I found the following pattern that leads in to interesting findings:
grep -r "ret.*|=.*__put_user" *
grep -r "ret.*|=.*__get_user" *
grep -r "ret.*|=.*__copy" *
The __put_user() calls in compat_ioctl.c, ptrace compat, signal compat,
since those appear in compat code, we could probably expect the kernel
addresses not to be reachable in the lower 32-bit range, so I think they
might not be exploitable.
For the "__get_user" cases, I don't think those are exploitable: the worse
that can happen is that the kernel will copy kernel memory into in-kernel
buffers, and will fail immediately afterward.
The alpha csum_partial_copy_from_user() seems to be missing the
access_ok() check entirely. The fix is inspired from x86. This could
lead to information leak on alpha. I also noticed that many architectures
map csum_partial_copy_from_user() to csum_partial_copy_generic(), but I
wonder if the latter is performing the access checks on every
architectures.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
commit 5578de4834fe0f2a34fedc7374be691443396d1f upstream.
There are two array out-of-bounds memory accesses, one in
cipso_v4_map_lvl_valid(), the other in netlbl_bitmap_walk(). Both
errors are embarassingly simple, and the fixes are straightforward.
As a FYI for anyone backporting this patch to kernels prior to v4.8,
you'll want to apply the netlbl_bitmap_walk() patch to
cipso_v4_bitmap_walk() as netlbl_bitmap_walk() doesn't exist before
Linux v4.8.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 446fda4f26 ("[NetLabel]: CIPSOv4 engine")
Fixes: 3faa8f982f95 ("netlabel: Move bitmap manipulation functions to the NetLabel core.")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16 following Paul's hint]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
This patch fix spelling typo in Documentation/DocBook.
It is because .html and .xml files are generated by make htmldocs,
I have to fix a typo within the source files.
Signed-off-by: Masanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
[ Upstream commit 50ce163a72d817a99e8974222dcf2886d5deb1ae ]
For some reason, tcp_grow_window() correctly tests if enough room
is present before attempting to increase tp->rcv_ssthresh,
but does not prevent it to grow past tcp_space()
This is causing hard to debug issues, like failing
the (__tcp_select_window(sk) >= tp->rcv_wnd) test
in __tcp_ack_snd_check(), causing ACK delays and possibly
slow flows.
Depending on tcp_rmem[2], MTU, skb->len/skb->truesize ratio,
we can see the problem happening on "netperf -t TCP_RR -- -r 2000,2000"
after about 60 round trips, when the active side no longer sends
immediate acks.
This bug predates git history.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit 355b98553789 ("netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()")
makes net_hash_mix() return a true 32 bits of entropy. When used in the
IP ID generation algorithm, this has the effect of extending the IP ID
generation key from 32 bits to 64 bits.
However, net_hash_mix() is only used for IP ID generation starting with
kernel version 4.1. Therefore, earlier kernels remain with 32-bit key
no matter what the net_hash_mix() return value is.
This change addresses the issue by explicitly extending the key to 64
bits for kernels older than 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 3d8830266ffc28c16032b859e38a0252e014b631 ]
NULL or ZERO_SIZE_PTR will be returned for zero sized memory
request, and derefencing them will lead to a segfault
so it is unnecessory to call vzalloc for zero sized memory
request and not call functions which maybe derefence the
NULL allocated memory
this also fixes a possible memory leak if phy_ethtool_get_stats
returns error, memory should be freed before exit
Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Reviewed-by: Wang Li <wangli39@baidu.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 355b98553789b646ed97ad801a619ff898471b92 ]
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162a ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit ff7b11aa481f682e0e9711abfeb7d03f5cd612bf ]
Commit 9060cb719e61 ("net: crypto set sk to NULL when af_alg_release.")
fixed a use-after-free in sockfs_setattr() when an AF_ALG socket is
closed concurrently with fchownat(). However, it ignored that many
other proto_ops::release() methods don't set sock->sk to NULL and
therefore allow the same use-after-free:
- base_sock_release
- bnep_sock_release
- cmtp_sock_release
- data_sock_release
- dn_release
- hci_sock_release
- hidp_sock_release
- iucv_sock_release
- l2cap_sock_release
- llcp_sock_release
- llc_ui_release
- rawsock_release
- rfcomm_sock_release
- sco_sock_release
- svc_release
- vcc_release
- x25_release
Rather than fixing all these and relying on every socket type to get
this right forever, just make __sock_release() set sock->sk to NULL
itself after calling proto_ops::release().
