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Author SHA1 Message Date
Eric Dumazet
f322f61b7d net: cleanups in sock_setsockopt()
Use min_t()/max_t() macros, reformat two comments, use !!test_bit() to
match !!sock_flag()

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 8298193012)

Change-Id: I0ce9a8fda6dbe86101cc6e618069fb8fc5f77cbd
2017-03-01 19:44:16 -07:00
Flex1911
492b9b9938 flo/deb: rebrand device for LineageOS
Change-Id: I0a2c9f6c5f692a90c9a4988a435d0b5f891dc43a
2017-01-02 21:42:51 +11:00
Ben Romberger
1eec0b48dc ASoC: msm: qdsp6v2: Change audio drivers to use %pK
Change all qdsp6v2 audio driver to use %pK instead
of %p. %pK hides addresses when the users doesn't
have kernel permissions. If address information
is needed echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict.

Signed-off-by: Ben Romberger <bromberg@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Surendar karka <sukark@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit bb2bc015d50dd7e8158e36e8eec0f6000469155a)

Change-Id: I16d0103fbb5356506f0287732bbcfe83c79e4ace
2016-12-22 22:05:11 +11:00
Min Chong
fc0f8c5ad4 BACKPORT: usb: gadget: f_mbim: Change %p to %pK in debug messages
The format specifier %p can leak kernel addresses
while not valuing the kptr_restrict system settings.
Use %pK instead of %p, which also evaluates whether
kptr_restrict is set.

Bug: 31802656
Change-Id: I74e83192e0379586469edba3c7579a1cd75cf3c0
Signed-off-by: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
2016-12-22 22:05:10 +11:00
Min Chong
264e783c93 netfilter: Change %p to %pK in debug messages
The format specifier %p can leak kernel addresses
while not valuing the kptr_restrict system settings.
Use %pK instead of %p, which also evaluates whether
kptr_restrict is set.

Bug: 31796940
Change-Id: Ia2946d6b493126d68281f97778faf578247f088e
Signed-off-by: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
2016-12-22 22:05:10 +11:00
Steve Pfetsch
d39b8b9e21 drivers: video: Add bounds checking in fb_cmap_to_user
Verify that unsigned int value will not become negative before cast to
signed int.

Bug: 31651010
Change-Id: I548a200f678762042617f11100b6966a405a3920
2016-12-22 22:05:10 +11:00
Ping Li
1180db142c fbcmap: Remove unnecessary condition check
In fb_set_user_cmap function, cmap->start variable is an unsigned
integer, it doesn't need a condition check with the sign.

Change-Id: I355ddb7edcc085ee52e4054833b687640376eee3
Signed-off-by: Ping Li <pingli@codeaurora.org>
2016-12-22 22:05:10 +11:00
Pawan Kumar
423ee25484 fbmem: Check failure of FBIOPUTCMAP ioctl
On FBIOPUTCMAP ioctl failure deallocate
fb cmap. Put null check for cmap red, green,
blue component.

Change-Id: I10468ee30d0e76c256cf3d7a6ffe14db7fd4511b
Signed-off-by: Pawan Kumar <pavaku@codeaurora.org>
2016-12-22 22:05:09 +11:00
Siqi Lin
1197f828df net: ping: Fix stack buffer overflow in ping_common_sendmsg()
In ping_common_sendmsg(), when len < icmph_len, memcpy_fromiovec()
will access invalid memory because msg->msg_iov only has 1 element
and memcpy_fromiovec() attempts to increment it. KASAN report:

