Commit 9183df25fe7b ("shm: add memfd_create() syscall") added a new
system call (memfd_create) but didn't update the asm-generic unistd
header.
This patch adds the new system call to the asm-generic version of
unistd.h so that it can be used by architectures such as arm64.
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
memfd_create() is similar to mmap(MAP_ANON), but returns a file-descriptor
that you can pass to mmap(). It can support sealing and avoids any
connection to user-visible mount-points. Thus, it's not subject to quotas
on mounted file-systems, but can be used like malloc()'ed memory, but with
a file-descriptor to it.
memfd_create() returns the raw shmem file, so calls like ftruncate() can
be used to modify the underlying inode. Also calls like fstat() will
return proper information and mark the file as regular file. If you want
sealing, you can specify MFD_ALLOW_SEALING. Otherwise, sealing is not
supported (like on all other regular files).
Compared to O_TMPFILE, it does not require a tmpfs mount-point and is not
subject to a filesystem size limit. It is still properly accounted to
memcg limits, though, and to the same overcommit or no-overcommit
accounting as all user memory.
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If two processes share a common memory region, they usually want some
guarantees to allow safe access. This often includes:
- one side cannot overwrite data while the other reads it
- one side cannot shrink the buffer while the other accesses it
- one side cannot grow the buffer beyond previously set boundaries
If there is a trust-relationship between both parties, there is no need
for policy enforcement. However, if there's no trust relationship (eg.,
for general-purpose IPC) sharing memory-regions is highly fragile and
often not possible without local copies. Look at the following two
use-cases:
1) A graphics client wants to share its rendering-buffer with a
graphics-server. The memory-region is allocated by the client for
read/write access and a second FD is passed to the server. While
scanning out from the memory region, the server has no guarantee that
the client doesn't shrink the buffer at any time, requiring rather
cumbersome SIGBUS handling.
2) A process wants to perform an RPC on another process. To avoid huge
bandwidth consumption, zero-copy is preferred. After a message is
assembled in-memory and a FD is passed to the remote side, both sides
want to be sure that neither modifies this shared copy, anymore. The
source may have put sensible data into the message without a separate
copy and the target may want to parse the message inline, to avoid a
local copy.
While SIGBUS handling, POSIX mandatory locking and MAP_DENYWRITE provide
ways to achieve most of this, the first one is unproportionally ugly to
use in libraries and the latter two are broken/racy or even disabled due
to denial of service attacks.
This patch introduces the concept of SEALING. If you seal a file, a
specific set of operations is blocked on that file forever. Unlike locks,
seals can only be set, never removed. Hence, once you verified a specific
set of seals is set, you're guaranteed that no-one can perform the blocked
operations on this file, anymore.
An initial set of SEALS is introduced by this patch:
- SHRINK: If SEAL_SHRINK is set, the file in question cannot be reduced
in size. This affects ftruncate() and open(O_TRUNC).
- GROW: If SEAL_GROW is set, the file in question cannot be increased
in size. This affects ftruncate(), fallocate() and write().
- WRITE: If SEAL_WRITE is set, no write operations (besides resizing)
are possible. This affects fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE), mmap() and
write().
- SEAL: If SEAL_SEAL is set, no further seals can be added to a file.
This basically prevents the F_ADD_SEAL operation on a file and
can be set to prevent others from adding further seals that you
don't want.
The described use-cases can easily use these seals to provide safe use
without any trust-relationship:
1) The graphics server can verify that a passed file-descriptor has
SEAL_SHRINK set. This allows safe scanout, while the client is
allowed to increase buffer size for window-resizing on-the-fly.
Concurrent writes are explicitly allowed.
2) For general-purpose IPC, both processes can verify that SEAL_SHRINK,
SEAL_GROW and SEAL_WRITE are set. This guarantees that neither
process can modify the data while the other side parses it.