Reproducer that produces the KASAN splat when any of these socket types
are configured into the kernel:
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
pthread_t t;
volatile int fd;
void *close_thread(void *arg)
{
for (;;) {
usleep(rand() % 100);
close(fd);
}
}
int main()
{
pthread_create(&t, NULL, close_thread, NULL);
for (;;) {
fd = socket(rand() % 50, rand() % 11, 0);
fchownat(fd, "", 1000, 1000, 0x1000);
close(fd);
}
}
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[syphyr: backport to 3.10, replace inode_lock/unlock]
Signed-off-by: L R <syphyr@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit a4dc6a49156b1f8d6e17251ffda17c9e6a5db78a ]
When using fanouts with AF_PACKET, the demux functions such as
fanout_demux_cpu will return an index in the fanout socket array, which
corresponds to the selected socket.
The ordering of this array depends on the order the sockets were added
to a given fanout group, so for FANOUT_CPU this means sockets are bound
to cpus in the order they are configured, which is OK.
However, when stopping then restarting the interface these sockets are
bound to, the sockets are reassigned to the fanout group in the reverse
order, due to the fact that they were inserted at the head of the
interface's AF_PACKET socket list.
This means that traffic that was directed to the first socket in the
fanout group is now directed to the last one after an interface restart.
In the case of FANOUT_CPU, traffic from CPU0 will be directed to the
socket that used to receive traffic from the last CPU after an interface
restart.
This commit introduces a helper to add a socket at the tail of a list,
then uses it to register AF_PACKET sockets.
Note that this changes the order in which sockets are listed in /proc and
with sock_diag.
Fixes: dc99f60069 ("packet: Add fanout support")
Signed-off-by: Maxime Chevallier <maxime.chevallier@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 4ef8c1c93f848e360754f10eb2e7134c872b6597 ]
Ilan reported that sometimes nl80211 messages weren't working if
the frames being transported got very large, which was really a
problem for userspace-to-kernel messages, but prompted me to look
at the code.
Upon review, I found various places where variable-length data is
transported in an nl80211 message but the message isn't allocated
taking that into account. This shouldn't cause any problems since
the frames aren't really that long, apart in one place where two
(possibly very long frames) might not fit.
Fix all the places (that I found) that get variable length data
from the driver and put it into a message to take the length of
the variable data into account. The 100 there is just a safe
constant for the remaining message overhead (it's usually around
50 for most messages.)
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 7c9cbd0b5e38a1672fcd137894ace3b042dfbf69 upstream.
The function l2cap_get_conf_opt will return L2CAP_CONF_OPT_SIZE + opt->len
as length value. The opt->len however is in control over the remote user
and can be used by an attacker to gain access beyond the bounds of the
actual packet.
To prevent any potential leak of heap memory, it is enough to check that
the resulting len calculation after calling l2cap_get_conf_opt is not
below zero. A well formed packet will always return >= 0 here and will
end with the length value being zero after the last option has been
parsed. In case of malformed packets messing with the opt->len field the
length value will become negative. If that is the case, then just abort
and ignore the option.
In case an attacker uses a too short opt->len value, then garbage will
be parsed, but that is protected by the unknown option handling and also
the option parameter size checks.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit af3d5d1c87664a4f150fcf3534c6567cb19909b0 upstream.
When doing option parsing for standard type values of 1, 2 or 4 octets,
the value is converted directly into a variable instead of a pointer. To
avoid being tricked into being a pointer, check that for these option
types that sizes actually match. In L2CAP every option is fixed size and
thus it is prudent anyway to ensure that the remote side sends us the
right option size along with option paramters.
If the option size is not matching the option type, then that option is
silently ignored. It is a protocol violation and instead of trying to
give the remote attacker any further hints just pretend that option is
not present and proceed with the default values. Implementation
following the specification and its qualification procedures will always
use the correct size and thus not being impacted here.
To keep the code readable and consistent accross all options, a few
cosmetic changes were also required.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit b5476022bbada3764609368f03329ca287528dc8 ]
IPv4 stack reacts to changes to small MTU, by disabling itself under
RTNL.
But there is a window where threads not using RTNL can see a wrong
device mtu. This can lead to surprises, in igmp code where it is
assumed the mtu is suitable.
Fix this by reading device mtu once and checking IPv4 minimal MTU.
This patch adds missing IPV4_MIN_MTU define, to not abuse
ETH_MIN_MTU anymore.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Use READ_ONCE in patches applied after importing the Samsung kernel
where the upstream patch did it.