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy_fromiovec+0x60/0x114 at addr ffffffc071077da0
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c2/9623
page:ffffffbe034b9a08 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x0
flags: 0x0()
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
CPU: 0 PID: 9623 Comm: trinity-c2 Tainted: G    BU         3.18.0-dirty 
Hardware name: Google Tegra210 Smaug Rev 1,3+ (DT)
Call trace:
[<ffffffc000209c98>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ac arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:90
[<ffffffc000209e54>] show_stack+0x10/0x1c arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:171
[<     inline     >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffc000f18dc4>] dump_stack+0x7c/0xd0 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<     inline     >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:147
[<     inline     >] kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:236
[<ffffffc000373dcc>] kasan_report+0x380/0x4b8 mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<     inline     >] check_memory_region mm/kasan/kasan.c:264
[<ffffffc00037352c>] __asan_load8+0x20/0x70 mm/kasan/kasan.c:507
[<ffffffc0005b9624>] memcpy_fromiovec+0x5c/0x114 lib/iovec.c:15
[<     inline     >] memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:2667
[<ffffffc000ddeba0>] ping_common_sendmsg+0x50/0x108 net/ipv4/ping.c:674
[<ffffffc000dded30>] ping_v4_sendmsg+0xd8/0x698 net/ipv4/ping.c:714
[<ffffffc000dc91dc>] inet_sendmsg+0xe0/0x12c net/ipv4/af_inet.c:749
[<     inline     >] __sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:624
[<     inline     >] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632
[<ffffffc000cab61c>] sock_sendmsg+0x124/0x164 net/socket.c:643
[<     inline     >] SYSC_sendto net/socket.c:1797
[<ffffffc000cad270>] SyS_sendto+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:1761
Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffffffc071077c80: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1
 ffffffc071077d00: f1 f1 04 f4 f4 f4 f2 f2 f2 f2 04 f4 f4 f4 f2 f2
>ffffffc071077d80: f2 f2 00 00 f4 f4 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00
                               ^
 ffffffc071077e00: 00 f4 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffffffc071077e80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00

Bug: 31349935
Change-Id: Ib7385fc26dfe7e07e9bab42a10ff65a37cbaab54
Signed-off-by: Siqi Lin <siqilin@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit f13b36c3ff20b5208395fa83d6d2b6dc5e114a61)
2016-12-22 22:05:09 +11:00
Suman Mukherjee
a6c6ae09a6 msm: sensor: validate the i2c table index before use
Verifying the i2c table index value before accessing
the i2c table to avoid memory corruption issues.
CRs-Fixed: 1065916

Change-Id: I0e31c22f90006f27a77cd420288334b8355cee95
Signed-off-by: Sureshnaidu Laveti <lsuresh@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Suman Mukherjee <sumam@codeaurora.org>
2016-12-22 21:39:17 +11:00
Al Viro
6cbb0519f4 arm: fix handling of F_OFD_... in oabi_fcntl64()
Change-Id: I75054f88e8c2c10a61b100a20b00bfbf09ff7c4d
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.15+
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jeff.layton@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2016-12-12 15:36:07 +11:00
Philip Pettersson
f0cf70f5d0 packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.

This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.

The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.

Change-Id: Iec8b20f499134e1edd0f9214aa4dde477d1674e1
Fixes: f6fb8f100b ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-12 15:29:13 +11:00
Simon Shields
23301c6b39 flo: enable RPFILTER
Change-Id: I3b3b29743bdbe01b6e83b840158bd94c2e83edc6
2016-12-12 15:23:40 +11:00
Simon Shields
80f93fb9a3 Revert "Revert "video: mdp4: Color temperature interface using PCC""
This reverts commits c4e35c98f4,
c4e35c98f4.

Change-Id: I50e44e0c24144a04347760313e5dae576e6704e3
2016-11-28 21:01:22 +11:00
Simon Shields
c4e35c98f4 Revert "video: mdp4: Color temperature interface using PCC"
This reverts commit ecf3da5bd5.

Change-Id: I5a8daa6b8d52f71a6c4aabf801ecb70b7d1b83fa
2016-11-23 16:02:54 -08:00
Simon Shields
191b2f2b60 Revert "mdp4: pcc: fix PCC disablement"
This reverts commit 52d9e81de2.

Change-Id: I30adec69a9db3235c1399a8b6681603d4f5cc089
2016-11-23 16:02:30 -08:00
Dave Daynard
52d9e81de2 mdp4: pcc: fix PCC disablement
MDP_PP_OPS_DISABLE flag doesn't exist on A family, using it actually
completely disables PCC

Change-Id: Ib174ca08f634f9b256178f977bd5d59db751ef7c
2016-11-19 18:43:10 +11:00
Steve Kondik
ecf3da5bd5 video: mdp4: Color temperature interface using PCC
* MDP 4.2 supports Polynomial Color Correction. Use this to implement
   a simple sysfs API for adjusting RGB scaling values. This can be
   used to implement color temperature and other controls.
* Why use this when we have KCAL? This code is dead simple, the
   interface is in the right place, and it allows for 128X accuracy.

