nsproxy.pid_ns is *not* the task's pid namespace. The name should clarify
that.
This makes it more obvious that setns on a pid namespace is weird --
it won't change the pid namespace shown in procfs.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
A zombie task obviously can't fork(), remove the unnecessary
initialization of child->exit_state. It is zero anyway after
dup_task_struct().
Note: copy_process() is huge and it has a lot of chaotic
initializations, probably it makes sense to move them into the
new helper called by dup_task_struct().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20131113143612.GA10540@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
de_thread() can use change_pid() instead of detach + attach. This looks
better and this ensures that, say, next_thread() can never see a task with
->pid == NULL.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
copy_process() adds the new child to thread_group/init_task.tasks list and
then does attach_pid(child, PIDTYPE_PID). This means that the lockless
next_thread() or next_task() can see this thread with the wrong pid. Say,
"ls /proc/pid/task" can list the same inode twice.
We could move attach_pid(child, PIDTYPE_PID) up, but in this case
find_task_by_vpid() can find the new thread before it was fully
initialized.
And this is already true for PIDTYPE_PGID/PIDTYPE_SID, With this patch
copy_process() initializes child->pids[*].pid first, then calls
attach_pid() to insert the task into the pid->tasks list.
attach_pid() no longer need the "struct pid*" argument, it is always
called after pid_link->pid was already set.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
"case 0" in free_pid() assumes that disable_pid_allocation() should
clear PIDNS_HASH_ADDING before the last pid goes away.
However this doesn't happen if the first fork() fails to create the
child reaper which should call disable_pid_allocation().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
commit 7b55851367136b1efd84d98fea81ba57a98304cf upstream.
This changes the fork(2) syscall to record the process start_time after
initializing the basic task structure but still before making the new
process visible to user-space.
Technically, we could record the start_time anytime during fork(2). But
this might lead to scenarios where a start_time is recorded long before
a process becomes visible to user-space. For instance, with
userfaultfd(2) and TLS, user-space can delay the execution of fork(2)
for an indefinite amount of time (and will, if this causes network
access, or similar).
By recording the start_time late, it much closer reflects the point in
time where the process becomes live and can be observed by other
processes.
Lastly, this makes it much harder for user-space to predict and control
the start_time they get assigned. Previously, user-space could fork a
process and stall it in copy_thread_tls() before its pid is allocated,
but after its start_time is recorded. This can be misused to later-on
cycle through PIDs and resume the stalled fork(2) yielding a process
that has the same pid and start_time as a process that existed before.
This can be used to circumvent security systems that identify processes
by their pid+start_time combination.
Even though user-space was always aware that start_time recording is
flaky (but several projects are known to still rely on start_time-based
identification), changing the start_time to be recorded late will help
mitigate existing attacks and make it much harder for user-space to
control the start_time a process gets assigned.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no>
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: start_time initialisation code is different]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 3fd37226216620c1a468afa999739d5016fbc349 upstream.
Imagine we have a pid namespace and a task from its parent's pid_ns,
which made setns() to the pid namespace. The task is doing fork(),
while the pid namespace's child reaper is dying. We have the race
between them:
Task from parent pid_ns Child reaper
copy_process() ..
alloc_pid() ..
.. zap_pid_ns_processes()
.. disable_pid_allocation()
.. read_lock(&tasklist_lock)
.. iterate over pids in pid_ns
.. kill tasks linked to pids
.. read_unlock(&tasklist_lock)
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); ..
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID); ..
.. ..
So, just created task p won't receive SIGKILL signal,
and the pid namespace will be in contradictory state.
Only manual kill will help there, but does the userspace
care about this? I suppose, the most users just inject
a task into a pid namespace and wait a SIGCHLD from it.
The patch fixes the problem. It simply checks for
(pid_ns->nr_hashed & PIDNS_HASH_ADDING) in copy_process().
We do it under the tasklist_lock, and can't skip
PIDNS_HASH_ADDING as noted by Oleg:
"zap_pid_ns_processes() does disable_pid_allocation()
and then takes tasklist_lock to kill the whole namespace.