Furthermore, it guarantees that even with writable FDs passed to the
peer, it cannot increase the size to hit memory-limits of the source
process (in case the file-storage is accounted to the source).
The new API is an extension to fcntl(), adding two new commands:
F_GET_SEALS: Return a bitset describing the seals on the file. This
can be called on any FD if the underlying file supports
sealing.
F_ADD_SEALS: Change the seals of a given file. This requires WRITE
access to the file and F_SEAL_SEAL may not already be set.
Furthermore, the underlying file must support sealing and
there may not be any existing shared mapping of that file.
Otherwise, EBADF/EPERM is returned.
The given seals are _added_ to the existing set of seals
on the file. You cannot remove seals again.
The fcntl() handler is currently specific to shmem and disabled on all
files. A file needs to explicitly support sealing for this interface to
work. A separate syscall is added in a follow-up, which creates files that
support sealing. There is no intention to support this on other
file-systems. Semantics are unclear for non-volatile files and we lack any
use-case right now. Therefore, the implementation is specific to shmem.
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Ryan Lortie <desrt@desrt.ca>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The systemd plumbers expressed a wish that tmpfs support preallocation.
Cong Wang wrote a patch, but several kernel guys expressed scepticism:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/11/18/137
Christoph Hellwig: What for exactly? Please explain why preallocating on
tmpfs would make any sense.
Kay Sievers: To be able to safely use mmap(), regarding SIGBUS, on files
on the /dev/shm filesystem. The glibc fallback loop for -ENOSYS [or
-EOPNOTSUPP] on fallocate is just ugly.
Hugh Dickins: If tmpfs is going to support
fallocate(FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE), it would seem perverse to permit the
deallocation but fail the allocation. Christoph Hellwig: Agreed.
Now that we do have shmem_fallocate() for hole-punching, plumb in basic
support for preallocation mode too. It's fairly straightforward (though
quite a few details needed attention), except for when it fails part way
through. What a pity that fallocate(2) was not specified to return the
length allocated, permitting short fallocations!
As it is, when it fails part way through, we ought to free what has just
been allocated by this system call; but must be very sure not to free any
allocated earlier, or any allocated by racing accesses (not all excluded
by i_mutex).
But we cannot distinguish them: so in this patch simply leak allocations
on partial failure (they will be freed later if the file is removed).
An attractive alternative approach would have been for fallocate() not to
allocate pages at all, but note reservations by entries in the radix-tree.
But that would give less assurance, and, critically, would be hard to fit
with mem cgroups (who owns the reservations?): allocating pages lets
fallocate() behave in just the same way as write().
Change-Id: I48e9a02d087213ffd74ffd65f2f29d71bcf07eab
Based-on-patch-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: Kay Sievers <kay@vrfy.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* We have literally no dt, so we need to at least fake the fact
that we support this sort of thing...
Change-Id: Ic508f27ffc67a8d9699a2e9fe6795d8bdecb9aeb
Opening of multiple instance of voice_svc user space from app will
lead to pointer deference of private data within apr callback. As
multi-instance not supported added check to deny open() from user
space if previous instance hasn't been closed.
Change-Id: Ia5ef16c69a517760fc9d45530a8a41a333fa2a21
Signed-off-by: Ajit Pandey <ajitp@codeaurora.org>
[haggertk: Backport to 3.4/msm8974]
CVE-2019-10497
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Issue is seen when apr callback is received while voice_svc_release
is in process of freeing the driver private data.
Avoid invalid access of private data pointer by putting
the callback and release functions in the same locked context.
Change-Id: I93af13cab0a3c7e653a9bc9fa7f4f86bfa0502df
Signed-off-by: smanag <smanag@codeaurora.org>
[haggertk: Backport to 3.4/msm8974]
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
The range checking for audio buffer copying in function
"audio_in_write" is using the incorrect buffer size.
Change it to the actual allocated audio buffer size.