Change-Id: Iefb17e920225234d8503607bccb2d128bf5ec660
2016-11-19 18:43:10 +11:00
Liam Mark
82ab4b472e ion: disable system contig heap
A malicious application can take advantage of the ION contig heap to
create a specific memory chunk size to exercise a rowhammer attack on the
physical hardware.
So remove support for the ION contig heap.

Change-Id: I9cb454cebb74df291479cecc3533d2c684363f77
Signed-off-by: Liam Mark <lmark@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Prakash Gupta <guptap@codeaurora.org>
2016-11-14 05:17:26 -08:00
Michal Hocko
6c80480d01 mm, gup: close FOLL MAP_PRIVATE race
commit 19be0eaffa3ac7d8eb6784ad9bdbc7d67ed8e619 upstream.

faultin_page drops FOLL_WRITE after the page fault handler did the CoW
and then we retry follow_page_mask to get our CoWed page. This is racy,
however because the page might have been unmapped by that time and so
we would have to do a page fault again, this time without CoW. This
would cause the page cache corruption for FOLL_FORCE on MAP_PRIVATE
read only mappings with obvious consequences.

This is an ancient bug that was actually already fixed once by Linus
eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db975 ("Fix get_user_pages() race
for write access") but that was then undone due to problems on s390
by commit f33ea7f404 ("fix get_user_pages bug") because s390 didn't
have proper dirty pte tracking until abf09bed3c ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits"). This wasn't a problem at the time as pointed out
by Hugh Dickins because madvise relied on mmap_sem for write up until
0a27a14a62 ("mm: madvise avoid exclusive mmap_sem") but since then we
can race with madvise which can unmap the fresh COWed page or with KSM
and corrupt the content of the shared page.

This patch is based on the Linus' approach to not clear FOLL_WRITE after
the CoW page fault (aka VM_FAULT_WRITE) but instead introduces FOLL_COW
to note this fact. The flag is then rechecked during follow_pfn_pte to
enforce the page fault again if we do not see the CoWed page. Linus was
suggesting to check pte_dirty again as s390 is OK now. But that would
make backporting to some old kernels harder. So instead let's just make
sure that vm_normal_page sees a pure anonymous page.

This would guarantee we are seeing a real CoW page. Introduce
can_follow_write_pte which checks both pte_write and falls back to
PageAnon on forced write faults which passed CoW already. Thanks to Hugh
to point out that a special care has to be taken for KSM pages because
our COWed page might have been merged with a KSM one and keep its
PageAnon flag.

Change-Id: I164802be6d757c7a49b57416dfc9f4605ce0e1fb
Fixes: 0a27a14a62 ("mm: madvise avoid exclusive mmap_sem")
Reported-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Disclosed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Adjust filename, context, indentation
 - The 'no_page' exit path in follow_page() is different, so open-code the
   cleanup
 - Delete a now-unused label]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
2016-11-12 18:53:37 -07:00
Simon Shields
0023ada1ec Revert "mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from __get_user_pages()"
The patch was incorrectly backported.
Revert it to bring in the correct backport.

This reverts commit 82a3f4741a.

Change-Id: I0e502701d6653ce6f004cbcf154b1ccc57e216e7
2016-11-12 18:52:43 -07:00
Benjamin Tissoires
ebae6ed00f HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.

The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.

Change-Id: I11d44957b450a3eda258c05f9e833c71a079e83c
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2016-11-11 13:50:00 +11:00
Peter Hurley
1a2fccc947 BACKPORT: tty: Prevent ldisc drivers from re-using stale tty fields
(cherry picked from commit dd42bf1197144ede075a9d4793123f7689e164bc)

Line discipline drivers may mistakenly misuse ldisc-related fields
when initializing. For example, a failure to initialize tty->receive_room
in the N_GIGASET_M101 line discipline was recently found and fixed [1].
Now, the N_X25 line discipline has been discovered accessing the previous
line discipline's already-freed private data [2].

Harden the ldisc interface against misuse by initializing revelant
tty fields before instancing the new line discipline.