Change-Id: I7c4bbf99dc45c105289bfb404d1818e571069113
Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <xda@vinschen.de>
sockaddr structure is filled with required information only which
results in few memory locations of structure with uninitialized data.
Memset complete structure before using it to remove uninitialized data.
CRs-Fixed: 2274853
Change-Id: I181710bde100fb1553b925d9fdf227af35ff38b5
Signed-off-by: Arun Kumar Neelakantam <aneela@codeaurora.org>
commit ec7cb62d18d854ea09df8b7194e7e710985f8b9a upstream.
DCCP doesn't purge timewait sockets on network namespace shutdown.
So, after net namespace destroyed we could still have an active timer
which will trigger use after free in tw_timer_handler():
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tw_timer_handler+0x4a/0xa0 at addr ffff88010e0d1e10
Read of size 8 by task swapper/1/0
Call Trace:
__asan_load8+0x54/0x90
tw_timer_handler+0x4a/0xa0
call_timer_fn+0x127/0x480
expire_timers+0x1db/0x2e0
run_timer_softirq+0x12f/0x2a0
__do_softirq+0x105/0x5b4
irq_exit+0xdd/0xf0
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0x70
apic_timer_interrupt+0x90/0xa0
Object at ffff88010e0d1bc0, in cache net_namespace size: 6848
Allocated:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
kasan_kmalloc+0xee/0x180
kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
kmem_cache_alloc+0x134/0x310
copy_net_ns+0x8d/0x280
create_new_namespaces+0x23f/0x340
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0x75/0xf0
SyS_unshare+0x299/0x4f0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0xad
Freed:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20
kasan_slab_free+0xae/0x180
kmem_cache_free+0xb4/0x350
net_drop_ns+0x3f/0x50
cleanup_net+0x3df/0x450
process_one_work+0x419/0xbb0
worker_thread+0x92/0x850
kthread+0x192/0x1e0
ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x40
Add .exit_batch hook to dccp_v4_ops()/dccp_v6_ops() which will purge
timewait sockets on net namespace destruction and prevent above issue.
Fixes: f2bf415cfe ("mib: add net to NET_ADD_STATS_BH")
Change-Id: I092f047f2ae2c13f4610512047c5a75833e165d6
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: pass twdr parameter to inet_twsk_purge()
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 7a94b8c2eee7083ddccd0515830f8c81a8e44b1a upstream.
As ieee80211_bss_get_ie() derefences an RCU to return ssid_ie, both
the call to this function and any operation on this variable need
protection by the RCU read lock.
Fixes: 44905265bc15 ("nl80211: don't expose wdev->ssid for most interfaces")
Change-Id: I7d9c6c32135f4be34678537653787654d435116e
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 4564b187c16327045d87596e8980c65ba7b84c50 upstream.
Evidently I introduced a locking bug in my change here,
the nla_put_failure sometimes needs to unlock. Fix it.
Fixes: 44905265bc15 ("nl80211: don't expose wdev->ssid for most interfaces")
Change-Id: I10e56d2a47ec402597a603e0abb3e1335dfb8be3
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 44905265bc155e0237c76c25bf5ddf740d85a8f2 upstream.
For mesh, this is simply wrong - there's no SSID, only the
mesh ID, so don't expose it at all.
For (P2P) client, it's wrong, because it exposes an internal
value that's only used when certain APIs are used.
For AP, it's actually the only correct case, so leave that.
All other interface types shouldn't be setting this anyway,
so there it won't change anything.
Fixes: b84e7a05f6 ("nl80211: send the NL80211_ATTR_SSID in nl80211_send_iface()")
Change-Id: I71aa50fc03d401264fb19bf83da3b253f157ad72
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit ca92e173ab34a4f7fc4128bd372bd96f1af6f507 upstream.
sadhcnt is reported by `ip -s xfrm state count` as "buckets count", not the
hash mask.
Fixes: 28d8909bc7 ("[XFRM]: Export SAD info.")
Change-Id: Id5d62663152dca9350ff09b4d5815bf6ce05f52b
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit b1d0a5d0cba4597c0394997b2d5fced3e3841b4e upstream.
recent and hashlimit both create /proc files, but only check that
name is 0 terminated.
This can trigger WARN() from procfs when name is "" or "/".
Add helper for this and then use it for both.