Given that copy_process() checks PIDNS_HASH_ADDING
under write_lock(tasklist) they can't race;
if copy_process() takes this lock first, the new child will
be killed, otherwise copy_process() can't miss
the change in ->nr_hashed."
If allocation is disabled, we just return -ENOMEM
like it's made for such cases in alloc_pid().
v2: Do not move disable_pid_allocation(), do not
introduce a new variable in copy_process() and simplify
the patch as suggested by Oleg Nesterov.
Account the problem with double irq enabling
found by Eric W. Biederman.
Fixes: c876ad7682 ("pidns: Stop pid allocation when init dies")
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CC: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
CC: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CC: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
CC: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CC: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: the proper cleanup label is bad_fork_free_pid, not
bad_fork_cancel_cgroup]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit caa415270c732505240bb60171c44a7838c555e8 upstream.
nh_exceptions is effectively used under rcu, but lacks proper
barriers. Between kzalloc() and setting of nh->nh_exceptions(),
we need a proper memory barrier.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Fixes: 4895c771c7 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
dup_mm() is used only in kernel/fork.c
Signed-off-by: Daeseok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix errors reported by checkpatch.pl. One error is parentheses, the other
is a whitespace issue.
Signed-off-by: Daeseok Youn <daeseok.youn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When a task is attempting to violate the RLIMIT_NPROC limit we have a
check to see if the task is sufficiently priviledged. The check first
looks at CAP_SYS_ADMIN, then CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, then if the task is uid=0.
A result is that tasks which are allowed by the uid=0 check are first
checked against the security subsystem. This results in the security
subsystem auditting a denial for sys_admin and sys_resource and then the
task passing the uid=0 check.
This patch rearranges the code to first check uid=0, since if we pass that
we shouldn't hit the security system at all. We then check sys_resource,
since it is the smallest capability which will solve the problem. Lastly
we check the fallback everything cap_sysadmin. We don't want to give this
capability many places since it is so powerful.
This will eliminate many of the false positive/needless denial messages we
get when a root task tries to violate the nproc limit. (note that
kthreads count against root, so on a sufficiently large machine we can
actually get past the default limits before any userspace tasks are
launched.)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
copy_process() does a lot of "chaotic" initializations and checks
CLONE_THREAD twice before it takes tasklist. In particular it sets
"p->group_leader = p" and then changes it again under tasklist if
!thread_group_leader(p).
This looks a bit confusing, lets create a single "if (CLONE_THREAD)" block
which initializes ->exit_signal, ->group_leader, and ->tgid.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently RT is deleted even if rt rule or header proc ctx
is invalid. Add check to prevent it.
Change-Id: Ic37ff9a33fab2b3c0d6393e43452e4b62a91d932
Acked-by: Pooja Kumari <kumarip@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mohammed Javid <mjavid@codeaurora.org>
To increase compiler portability there is <linux/compiler.h> which
provides convenience macros for various gcc constructs. Eg: __weak for
__attribute__((weak)). I've replaced all instances of gcc attributes
with the right macro in the kernel subsystem.
Signed-off-by: Gideon Israel Dsouza <gidisrael@gmail.com>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Now that allow_signal() is really trivial we can unify it with
disallow_signal(). Add the new helper, kernel_sigaction(), and
reimplement allow_signal/disallow_signal as a trivial wrappers.
This saves one EXPORT_SYMBOL() and the new helper can have more users.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
disallow_signal() simply sets SIG_IGN, this is not enough and
recalc_sigpending() is simply pointless because in can never change the
state of TIF_SIGPENDING.
If we ignore a signal, we also need to do flush_sigqueue_mask() for the
case when this signal is pending, this way recalc_sigpending() can
actually clear TIF_SIGPENDING and we do not "leak" the allocated
siginfo's.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
allow_signal() does sigdelset(current->blocked) due to historic reason,
previously it could be called by a daemonize()'ed kthread, and
daemonize() played with current->blocked.