[1]
    commit fd98e9419d8d622a4de91f76b306af6aa627aa9c
    Author: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
    Date:   Tue Jul 14 00:37:13 2015 +0200

    isdn/gigaset: reset tty->receive_room when attaching ser_gigaset

[2] Report from Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
    [  634.336761] ==================================================================
    [  634.338226] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_asy_open_tty+0x13d/0x490 at addr ffff8800a743efd0
    [  634.339558] Read of size 4 by task syzkaller_execu/8981
    [  634.340359] =============================================================================
    [  634.341598] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
    ...
    [  634.405018] Call Trace:
    [  634.405277] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
    [  634.405775] print_trailer (mm/slub.c:655)
    [  634.406361] object_err (mm/slub.c:662)
    [  634.406824] kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:138 mm/kasan/report.c:236)
    [  634.409581] __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279)
    [  634.411355] x25_asy_open_tty (drivers/net/wan/x25_asy.c:559 (discriminator 1))
    [  634.413997] tty_ldisc_open.isra.2 (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:447)
    [  634.414549] tty_set_ldisc (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:567)
    [  634.415057] tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2646 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2879)
    [  634.423524] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607)
    [  634.427491] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613)
    [  634.427945] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:188)

Cc: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: Ibed6feadfb9706d478f93feec3b240aecfc64af3
Bug: 30951112
2016-11-11 13:49:30 +11:00
Paul Moore
2b53ad2c75 BACKPORT: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
(cherry picked from commit 43761473c254b45883a64441dd0bc85a42f3645c)

There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1].  Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.

This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s).  In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).

As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:

 * https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25

[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.

[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data.  I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation).  The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.

Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change-Id: I10e979e94605e3cf8d461e3e521f8f9837228aa5
Bug: 30956807
2016-11-11 13:44:38 +11:00
Peter Zijlstra
145365bfb6 perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.

Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.

When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.

Change-Id: I751faf3215bbdaa6b6358f3a752bdd24126cfa0b
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-11-11 13:37:45 +11:00
Vladis Dronov
e74a14ad5f ALSA: usb-audio: Fix double-free in error paths after snd_usb_add_audio_stream() call
create_fixed_stream_quirk(), snd_usb_parse_audio_interface() and
create_uaxx_quirk() functions allocate the audioformat object by themselves
and free it upon error before returning. However, once the object is linked
to a stream, it's freed again in snd_usb_audio_pcm_free(), thus it'll be
double-freed, eventually resulting in a memory corruption.

This patch fixes these failures in the error paths by unlinking the audioformat
object before freeing it.

Based on a patch by Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

[Note for stable backports:
 this patch requires the commit 902eb7fd1e4a ('ALSA: usb-audio: Minor
 code cleanup in create_fixed_stream_quirk()')]

Change-Id: I129dc4f3b0ae4cb6f790c16d24dd768c9ee06822
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1283358
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # see the note above
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2016-11-11 13:37:28 +11:00
Takashi Iwai
74f53621d2 ALSA: usb-audio: Minor code cleanup in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
Just a minor code cleanup: unify the error paths.

Change-Id: I31346b08ed1024819c58eff797c63bb42c283512
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2016-11-11 13:37:09 +11:00
Calvin Owens
aa37926b7e sg: Fix double-free when drives detach during SG_IO
In sg_common_write(), we free the block request and return -ENODEV if
the device is detached in the middle of the SG_IO ioctl().

Unfortunately, sg_finish_rem_req() also tries to free srp->rq, so we
end up freeing rq->cmd in the already free rq object, and then free
the object itself out from under the current user.

This ends up corrupting random memory via the list_head on the rq
object. The most common crash trace I saw is this:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at block/blk-core.c:1420!
  Call Trace:
  [<ffffffff81281eab>] blk_put_request+0x5b/0x80
  [<ffffffffa0069e5b>] sg_finish_rem_req+0x6b/0x120 [sg]
  [<ffffffffa006bcb9>] sg_common_write.isra.14+0x459/0x5a0 [sg]
  [<ffffffff8125b328>] ? selinux_file_alloc_security+0x48/0x70
  [<ffffffffa006bf95>] sg_new_write.isra.17+0x195/0x2d0 [sg]
  [<ffffffffa006cef4>] sg_ioctl+0x644/0xdb0 [sg]
  [<ffffffff81170f80>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x90/0x520
  [<ffffffff81258967>] ? file_has_perm+0x97/0xb0
  [<ffffffff811714a1>] SyS_ioctl+0x91/0xb0
  [<ffffffff81602afb>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
    RIP [<ffffffff81281e04>] __blk_put_request+0x154/0x1a0

The solution is straightforward: just set srp->rq to NULL in the
failure branch so that sg_finish_rem_req() doesn't attempt to re-free
it.