Change-Id: I6772510c4de2697a546204cb0d11df406a17e2a1
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Reported-by: <syzbot+0502b00edac2a0680b61@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- xt_hashlimit has only one check function
- Adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit ee1abcf689353f36d9322231b4320926096bdee0 upstream.
Commit a61bbcf28a ("[NET]: Store skb->timestamp as offset to a base
timestamp") introduces a neighbour control buffer and zeroes it out in
ndisc_rcv(), as ndisc_recv_ns() uses it.
Commit f2776ff047 ("[IPV6]: Fix address/interface handling in UDP and
DCCP, according to the scoping architecture.") introduces the usage of the
IPv6 control buffer in protocol error handlers (e.g. inet6_iif() in
present-day __udp6_lib_err()).
Now, with commit b94f1c0904 ("ipv6: Use icmpv6_notify() to propagate
redirect, instead of rt6_redirect()."), we call protocol error handlers
from ndisc_redirect_rcv(), after the control buffer is already stolen and
some parts are already zeroed out. This implies that inet6_iif() on this
path will always return zero.
This gives unexpected results on UDP socket lookup in __udp6_lib_err(), as
we might actually need to match sockets for a given interface.
Instead of always claiming the control buffer in ndisc_rcv(), do that only
when needed.
Fixes: b94f1c0904 ("ipv6: Use icmpv6_notify() to propagate redirect, instead of rt6_redirect().")
Change-Id: I513dae5308ae374639dd0da55c2b68270fe46e54
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit 604d415e2bd642b7e02c80e719e0396b9d4a77a6 upstream.
syzkaller triggered a use-after-free [1], caused by a combination of
skb_get() in llc_conn_state_process() and usage of sk_eat_skb()
sk_eat_skb() is assuming the skb about to be freed is only used by
the current thread. TCP/DCCP stacks enforce this because current
thread holds the socket lock.
llc_conn_state_process() wants to make sure skb does not disappear,
and holds a reference on the skb it manipulates. But as soon as this
skb is added to socket receive queue, another thread can consume it.
This means that llc must use regular skb_unlink() and kfree_skb()
so that both producer and consumer can safely work on the same skb.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:21 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refcount_read include/linux/refcount.h:43 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_unref include/linux/skbuff.h:967 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kfree_skb+0xb7/0x580 net/core/skbuff.c:655
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8801d1f6fba4 by task ksoftirqd/1/18
CPU: 1 PID: 18 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #295
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b6 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x13e/0x1b0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:272
atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:21 [inline]
refcount_read include/linux/refcount.h:43 [inline]
skb_unref include/linux/skbuff.h:967 [inline]
kfree_skb+0xb7/0x580 net/core/skbuff.c:655
llc_sap_state_process+0x9b/0x550 net/llc/llc_sap.c:224
llc_sap_rcv+0x156/0x1f0 net/llc/llc_sap.c:297
llc_sap_handler+0x65e/0xf80 net/llc/llc_sap.c:438
llc_rcv+0x79e/0xe20 net/llc/llc_input.c:208
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x14d/0x200 net/core/dev.c:4913
__netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5023
process_backlog+0x218/0x6f0 net/core/dev.c:5829
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6249 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x7c5/0x1950 net/core/dev.c:6315
__do_softirq+0x30c/0xb03 kernel/softirq.c:292
run_ksoftirqd+0x94/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:653
smpboot_thread_fn+0x68b/0xa00 kernel/smpboot.c:164
kthread+0x35a/0x420 kernel/kthread.c:246
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:413
Allocated by task 18:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xc7/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x144/0x730 mm/slab.c:3644
__alloc_skb+0x119/0x770 net/core/skbuff.c:193
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:995 [inline]
llc_alloc_frame+0xbc/0x370 net/llc/llc_sap.c:54
llc_station_ac_send_xid_r net/llc/llc_station.c:52 [inline]
llc_station_rcv+0x1dc/0x1420 net/llc/llc_station.c:111
llc_rcv+0xc32/0xe20 net/llc/llc_input.c:220
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x14d/0x200 net/core/dev.c:4913
__netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5023
process_backlog+0x218/0x6f0 net/core/dev.c:5829
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6249 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x7c5/0x1950 net/core/dev.c:6315
__do_softirq+0x30c/0xb03 kernel/softirq.c:292
Freed by task 16383:
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x83/0x290 mm/slab.c:3756
kfree_skbmem+0x154/0x230 net/core/skbuff.c:582
__kfree_skb+0x1d/0x20 net/core/skbuff.c:642
sk_eat_skb include/net/sock.h:2366 [inline]
llc_ui_recvmsg+0xec2/0x1610 net/llc/af_llc.c:882
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:794 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0xd0/0x110 net/socket.c:801
___sys_recvmsg+0x2b6/0x680 net/socket.c:2278
__sys_recvmmsg+0x303/0xb90 net/socket.c:2390
do_sys_recvmmsg+0x181/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2466
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2484 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2480 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:2480
do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801d1f6fac0
which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232
The buggy address is located 228 bytes inside of
232-byte region [ffff8801d1f6fac0, ffff8801d1f6fba8)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea000747dbc0 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801d9be7680 index:0xffff8801d1f6fe80
flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffffea0007346e88 ffffea000705b108 ffff8801d9be7680
raw: ffff8801d1f6fe80 ffff8801d1f6f0c0 000000010000000b 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801d1f6fa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8801d1f6fb00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8801d1f6fb80: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff8801d1f6fc00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8801d1f6fc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Change-Id: Id17934aae15b429e0597979e24fb1f600e3a8da4
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
- sk_eat_skb() takes a third parameter here
- Adjust indentation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
commit aa8f8778493c85fff480cdf8b349b1e1dcb5f243 upstream.
