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https://github.com/team-infusion-developers/android_kernel_samsung_msm8976.git
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4e5ab4cb85
Add new per-packet access controls to SELinux, replacing the old packet controls. Packets are labeled with the iptables SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets, then security policy for the packets is enforced with these controls. To allow for a smooth transition to the new controls, the old code is still present, but not active by default. To restore previous behavior, the old controls may be activated at runtime by writing a '1' to /selinux/compat_net, and also via the kernel boot parameter selinux_compat_net. Switching between the network control models requires the security load_policy permission. The old controls will probably eventually be removed and any continued use is discouraged. With this patch, the new secmark controls for SElinux are disabled by default, so existing behavior is entirely preserved, and the user is not affected at all. It also provides a config option to enable the secmark controls by default (which can always be overridden at boot and runtime). It is also noted in the kconfig help that the user will need updated userspace if enabling secmark controls for SELinux and that they'll probably need the SECMARK and CONNMARK targets, and conntrack protocol helpers, although such decisions are beyond the scope of kernel configuration. Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
68 lines
1.9 KiB
C
68 lines
1.9 KiB
C
/*
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* SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks
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*
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* Author : Trent Jaeger, <jaegert@us.ibm.com>
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*/
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#ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
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#define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
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int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
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int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new);
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void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
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int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
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int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
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void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
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int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
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int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir);
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/*
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* Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket)
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*/
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static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk)
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{
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if (!sk->sk_socket)
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return NULL;
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return SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_security;
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}
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static inline u32 selinux_no_sk_sid(struct flowi *fl)
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{
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/* NOTE: no sock occurs on ICMP reply, forwards, ... */
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/* icmp_reply: authorize as kernel packet */
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if (fl && fl->proto == IPPROTO_ICMP) {
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return SECINITSID_KERNEL;
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}
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return SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
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int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
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int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
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u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk);
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u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
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#else
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static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
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{
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return SECSID_NULL;
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}
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static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
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{
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return SECSID_NULL;
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}
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#endif
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#endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
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