Additionally, since sg_rq_end_io() will never be called on the object
when this happens, we need to free memory backing ->cmd if it isn't
embedded in the object itself.

KASAN was extremely helpful in finding the root cause of this bug.

Change-Id: I8c2389a4e2e1b5f753a47f8af60502a761b891b5
Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2016-11-11 13:36:31 +11:00
Omar Sandoval
dbe124efba block: fix use-after-free in sys_ioprio_get()
get_task_ioprio() accesses the task->io_context without holding the task
lock and thus can race with exit_io_context(), leading to a
use-after-free. The reproducer below hits this within a few seconds on
my 4-core QEMU VM:

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	pid_t pid, child;
	long nproc, i;

	/* ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE, 0)); */
	syscall(SYS_ioprio_set, 1, 0, 0x6000);

	nproc = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);

	for (i = 0; i < nproc; i++) {
		pid = fork();
		assert(pid != -1);
		if (pid == 0) {
			for (;;) {
				pid = fork();
				assert(pid != -1);
				if (pid == 0) {
					_exit(0);
				} else {
					child = wait(NULL);
					assert(child == pid);
				}
			}
		}

		pid = fork();
		assert(pid != -1);
		if (pid == 0) {
			for (;;) {
				/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
				syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
			}
		}
	}

	for (;;) {
		/* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */
		syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0);
	}

	return 0;
}

This gets us KASAN dumps like this:

[   35.526914] ==================================================================
[   35.530009] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in get_task_ioprio+0x7b/0x90 at addr ffff880066f34e6c
[   35.530009] Read of size 2 by task ioprio-gpf/363
[   35.530009] =============================================================================
[   35.530009] BUG blkdev_ioc (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
[   35.530009] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

[   35.530009] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[   35.530009] INFO: Allocated in create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370 age=0 cpu=0 pid=360
[   35.530009] 	___slab_alloc+0x55d/0x5a0
[   35.530009] 	__slab_alloc.isra.20+0x2b/0x40
[   35.530009] 	kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x84/0x200
[   35.530009] 	create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370
[   35.530009] 	get_task_io_context+0x92/0xb0
[   35.530009] 	copy_process.part.8+0x5029/0x5660
[   35.530009] 	_do_fork+0x155/0x7e0
[   35.530009] 	SyS_clone+0x19/0x20
[   35.530009] 	do_syscall_64+0x195/0x3a0
[   35.530009] 	return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
[   35.530009] INFO: Freed in put_io_context+0xe7/0x120 age=0 cpu=0 pid=1060
[   35.530009] 	__slab_free+0x27b/0x3d0
[   35.530009] 	kmem_cache_free+0x1fb/0x220
[   35.530009] 	put_io_context+0xe7/0x120
[   35.530009] 	put_io_context_active+0x238/0x380
[   35.530009] 	exit_io_context+0x66/0x80
[   35.530009] 	do_exit+0x158e/0x2b90
[   35.530009] 	do_group_exit+0xe5/0x2b0
[   35.530009] 	SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20
[   35.530009] 	entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4
[   35.530009] INFO: Slab 0xffffea00019bcd00 objects=20 used=4 fp=0xffff880066f34ff0 flags=0x1fffe0000004080
[   35.530009] INFO: Object 0xffff880066f34e58 @offset=3672 fp=0x0000000000000001
[   35.530009] ==================================================================

Fix it by grabbing the task lock while we poke at the io_context.