KMSAN reported use of uninit-value that I tracked to lack
of proper size check on RTA_TABLE attribute.
I also believe RTA_PREFSRC lacks a similar check.
Fixes: 86872cb579 ("[IPv6] route: FIB6 configuration using struct fib6_config")
Fixes: c3968a857a ("ipv6: RTA_PREFSRC support for ipv6 route source address selection")
Change-Id: Ie870ede087a9209ff20b9dd31da0e2da8e9be101
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
netlink_sendmsg() was changed to prevent non-root processes from sending
messages with dst_pid != 0.
netlink_connect() however still only checks if nladdr->nl_groups is set.
This patch modifies netlink_connect() to check for the same condition.
Change-Id: I3179755947077de1d2a92a7573fbdac65314e6dc
Signed-off-by: Mike Pecovnik <mike.pecovnik@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
commit b078556aecd791b0e5cb3a59f4c3a14273b52121 upstream.
l4proto->manip_pkt() can cause reallocation of skb head so pointer
to the ipv6 header must be reloaded.
Change-Id: Ib9d20d8a0c62e880ed2adc6ee666654c47ceb7f9
Reported-and-tested-by: <syzbot+10005f4292fc9cc89de7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Fixes: 58a317f106 ("netfilter: ipv6: add IPv6 NAT support")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
[ Upstream commit fc62814d690cf62189854464f4bd07457d5e9e50 ]
When calculating rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr the result
can overflow. Check it for overflow without limiting the total buffer
size to UINT_MAX.
This change fixes support for packet ring buffers >= UINT_MAX.
Fixes: 8f8d28e4d6d8 ("net/packet: fix overflow in check for tp_frame_nr")
Signed-off-by: Kal Conley <kal.conley@dectris.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fix following sparse errors :
net/ipv4/igmp.c:1222:25: warning: cast from restricted __be32
net/ipv4/igmp.c🔢31: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces)
net/ipv4/igmp.c🔢31: expected struct ip_mc_list [noderef] <asn:4>*next_hash
net/ipv4/igmp.c🔢31: got struct ip_mc_list *<noident>
net/ipv4/igmp.c:1250:31: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces)
net/ipv4/igmp.c:1250:31: expected struct ip_mc_list [noderef] <asn:4>*next_hash
net/ipv4/igmp.c:1250:31: got struct ip_mc_list *<noident>
net/ipv4/igmp.c:2380:37: warning: cast from restricted __be32
These were added by commit e9897071350bd9
("igmp: hash a hash table to speedup ip_check_mc_rcu()")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
After IP route cache removal, multicast applications using
a lot of multicast addresses hit a O(N) behavior in ip_check_mc_rcu()
Add a per in_device hash table to get faster lookup.
This hash table is created only if the number of items in mc_list is
above 4.
Reported-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Tested-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Don't export arp_invalidate, only used in arp.c
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Help of this function says: "in_dev: only on this interface, 0=any interface",
but since commit 39a6d06300 ("[NETNS]: Process inet_confirm_addr in the
correct namespace."), the code supposes that it will never be NULL. This
function is never called with in_dev == NULL, but it's exported and may be used
by an external module.
Because this patch restore the ability to call inet_confirm_addr() with in_dev
== NULL, I partially revert the above commit, as suggested by Julian.