Change-Id: Ib7aaa2163c0d99161369eb85d09dc2d23d8c787b
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyu Ye <benyxy@codeaurora.org>
[haggertk: Backport to 3.4/msm8974]
CVE-2019-2341
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Adding code changes to validate buffer size.
While calling ipa_read verifying the kernel buffer
size in range or not.
Change-Id: Idc608c2cf0587a00f19ece38a4eb646f7fde68e3
Signed-off-by: Praveen Kurapati <pkurapat@codeaurora.org>
CVE-2019-2333
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Free the memory pointed by msg pointer if
copy_to_user fails.
Change-Id: I628e089d844a3e1818a1a550e77ac10f33640ac9
Acked-by: Mohammed Javid <mjavid@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Utkarsh Saxena <usaxena@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
sockaddr structure is filled with required information only which
results in few memory locations of structure with uninitialized data.
Memset complete structure before using it to remove uninitialized data.
CRs-Fixed: 2274853
Change-Id: I181710bde100fb1553b925d9fdf227af35ff38b5
Signed-off-by: Arun Kumar Neelakantam <aneela@codeaurora.org>
[haggertk: Backport to 3.4/msm8974]
CVE-2018-12011
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit a5f596830e27e15f7a0ecd6be55e433d776986d8 upstream.
This change fixes buffer overflows and silent data corruption with the
usbmon device driver text file read operations.
Signed-off-by: Fredrik Noring <noring@nocrew.org>
Signed-off-by: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CVE-2019-9456
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Change-Id: Id947b4ae5a79a4c1bf8d8f394ad1c46cc9d2fd17
SSM driver is not enabled and hence needs deprecation.
Remove all the SSM driver references.
CRs-Fixed: 2268386
Change-Id: I02f82817023d2fcc6d05a2f0d7eb3aec8f60a7d5
Signed-off-by: Manoj Prabhu B <bmanoj@codeaurora.org>
CVE-2018-12010
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
TX and RX FIFOs of Microcontroller are used to exchange commands
and messages between Micro FW and CPP driver. TX FIFO depth is
16 32-bit words, incase of errors there is a chance of overflow.
To prevent possible out of bound access, TX FIFO depth or
level is checked for MAX depth before accessing the FIFO.
Change-Id: I5adf39b46ff10e358c4a2c03a2de07d44b99cedb
Signed-off-by: Pratap Nirujogi <pratapn@codeaurora.org>
[haggertk: Backport to 3.4/msm8974. Note that this includes patching
the non-standard camera_ll implementation as well on this kernel.]
CVE-2018-11986
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
To avoid access of variable after being freed, using
list_first_entry_safe function to iterate over list
of given type, safe against removal of list entry.
Change-Id: I70611fddf3e9b80b1affa3e5235be24eac0d0a58
Signed-off-by: Monika Singh <monising@codeaurora.org>
CVE-2018-11988
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
"bssid" is only initialized out of the while loop, in case of two
events with same type: EVENT_CONNECT_RESULT, but one has zero
ether addr, the other is non-zero, the bssid pointer will be
referenced twice, which lead to use-after-free issue.
Change-Id: Ie8a24275f7ec5c2f936ef0a802a42e5f63be9c71
CRs-Fixed: 2254305
Signed-off-by: Zhu Jianmin <jianminz@codeaurora.org>
CVE-2018-11939
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit 9824dfae5741275473a23a7ed5756c7b6efacc9d upstream.
Fields ->dev and ->next of struct ipddp_route may be copied to
userspace on the SIOCFINDIPDDPRT ioctl. This is only accessible
to CAP_NET_ADMIN though. Let's manually copy the relevant fields
instead of using memcpy().
BugLink: http://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2018/09/linux-kernel-infoleaks.html
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CVE-2018-20511
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Change-Id: I74f1982a5c0a14514348aaecbc351bc3249c52da
commit 5146f95df782b0ac61abde36567e718692725c89 upstream.