Change-Id: I4261aaf076fab943a80a45b0a77e023aa4ecbbd8
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
2016-11-11 13:35:57 +11:00
Vegard Nossum
415e7642f8 block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:

    ==================================================================
    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
    Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
    =============================================================================
    BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
    INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
            ___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
            __slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
            kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
            disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
            traverse+0x176/0x860
            seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
            proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
            do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
            do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
            vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
            do_preadv+0x126/0x170
            SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
            do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
            return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
    INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
            __slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
            kfree+0x20a/0x220
            disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
            traverse+0x3b5/0x860
            seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
            proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
            do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
            do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
            vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
            do_preadv+0x126/0x170
            SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
            do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
            return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a

    CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G    B           4.7.0+ 
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
     ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
     ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
     ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
     [<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
     [<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
     [<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
     [<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
     [<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
     [<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
     [<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
     [<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
     [<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
     [<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
     [<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
     [<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
     [<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
     [<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10

This problem can occur in the following situation:

open()
 - pread()
    - .seq_start()
       - iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
       - seqf->private = iter
    - .seq_stop()
       - kfree(seqf->private)
 - pread()
    - .seq_start()
       - iter = kmalloc() // fails
    - .seq_stop()
       - class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer

As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.

An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.

Change-Id: I41ee55505a213f99a92ce630885e6c31b4b60232
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
2016-11-11 13:32:03 +11:00
Linus Torvalds
82a3f4741a mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from __get_user_pages()
commit 19be0eaffa3ac7d8eb6784ad9bdbc7d67ed8e619 upstream.

This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db975 ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404 ("fix get_user_pages bug").

In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better).  The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3c ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9.  Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.

Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.

To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.

Change-Id: Ifcb16e37ceb6b8845d7a77a97f5fda6670d08378
Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[wt: s/gup.c/memory.c; s/follow_page_pte/follow_page_mask;
     s/faultin_page/__get_user_page]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
(cherry picked from commit 59747d5d21)
2016-10-31 05:37:50 -07:00
David Howells
9537b8ff2e KEYS: Fix short sprintf buffer in /proc/keys show function
Fix a short sprintf buffer in proc_keys_show().  If the gcc stack protector
is turned on, this can cause a panic due to stack corruption.

The problem is that xbuf[] is not big enough to hold a 64-bit timeout
rendered as weeks:

	(gdb) p 0xffffffffffffffffULL/(60*60*24*7)
	$2 = 30500568904943

That's 14 chars plus NUL, not 11 chars plus NUL.

Expand the buffer to 16 chars.

I think the unpatched code apparently works if the stack-protector is not
enabled because on a 32-bit machine the buffer won't be overflowed and on a
64-bit machine there's a 64-bit aligned pointer at one side and an int that
isn't checked again on the other side.

The panic incurred looks something like:

Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff81352ebe
CPU: 0 PID: 1692 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.7.2-201.fc24.x86_64 
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
 0000000000000086 00000000fbbd2679 ffff8800a044bc00 ffffffff813d941f
 ffffffff81a28d58 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc88 ffffffff811b2cb6
 ffff880000000010 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc30 00000000fbbd2679
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff813d941f>] dump_stack+0x63/0x84
 [<ffffffff811b2cb6>] panic+0xde/0x22a
 [<ffffffff81352ebe>] ? proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0
 [<ffffffff8109f7f9>] __stack_chk_fail+0x19/0x30
 [<ffffffff81352ebe>] proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0
 [<ffffffff81350410>] ? key_validate+0x50/0x50
 [<ffffffff8134db30>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
 [<ffffffff8126b31c>] seq_read+0x2cc/0x390
 [<ffffffff812b6b12>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70
 [<ffffffff81244fc7>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x150
 [<ffffffff81357020>] ? security_file_permission+0xa0/0xc0
 [<ffffffff81246156>] vfs_read+0x96/0x130
 [<ffffffff81247635>] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
 [<ffffffff817eb872>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4

Change-Id: I0787d5a38c730ecb75d3c08f28f0ab36295d59e7
Reported-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
2016-10-31 23:36:27 +11:00
Eric Dumazet
1c6a02e572 tcp: fix use after free in tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue()
When tcp_sendmsg() allocates a fresh and empty skb, it puts it at the
tail of the write queue using tcp_add_write_queue_tail()

Then it attempts to copy user data into this fresh skb.

If the copy fails, we undo the work and remove the fresh skb.

Unfortunately, this undo lacks the change done to tp->highest_sack and
we can leave a dangling pointer (to a freed skb)

Later, tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue() can dereference this pointer and
access freed memory. For regular kernels where memory is not unmapped,
this might cause SACK bugs because tcp_highest_sack_seq() is buggy,
returning garbage instead of tp->snd_nxt, but with various debug
features like CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, this can crash the kernel.