Now that daemonize() has gone away we can remove sigdelset() and
recalc_sigpending(). If a user really wants to unblock a signal, it
must use sigprocmask() or set_current_block() explicitely.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
I found the following pattern that leads in to interesting findings:
grep -r "ret.*|=.*__put_user" *
grep -r "ret.*|=.*__get_user" *
grep -r "ret.*|=.*__copy" *
The __put_user() calls in compat_ioctl.c, ptrace compat, signal compat,
since those appear in compat code, we could probably expect the kernel
addresses not to be reachable in the lower 32-bit range, so I think they
might not be exploitable.
For the "__get_user" cases, I don't think those are exploitable: the worse
that can happen is that the kernel will copy kernel memory into in-kernel
buffers, and will fail immediately afterward.
The alpha csum_partial_copy_from_user() seems to be missing the
access_ok() check entirely. The fix is inspired from x86. This could
lead to information leak on alpha. I also noticed that many architectures
map csum_partial_copy_from_user() to csum_partial_copy_generic(), but I
wonder if the latter is performing the access checks on every
architectures.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
commit 3597dfe01d12f570bc739da67f857fd222a3ea66 upstream.
Instead of playing whack-a-mole and changing SEND_SIG_PRIV to
SEND_SIG_FORCED throughout the kernel to ensure a pid namespace init
gets signals sent by the kernel, stop allowing a pid namespace init to
ignore SIGKILL or SIGSTOP sent by the kernel. A pid namespace init is
only supposed to be able to ignore signals sent from itself and
children with SIG_DFL.
Fixes: 921cf9f630 ("signals: protect cinit from unblocked SIG_DFL signals")
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Commit ea08dc5191d9 "fs/binfmt_elf.c: fix bug in loading of PIE
binaries", which was a backport of commit a87938b2e246 upstream,
added a new failure path to load_elf_binary().
Before commit 19d860a140be "handle suicide on late failure exits in
execve() in search_binary_handler()", load_elf_binary() wass
responsible for sending a fatal signal to the task in case of an error
after flushing the old executable. Add that to the new failure path.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 5578de4834fe0f2a34fedc7374be691443396d1f upstream.
There are two array out-of-bounds memory accesses, one in
cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(), the other in netlbl_bitmap_walk(). Both
errors are embarassingly simple, and the fixes are straightforward.
As a FYI for anyone backporting this patch to kernels prior to v4.8,
you'll want to apply the netlbl_bitmap_walk() patch to
cipso_v4_bitmap_walk() as netlbl_bitmap_walk() doesn't exist before
Linux v4.8.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 446fda4f26 ("[NetLabel]: CIPSOv4 engine")
Fixes: 3faa8f982f95 ("netlabel: Move bitmap manipulation functions to the NetLabel core.")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 following Paul's hint]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 0a1d52994d440e21def1c2174932410b4f2a98a1 upstream.
security_mmap_addr() does a capability check with current_cred(), but
we can reach this code from contexts like a VFS write handler where
current_cred() must not be used.
This can be abused on systems without SMAP to make NULL pointer
dereferences exploitable again.
Fixes: 8869477a49 ("security: protect from stack expansion into low vm addresses")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 32e4e6d5cbb0c0e427391635991fe65e17797af8 upstream.
expand_stack(vma) fails if address < stack_guard_gap even if there is no
vma->vm_prev. I don't think this makes sense, and we didn't do this
before the recent commit 1be7107fbe18 ("mm: larger stack guard gap,
between vmas").
We do not need a gap in this case, any address is fine as long as
security_mmap_addr() doesn't object.
This also simplifies the code, we know that address >= prev->vm_end and
thus underflow is not possible.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170628175258.GA24881@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit cc1780fc42c76c705dd07ea123f1143dc5057630 upstream.
Align the payload of "user" and "logon" keys so that users of the
keyrings service can access it as a struct that requires more than
2-byte alignment. fscrypt currently does this which results in the read
of fscrypt_key::size being misaligned as it needs 4-byte alignment.