The function hso_probe reads if_num from the USB device (as an u8) and uses
it without a length check to index an array, resulting in an OOB memory read
in hso_probe or hso_get_config_data.
Add a length check for both locations and updated hso_probe to bail on
error.
This issue has been assigned CVE-2018-19985.
Change-Id: I592d0f50b24abe5b8d270fab303c9cb78fbd546f
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
commit 704620afc70cf47abb9d6a1a57f3825d2bca49cf upstream.
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CVE-2018-20169
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Change-Id: I58b9bd1e61a9dd722d99ed05f86f75bd0eb525b4
commit 07f2c7ab6f8d0a7e7c5764c4e6cc9c52951b9d9c upstream.
When SCTP makes INIT or INIT_ACK packet the total chunk length
can exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN which leads to kernel panic when
transmitting these packets, e.g. the crash on sending INIT_ACK:
[ 597.804948] skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:00000000ffae06e4 len:120168
put:120156 head:000000007aa47635 data:00000000d991c2de
tail:0x1d640 end:0xfec0 dev:<NULL>
...
[ 597.976970] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 598.033408] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:104!
[ 600.314841] Call Trace:
[ 600.345829] <IRQ>
[ 600.371639] ? sctp_packet_transmit+0x2095/0x26d0 [sctp]
[ 600.436934] skb_put+0x16c/0x200
[ 600.477295] sctp_packet_transmit+0x2095/0x26d0 [sctp]
[ 600.540630] ? sctp_packet_config+0x890/0x890 [sctp]
[ 600.601781] ? __sctp_packet_append_chunk+0x3b4/0xd00 [sctp]
[ 600.671356] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x3f/0x90 [sctp]
[ 600.731482] sctp_outq_flush+0x663/0x30d0 [sctp]
[ 600.788565] ? sctp_make_init+0xbf0/0xbf0 [sctp]
[ 600.845555] ? sctp_check_transmitted+0x18f0/0x18f0 [sctp]
[ 600.912945] ? sctp_outq_tail+0x631/0x9d0 [sctp]
[ 600.969936] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.22+0x3be1/0x5cb0 [sctp]
[ 601.041593] ? sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x85f/0xc30 [sctp]
[ 601.104837] ? sctp_generate_t1_cookie_event+0x20/0x20 [sctp]
[ 601.175436] ? sctp_eat_data+0x1710/0x1710 [sctp]
[ 601.233575] sctp_do_sm+0x182/0x560 [sctp]
[ 601.284328] ? sctp_has_association+0x70/0x70 [sctp]
[ 601.345586] ? sctp_rcv+0xef4/0x32f0 [sctp]
[ 601.397478] ? sctp6_rcv+0xa/0x20 [sctp]
...
Here the chunk size for INIT_ACK packet becomes too big, mostly
because of the state cookie (INIT packet has large size with
many address parameters), plus additional server parameters.
Later this chunk causes the panic in skb_put_data():
skb_packet_transmit()
sctp_packet_pack()
skb_put_data(nskb, chunk->skb->data, chunk->skb->len);
'nskb' (head skb) was previously allocated with packet->size
from u16 'chunk->chunk_hdr->length'.
As suggested by Marcelo we should check the chunk's length in
_sctp_make_chunk() before trying to allocate skb for it and
discard a chunk if its size bigger than SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leinter@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
- Keep using WORD_ROUND() instead of SCTP_PAD4()
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CVE-2018-5803
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Change-Id: I68b9b08d0e57ebb4e9f4c93d0e10b4ea20b6b269
commit f67b15037a7a50c57f72e69a6d59941ad90a0f0f upstream.
Annoyingly, modify_user_hw_breakpoint() unnecessarily complicates the
modification of a breakpoint - simplify it and remove the pointless
local variables.
Also update the stale Docbook while at it.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CVE-2018-1000199
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Change-Id: I741a60b376e118cb599c1200c160456b7f9c404d
commit 500ad2d8b01390c98bc6dce068bccfa9534b8212 upstream.