This bug was found by Marco Grassi thanks to syzkaller.

Change-Id: I264f97d30d0a623011d9ee811c63fa0e0c2149a2
Fixes: 6859d49475 ("[TCP]: Abstract tp->highest_sack accessing & point to next skb")
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-31 23:36:25 +11:00
Lars-Peter Clausen
c2f44eb7b6 ALSA: control: Fix replacing user controls
There are two issues with the current implementation for replacing user
controls. The first is that the code does not check if the control is actually a
user control and neither does it check if the control is owned by the process
that tries to remove it. That allows userspace applications to remove arbitrary
controls, which can cause a user after free if a for example a driver does not
expect a control to be removed from under its feed.

The second issue is that on one hand when a control is replaced the
user_ctl_count limit is not checked and on the other hand the user_ctl_count is
increased (even though the number of user controls does not change). This allows
userspace, once the user_ctl_count limit as been reached, to repeatedly replace
a control until user_ctl_count overflows. Once that happens new controls can be
added effectively bypassing the user_ctl_count limit.

Both issues can be fixed by instead of open-coding the removal of the control
that is to be replaced to use snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(). This function does
proper permission checks as well as decrements user_ctl_count after the control
has been removed.

Note that by using snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl() the check which returns -EBUSY at
beginning of the function if the control already exists is removed. This is not
a problem though since the check is quite useless, because the lock that is
protecting the control list is released between the check and before adding the
new control to the list, which means that it is possible that a different
control with the same settings is added to the list after the check. Luckily
there is another check that is done while holding the lock in snd_ctl_add(), so
we'll rely on that to make sure that the same control is not added twice.

Change-Id: Ia4bd6bff33e86ee8b971031381d07b80bd383171
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2016-10-31 23:36:23 +11:00
Nick Desaulniers
c3f8d15467 fs: ext4: disable support for fallocate FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE
Bug: 28760453
Change-Id: I019c2de559db9e4b95860ab852211b456d78c4ca
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
2016-10-31 23:29:10 +11:00
Nick Desaulniers
f1c0c6df64 binder: prevent kptr leak by using %pK format specifier
Works in conjunction with kptr_restrict.
Bug: 30143283

Change-Id: I2b3ce22f4e206e74614d51453a1d59b7080ab05a
2016-10-31 23:26:31 +11:00
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
a84ab4f34b net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path
The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free:

  Call Trace:
   [<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295
   [<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261
   [<     inline     >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281
   [<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270
   [<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
  arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185

And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the
reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return
some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set
sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it.

Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Fixes: a2e2725541 ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall")
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160122211644.GC2470@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Change-Id: Ie3b6ee89ad3e8cd3a0fe8f50f74aaa4834d0b4ca
2016-10-31 23:25:23 +11:00
Weiyin Jiang
1301ad430e ASoC: msm: audio-effects: misc fixes in h/w accelerated
effect

Adding memory copy size check and integer overflow check in h/w
accelerated effect driver.

Change-Id: I17d4cc0a38770f0c5067fa8047cd63e7bf085e48
CRs-Fixed: 1006609
Signed-off-by: Weiyin Jiang <wjiang@codeaurora.org>
2016-10-31 23:20:27 +11:00
Karthikeyan Ramasubramanian
f6c251ef75 net: ipc_router: Bind only a client port as control port
IPC Router binds any port as a control port and moves it from the client
port list to control port list. Misbehaving clients can exploit this
incorrect behavior.

IPC Router to check if the port is a client port before binding it as a
control port.

CRs-Fixed: 974577
Change-Id: I9f189b76967d5f85750218a7cb6537d187a69663
Signed-off-by: Karthikeyan Ramasubramanian <kramasub@codeaurora.org>
2016-10-31 23:08:48 +11:00
Sunil Khatri
c7bc413d93 ashmem: Validate ashmem memory with fops pointer
Validate the ashmem memory entry against f_op pointer
rather then comparing its name with path of the dentry.

This is to avoid any invalid access to ashmem area in cases
where some one deliberately set the dentry name to /ashmem.