Align to __alignof__(u64) rather than __alignof__(long) since in the
future it's conceivable that people would use structs beginning with
u64, which on some platforms would require more than 'long' alignment.
Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Fixes: 2aa349f6e3 ("[PATCH] Keys: Export user-defined keyring operations")
Fixes: 88bd6ccdcdd6 ("ext4 crypto: add encryption key management facilities")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit cf43a757fd49442bc38f76088b70c2299eed2c2f upstream.
In the middle of do_exit() there is there is a call
"ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT, code);" That call places the process
in TACKED_TRACED aka "(TASK_WAKEKILL | __TASK_TRACED)" and waits for
for the debugger to release the task or SIGKILL to be delivered.
Skipping past dequeue_signal when we know a fatal signal has already
been delivered resulted in SIGKILL remaining pending and
TIF_SIGPENDING remaining set. This in turn caused the
scheduler to not sleep in PTACE_EVENT_EXIT as it figured
a fatal signal was pending. This also caused ptrace_freeze_traced
in ptrace_check_attach to fail because it left a per thread
SIGKILL pending which is what fatal_signal_pending tests for.
This difference in signal state caused strace to report
strace: Exit of unknown pid NNNNN ignored
Therefore update the signal handling state like dequeue_signal
would when removing a per thread SIGKILL, by removing SIGKILL
from the per thread signal mask and clearing TIF_SIGPENDING.
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Ivan Delalande <colona@arista.com>
Fixes: 35634ffa1751 ("signal: Always notice exiting tasks")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 528871b456026e6127d95b1b2bd8e3a003dc1614 upstream.
The following commit:
9dff0aa95a32 ("perf/core: Don't WARN() for impossible ring-buffer sizes")
results in perf recording failures with larger mmap areas:
root@skl:/tmp# perf record -g -a
failed to mmap with 12 (Cannot allocate memory)
The root cause is that the following condition is buggy:
if (order_base_2(size) >= MAX_ORDER)
goto fail;
The problem is that @size is in bytes and MAX_ORDER is in pages,
so the right test is:
if (order_base_2(size) >= PAGE_SHIFT+MAX_ORDER)
goto fail;
Fix it.
Reported-by: "Jin, Yao" <yao.jin@linux.intel.com>
Bisected-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Analyzed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes: 9dff0aa95a32 ("perf/core: Don't WARN() for impossible ring-buffer sizes")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 7146db3317c67b517258cb5e1b08af387da0618b upstream.
Recently syzkaller was able to create unkillablle processes by
creating a timer that is delivered as a thread local signal on SIGHUP,
and receiving SIGHUP SA_NODEFERER. Ultimately causing a loop failing
to deliver SIGHUP but always trying.
When the stack overflows delivery of SIGHUP fails and force_sigsegv is
called. Unfortunately because SIGSEGV is numerically higher than
SIGHUP next_signal tries again to deliver a SIGHUP.
From a quality of implementation standpoint attempting to deliver the
timer SIGHUP signal is wrong. We should attempt to deliver the
synchronous SIGSEGV signal we just forced.
We can make that happening in a fairly straight forward manner by
instead of just looking at the signal number we also look at the
si_code. In particular for exceptions (aka synchronous signals) the
si_code is always greater than 0.
That still has the potential to pick up a number of asynchronous
signals as in a few cases the same si_codes that are used
for synchronous signals are also used for asynchronous signals,
and SI_KERNEL is also included in the list of possible si_codes.
Still the heuristic is much better and timer signals are definitely
excluded. Which is enough to prevent all known ways for someone
sending a process signals fast enough to cause unexpected and
arguably incorrect behavior.
Fixes: a27341cd5f ("Prioritize synchronous signals over 'normal' signals")
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: s/kernel_siginfo_t/siginfo_t/]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 35634ffa1751b6efd8cf75010b509dcb0263e29b upstream.