While debugging a warning message on PowerPC while using hardware
breakpoints, it was discovered that when perf_event_disable is invoked
through hw_breakpoint_handler function with interrupts disabled, a
subsequent IPI in the code path would trigger a WARN_ON_ONCE message in
smp_call_function_single function.
This patch calls __perf_event_disable() when interrupts are already
disabled, instead of perf_event_disable().
Reported-by: Edjunior Barbosa Machado <emachado@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: K.Prasad <Prasad.Krishnan@gmail.com>
[naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com: v3: Check to make sure we target current task]
Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120802081635.5811.17737.stgit@localhost.localdomain
[ Fixed build error on MIPS. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Change-Id: I4ed3bb0ff5c41d633868d488aaff14897e56e973
commit 89c6efa61f5709327ecfa24bff18e57a4e80c7fa upstream.
On a I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA read request, if data->block[0] is
greater than I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 1, the underlying I2C driver writes
data out of the msgbuf1 array boundary.
It is possible from a user application to run into that issue by
calling the I2C_SMBUS ioctl with data.block[0] greater than
I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 1.
This patch makes the code compliant with
Documentation/i2c/dev-interface by raising an error when the requested
size is larger than 32 bytes.
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8139f695>] dump_stack+0x67/0x92
[<ffffffff811802a4>] panic+0xc5/0x1eb
[<ffffffff810ecb5f>] ? vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30
[<ffffffff817456d3>] ? i2cdev_ioctl_smbus+0x303/0x320
[<ffffffff8109a68b>] __stack_chk_fail+0x1b/0x20
[<ffffffff817456d3>] i2cdev_ioctl_smbus+0x303/0x320
[<ffffffff81745aed>] i2cdev_ioctl+0x4d/0x1e0
[<ffffffff811f761a>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x2ba/0x490
[<ffffffff81336e43>] ? security_file_ioctl+0x43/0x60
[<ffffffff811f7869>] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
[<ffffffff81a22e97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a
Bug: 129148475
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Compostella <jeremy.compostella@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
[connoro@google.com: 4.9 backport: adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Connor O'Brien <connoro@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: I4c642f0ebe00f783a8456002f80a3b05dac21763
CVE-2019-9454
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
This shall help avoid copying uninitialized memory to the userspace when
calling ioctl(fd, SG_IO) with an empty command.
Change-Id: Ifb94a9a9e9b39a96308f2c0acb6fd0c9d56bbac6
Reported-by: syzbot+7d26fc1eea198488deab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CVE-2018-1000204
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Check if packet size is large enough to hold the header.
Change-Id: I7261f8111d8b5f4f7c181e469de248a732242d64
Signed-off-by: Vatsal Bucha <vbucha@codeaurora.org>
[haggertk: backport to 3.4/msm8974]
CVE-2019-2331
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
Check buffer size in qdsp_cvs_callback before access in
ul_pkt.
Change-Id: Ic19994b46086709231656ec747d2df988b7a512f
Signed-off-by: Vatsal Bucha <vbucha@codeaurora.org>
CVE-2019-10491
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
* Add default/max/min/threshold
* Change max value to 100
* Move intensity sysfs for CMHW
* Minor driver cleanups
apq8084 tweaks:
* Add DEFAULT_INTENSITY and set it to 5000; use as default value in
ss_vibrator_probe and pwm_default_show
* Use DEFAULT_INTENSITY and MAX_INTENSITY in pwm_default_show and pmw_max_show
Change-Id: Ie7ce0319e2df717c2a8cbf6ce23baab201fc0350
Signed-off-by: Paul Keith <javelinanddart@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <xda@vinschen.de>
[haggertk]: Bring cvxda's apq8084 version back into klte tree
Signed-off-by: Kevin F. Haggerty <haggertk@lineageos.org>
