool_pending_values = NULL;
@ -1532,11 +1534,6 @@ static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir)
return 0;
}
static inline unsigned int sel_div(unsigned long a, unsigned long b)
{
return a / b - (a % b < 0);
}
static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class)
{
return (class * (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1)) | SEL_CLASS_INO_OFFSET;
@ -1544,7 +1541,7 @@ static inline unsigned long sel_class_to_ino(u16 class)
static inline u16 sel_ino_to_class(unsigned long ino)
{
return sel_div(ino & SEL_INO_MASK, SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
return (ino & SEL_INO_MASK) / (SEL_VEC_MAX + 1);
}
static inline unsigned long sel_perm_to_ino(u16 class, u32 perm)
@ -1831,7 +1828,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
[SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
[SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
[SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO},
[SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUSR},
[SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUGO},
/* last one */ {""}
};
ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);

20
security/selinux/ss/context.h
View File

@ -74,6 +74,26 @@ out:
return rc;
}
/*
* Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the high level of 'src'.
*/
static inline int mls_context_cpy_high(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
{
int rc;
dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
if (rc)
goto out;
dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
if (rc)
ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
out:
return rc;
}
static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
{
return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&

24
security/selinux/ss/mls.c
View File

@ -517,6 +517,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
{
struct range_trans rtr;
struct mls_range *r;
struct class_datum *cladatum;
int default_range = 0;
if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
return 0;
@ -530,6 +532,28 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
r = hashtab_search(policydb.range_tr, &rtr);
if (r)
return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
if (cladatum)
default_range = cladatum->default_range;
}
switch (default_range) {
case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW:
return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH:
return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, scontext);
case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH:
return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW:
return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, tcontext);
case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH:
return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, tcontext);
case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext);
}
/* Fallthrough */
case AVTAB_CHANGE:
if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))

44
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
View File

@ -133,6 +133,16 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
};
static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
@ -1306,6 +1316,23 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
goto bad;
}
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
if (rc)
goto bad;
cladatum->default_user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
cladatum->default_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
cladatum->default_range = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
}
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 1);
if (rc)
goto bad;
cladatum->default_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
}
rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, cladatum);
if (rc)
goto bad;
@ -2832,6 +2859,23 @@ static int class_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
if (rc)
return rc;
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) {
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_user);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_role);
buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_range);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 3, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_type);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
return 0;
}

14
security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
View File

@ -60,6 +60,20 @@ struct class_datum {
struct symtab permissions; /* class-specific permission symbol table */
struct constraint_node *constraints; /* constraints on class permissions */
struct constraint_node *validatetrans; /* special transition rules */
/* Options how a new object user, role, and type should be decided */
#define DEFAULT_SOURCE 1
#define DEFAULT_TARGET 2
char default_user;
char default_role;
char default_type;
/* Options how a new object range should be decided */
#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW 1
#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH 2
#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH 3
#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW 4
#define DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH 5
#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH 6
char default_range;
};
/* Role attributes */

56
security/selinux/ss/services.c
View File

@ -1018,9 +1018,11 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
if (context->len) {
*scontext_len = context->len;
*scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!(*scontext))
return -ENOMEM;
if (scontext) {
*scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!(*scontext))
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
@ -1389,6 +1391,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
u32 *out_sid,
bool kern)
{
struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
struct avtab_key avkey;
@ -1437,12 +1440,20 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
goto out_unlock;
}
if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim)
cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
/* Set the user identity. */
switch (specified) {
case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
case AVTAB_CHANGE:
/* Use the process user identity. */
newcontext.user = scontext->user;
if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
} else {
/* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
/* Use the process user identity. */
newcontext.user = scontext->user;
}
break;
case AVTAB_MEMBER:
/* Use the related object owner. */
@ -1450,16 +1461,31 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
break;
}
/* Set the role and type to default values. */
if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
/* Use the current role and type of process. */
/* Set the role to default values. */
if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
newcontext.role = scontext->role;
newcontext.type = scontext->type;
} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
} else {
/* Use the well-defined object role. */
newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
/* Use the type of the related object. */
if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
newcontext.role = scontext->role;
else
newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
}
/* Set the type to default values. */
if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
newcontext.type = scontext->type;
} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
} else {
if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
/* Use the type of process. */
newcontext.type = scontext->type;
} else {
/* Use the type of the related object. */
newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
}
}
/* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
@ -3018,8 +3044,7 @@ out:
static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event)
{
int err = 0;
@ -3032,8 +3057,7 @@ static int __init aurule_init(void)
{
int err;
err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
if (err)
panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);

2
security/smack/smack.h
View File

@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
char type)
{
memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
memset(&a->sad, 0, sizeof(a->sad));
a->a.type = type;
a->a.smack_audit_data = &a->sad;
a->a.smack_audit_data->function = func;

6
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
View File

@ -1359,7 +1359,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
}
/**
* smack_dentry_open - Smack dentry open processing
* smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
* @file: the object
* @cred: unused
*
@ -1367,7 +1367,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
*
* Returns 0
*/
static int smack_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct inode_smack *isp = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
@ -3487,7 +3487,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask,
.file_receive = smack_file_receive,
.dentry_open = smack_dentry_open,
.file_open = smack_file_open,
.cred_alloc_blank = smack_cred_alloc_blank,
.cred_free = smack_cred_free,

6
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
View File

@ -319,14 +319,14 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
}
/**
* tomoyo_dentry_open - Target for security_dentry_open().
* tomoyo_file_open - Target for security_file_open().
*
* @f: Pointer to "struct file".
* @cred: Pointer to "struct cred".
*
* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
*/
static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
{
int flags = f->f_flags;
/* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */
@ -510,7 +510,7 @@ static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
.bprm_set_creds = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds,
.bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security,
.file_fcntl = tomoyo_file_fcntl,
.dentry_open = tomoyo_dentry_open,
.file_open = tomoyo_file_open,
.path_truncate = tomoyo_path_truncate,
.path_unlink = tomoyo_path_unlink,
.path_mkdir = tomoyo_path_mkdir,