Recently syzkaller was able to create unkillablle processes by
creating a timer that is delivered as a thread local signal on SIGHUP,
and receiving SIGHUP SA_NODEFERER. Ultimately causing a loop
failing to deliver SIGHUP but always trying.
Upon examination it turns out part of the problem is actually most of
the solution. Since 2.5 signal delivery has found all fatal signals,
marked the signal group for death, and queued SIGKILL in every threads
thread queue relying on signal->group_exit_code to preserve the
information of which was the actual fatal signal.
The conversion of all fatal signals to SIGKILL results in the
synchronous signal heuristic in next_signal kicking in and preferring
SIGHUP to SIGKILL. Which is especially problematic as all
fatal signals have already been transformed into SIGKILL.
Instead of dequeueing signals and depending upon SIGKILL to
be the first signal dequeued, first test if the signal group
has already been marked for death. This guarantees that
nothing in the signal queue can prevent a process that needs
to exit from exiting.
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Ref: ebf5ebe31d2c ("[PATCH] signal-fixes-2.5.59-A4")
History Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 828b1f65d23cf8a68795739f6dd08fc8abd9ee64 upstream.
Now we can turn get_signal() to the main function.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 as dependency of commit 35634ffa1751
"signal: Always notice exiting tasks"]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 10b1c7ac8bfed429cf3dcb0225482c8dc1485d8e upstream.
- Pass a ksignal struct to it
- Remove unused regs parameter
- Make it private as it's nowhere outside of kernel/signal.c is used
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 as dependency of commit 35634ffa1751
"signal: Always notice exiting tasks"]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
This patch fix spelling typo in Documentation/DocBook.
It is because .html and .xml files are generated by make htmldocs,
I have to fix a typo within the source files.
Signed-off-by: Masanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
commit df5601f9c3d831b4c478b004a1ed90a18643adbe upstream.
These parameters are nowhere used, so we can remove them.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 as dependency of commit 35634ffa1751
"signal: Always notice exiting tasks"]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 00554fa4f80279db92f82c4f52c8ae72711f173e upstream.
Use the more generic functions get_signal() signal_setup_done()
for signal delivery.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 as dependency of commit 35634ffa1751
"signal: Always notice exiting tasks"]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 9dff0aa95a324e262ffb03f425d00e4751f3294e upstream.
The perf tool uses /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_mlock_kb to determine how
large its ringbuffer mmap should be. This can be configured to arbitrary
values, which can be larger than the maximum possible allocation from
kmalloc.
When this is configured to a suitably large value (e.g. thanks to the
perf fuzzer), attempting to use perf record triggers a WARN_ON_ONCE() in
__alloc_pages_nodemask():
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 5666 at mm/page_alloc.c:4511 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3f8/0xbc8
Let's avoid this by checking that the requested allocation is possible
before calling kzalloc.
Reported-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190110142745.25495-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 6376360ecbe525a9c17b3d081dfd88ba3e4ed65b upstream.
Currently memory_failure() is racy against process's exiting, which
results in kernel crash by null pointer dereference.
The root cause is that memory_failure() uses force_sig() to forcibly
kill asynchronous (meaning not in the current context) processes. As
discussed in thread https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/6/8/236 years ago for OOM
fixes, this is not a right thing to do. OOM solves this issue by using
do_send_sig_info() as done in commit d2d393099d ("signal:
oom_kill_task: use SEND_SIG_FORCED instead of force_sig()"), so this
patch is suggesting to do the same for hwpoison. do_send_sig_info()
properly accesses to siglock with lock_task_sighand(), so is free from
the reported race.
I confirmed that the reported bug reproduces with inserting some delay
in kill_procs(), and it never reproduces with this patch.
Note that memory_failure() can send another type of signal using
force_sig_mceerr(), and the reported race shouldn't happen on it because
force_sig_mceerr() is called only for synchronous processes (i.e.
BUS_MCEERR_AR happens only when some process accesses to the corrupted
memory.)
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190116093046.GA29835@hori1.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Reported-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 7fe9f01c04c2673bd6662c35b664f0f91888b96f upstream.
