c0336ddcb0
commit 4aea96f4237cea0c51a8bc87c0db31f0f932f1f0 upstream. info.mode and info.port are indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. These issues were detected with the help of Smatch: sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:72 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls' [w] (local cap) sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs' [w] (local cap) sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls' [w] (local cap) Fix this by sanitizing both info.mode and info.port before using them to index emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls, emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls and emu->portptrs. Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1]. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> |
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| .. | ||
| Makefile | ||
| emux.c | ||
| emux_effect.c | ||
| emux_hwdep.c | ||
| emux_nrpn.c | ||
| emux_oss.c | ||
| emux_proc.c | ||
| emux_seq.c | ||
| emux_synth.c | ||
| emux_voice.h | ||
| soundfont.c | ||