Change-Id: I74e50cd244f68cb13009cf2355e528485f4de34b
Signed-off-by: Sunil Khatri <sunilkh@codeaurora.org>
2016-10-31 23:03:53 +11:00
Florian Westphal
71db8fdf0f UPSTREAM: netfilter: x_tables: validate e->target_offset early
(cherry pick from commit bdf533de6968e9686df777dc178486f600c6e617)

We should check that e->target_offset is sane before
mark_source_chains gets called since it will fetch the target entry
for loop detection.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Change-Id: Ic2dbc31c9525d698e94d4d8875886acf3524abbd
Bug: 29637687
2016-10-31 23:01:48 +11:00
Florian Westphal
efeea2b956 netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.

Change-Id: I22f514057d3e0403d1af61f4d9555403ab9f72ea
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
2016-10-31 23:00:43 +11:00
Scott Bauer
cd3f4552ef HID: hiddev: validate num_values for HIDIOCGUSAGES, HIDIOCSUSAGES commands
This patch validates the num_values parameter from userland during the
HIDIOCGUSAGES and HIDIOCSUSAGES commands. Previously, if the report id was set
to HID_REPORT_ID_UNKNOWN, we would fail to validate the num_values parameter
leading to a heap overflow.

Change-Id: I10866ee01c7ba430eab2b5cc3356c9519c7f9730
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2016-10-31 22:59:04 +11:00
Eric W. Biederman
61f1c9ad34 mnt: Fail collect_mounts when applied to unmounted mounts
The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c

In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into
collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree
pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path.   In those cases
collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and
if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts
it is reasonable to fail early.

The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path
check.  But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with
the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears
reasonable.

Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit
unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts
that appear in the mount tree.

Change-Id: I2edfee6d6951a2179ce8f53785b65ddb1eb95629
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-10-31 22:51:16 +11:00
Dan Carpenter
0f76e6ad56 KEYS: potential uninitialized variable
If __key_link_begin() failed then "edit" would be uninitialized.  I've
added a check to fix that.

Change-Id: I0e28bdba07f645437db2b08daf67ca27f16c6f5c
Fixes: f70e2e0619 ('KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
2016-10-31 22:49:16 +11:00
Vladis Dronov
cdd4896645 Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.

Change-Id: I02fa4ffcbe9a71948947ef5baeb72632688d9d07
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
2016-10-31 22:46:10 +11:00
Julia Lawall
45fcc17a90 Input: aiptek - adjust error-handling code label
At the point of this error-handling code, aiptek->urb has been allocated,
and it does not appear to be less necessary to free it here than in the
error-handling code just below.

Change-Id: I1b07d7cd62a3df78759dd5a9a5ad27e58350df01
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@mail.ru>
2016-10-31 22:45:54 +11:00
Benjamin Randazzo
7f5686b2df md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
commit b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16 upstream.

In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".

5769         file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770         if (!file)
5771                 return -ENOMEM;

This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.

5786         if (err == 0 &&
5787             copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788                 err = -EFAULT

But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.

5775         /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776         if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777                 file->pathname[0] = '\0';

Change-Id: I7cd2a3c7fad2e2cb9edb8b4eff2af8a3a8f40149
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
[lizf: Backported to 3.4: fix both branches]
Signed-off-by: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
2016-10-31 22:27:40 +11:00
Sabrina Dubroca
955be94706 net: add length argument to skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec
Without this length argument, we can read past the end of the iovec in
memcpy_toiovec because we have no way of knowing the total length of the
iovec's buffers.

This is needed for stable kernels where 89c22d8c3b27 ("net: Fix skb
csum races when peeking") has been backported but that don't have the
ioviter conversion, which is almost all the stable trees <= 3.18.

This also fixes a kernel crash for NFS servers when the client uses
 -onfsvers=3,proto=udp to mount the export.

Change-Id: I1865e3d7a1faee42a5008a9ad58c4d3323ea4bab
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
2016-10-31 22:26:43 +11:00
Thierry Strudel
1bbb8f5128 flo: disable CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT
Bug: 28522518
Change-Id: I11ec8e02bdb330c10f06e923c1c3d45a145ced15
Signed-off-by: Thierry Strudel <tstrudel@google.com>
2016-10-29 23:12:41 +08:00