The num_planes field in struct v4l2_pix_format_mplane is used in a loop
before validating it. As the use is printing a debug message in this case,
just cap the value to the maximum allowed.
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 3e96d7280f16e2f787307f695a31296b9e4a1cd7 upstream.
There are a few places where we access the data without checking the
actual object size from the USB audio descriptor. This may result in
OOB access, as recently reported.
This patch addresses these missing checks. Most of added codes are
simple bLength checks in the caller side. For the input and output
terminal parsers, we put the length check in the parser functions.
For the input terminal, a new argument is added to distinguish between
UAC1 and the rest, as they treat different objects.
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@163.com>
Tested-by: Hui Peng <benquike@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- Drop changes in parse_audio_input_terminal() and UAC3 handling
- Adjust context, indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit f4351a199cc120ff9d59e06d02e8657d08e6cc46 upstream.
The parser for the processing unit reads bNrInPins field before the
bLength sanity check, which may lead to an out-of-bound access when a
malformed descriptor is given. Fix it by assignment after the bLength
check.
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
If setting the interface fails, the SUBSTREAM_FLAG_SYNC_EP_STARTED
should be cleared.
Signed-off-by: Eldad Zack <eldad@fogrefinery.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
No frame length check when extract 11w transaction id from SA
query request and response action frame, if frame length is
shorter than expected, buffer overflow will happen
Change-Id: Iddefa809023da244564cfd227ccfe8c2de5717c0
CRs-Fixed: 2406370
propagation from qcacld-3.0 to qcacld-2.0
In the function limProcessAssocReqFrame, if wpa IE is
present, then dot11fUnpackIeWPA is called to copy the wpa IE
to destination buffer. pAssocReq->wpa.length is passed as the
length to copy the IE. As this length includes 4 bytes of the
OUI fields also, this could result in OOB read.
Change the length passed to the dot11fUnpackIeWPA as
(pAssocReq->wpa.length - 4), so that the additional 4 bytes of
the OUI fields are excluded.
Change-Id: If972b3a19d239bb955c7b4d4c7d94e25aa878f21
CRs-Fixed: 2406159
With commit f6896ad1b5966405e87ef668922cadddad52f2eb, an incorrectly ordered
memset() command was present. This causes compilation to fail on GCC 5+.
Fix the order of the passed parameters to properly set requested memory.
BUG=38500815
TEST= Kernel compiles and boots bullhead.
Change-Id: Ic7cc759bb19385ad6839d2003358c7ead6df94be
Tested-by: Aun-Ali Zaidi <admin@kodeit.net>
Signed-off-by: Aun-Ali Zaidi <admin@kodeit.net>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Currently we set CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE which suppressed the compiler
warning of unused variables which can lead undefined behavior e.g. memory
corruption and panic. See https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/25/347.
This patch fixes all the uninitilized variables in kernel
Bug: 33353384
Test: On device
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wvw@google.com>
Change-Id: I0ae1082f447b435d71156d471878ba71aa16c378
Send compress data by q6asm_run callback when user resumes music,
if the write_done event has been callback at offload pause state.
Bug: 30101878
Signed-off-by: Eric Laurent <elaurent@google.com>
Add pointer validation checks to prevent sending
invalid handles to ADSP as part of unmap memory
regions command.
CRs-Fixed: 1018367
Change-Id: I0dfb2fccb4414ed82ee10d73576fda66a273043d
Signed-off-by: Karthik Reddy Katta <a_katta@codeaurora.org>
Use smaller fragment sizes at DSP interface than at
user space interface.
This allows to write earlier to the DSP without waiting for
a full user space fragement in case of underrun or gapless
transition.
Bug: 28545177
Signed-off-by: Eric Laurent <elaurent@google.com>
Change the HW delay debug print so it does not
seem like an error. Adds comments in the code
describing the HW delay feature.
Change-Id: I0955623a7bdb0f4180c908ba079cf6f900e496a5
Signed-off-by: Ben Romberger <bromberg@codeaurora.org>