CC: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
We currently use prandom_u32() for allocation of ports in tcp bind(0)
and udp code. In case of plain SNAT we try to keep the ports as is
or increment on collision.
SNAT --random mode does use per-destination incrementing port
allocation. As a recent paper pointed out in [1] that this mode of
port allocation makes it possible to an attacker to find the randomly
allocated ports through a timing side-channel in a socket overloading
attack conducted through an off-path attacker.
So, NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM actually weakens the port randomization
in regard to the attack described in this paper. As we need to keep
compatibility, add another flag called NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM_FULLY
that would replace the NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM hash-based port
selection algorithm with a simple prandom_u32() in order to mitigate
this attack vector. Note that the lfsr113's internal state is
periodically reseeded by the kernel through a local secure entropy
source.
More details can be found in [1], the basic idea is to send bursts
of packets to a socket to overflow its receive queue and measure
the latency to detect a possible retransmit when the port is found.
Because of increasing ports to given destination and port, further
allocations can be predicted. This information could then be used by
an attacker for e.g. for cache-poisoning, NS pinning, and degradation
of service attacks against DNS servers [1]:
The best defense against the poisoning attacks is to properly
deploy and validate DNSSEC; DNSSEC provides security not only
against off-path attacker but even against MitM attacker. We hope
that our results will help motivate administrators to adopt DNSSEC.
However, full DNSSEC deployment make take significant time, and
until that happens, we recommend short-term, non-cryptographic
defenses. We recommend to support full port randomisation,
according to practices recommended in [2], and to avoid
per-destination sequential port allocation, which we show may be
vulnerable to derandomisation attacks.
Joint work between Hannes Frederic Sowa and Daniel Borkmann.
[1] https://sites.google.com/site/hayashulman/files/NIC-derandomisation.pdf
[2] http://arxiv.org/pdf/1205.5190v1.pdf
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Gratuitous arp packets are useful in switchover scenarios to update
client arp tables as quickly as possible. Currently, the mac address
of a neighbour is only updated after a locktime period has elapsed
since the last update. In most use cases such delays are unacceptable
for network admins. Moreover, the "updated" field of the neighbour
stucture doesn't record the last time the address of a neighbour
changed but records any change that happens to the neighbour. This is
clearly a bug since locktime uses that field as meaning "addr_updated".
With this observation, I was able to perpetuate a stale address by
sending a stream of gratuitous arp packets spaced less than locktime
apart. With this change the address is updated when a gratuitous arp
is received and the arp_accept sysctl is set.
Signed-off-by: Salam Noureddine <noureddine@aristanetworks.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
commit 6adc5fd6a142c6e2c80574c1db0c7c17dedaa42e upstream.
Proxy entries could have null pointer to net-device.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Fixes: 84920c1420 ("net: Allow ipv6 proxies and arp proxies be shown with iproute2")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
ndm_type means L3 address type, in neighbour proxy and vxlan, it's RTN_UNICAST.
NDA_DST is for netlink TLV type, hence it's not right value in this context.
Signed-off-by: Jun Zhao <mypopydev@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
commit 2c51a97f76d20ebf1f50fef908b986cb051fdff9 upstream.
The lockless lookups can return entry that is unlinked.
Sometimes they get reference before last neigh_cleanup_and_release,
sometimes they do not need reference. Later, any
modification attempts may result in the following problems:
1. entry is not destroyed immediately because neigh_update
can start the timer for dead entry, eg. on change to NUD_REACHABLE
state. As result, entry lives for some time but is invisible
and out of control.
2. __neigh_event_send can run in parallel with neigh_destroy
while refcnt=0 but if timer is started and expired refcnt can
reach 0 for second time leading to second neigh_destroy and
possible crash.
Thanks to Eric Dumazet and Ying Xue for their work and analyze
on the __neigh_event_send change.
Fixes: 767e97e1e0 ("neigh: RCU conversion of struct neighbour")
Fixes: a263b30936 ("ipv4: Make neigh lookups directly in output packet path.")
Fixes: 6fd6ce2056 ("ipv6: Do not depend on rt->n in ip6_finish_output2().")
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
iproute2 arpd seems to expect this as there's code and comments
to handle netlink probes with NUD_PROBE set. It is used to flush
the arpd cached mappings.
opennhrp instead turns off unicast probes (so it can handle all
neighbour discovery). Without this change it will not see NUD_PROBE
probes and cannot reconfirm the mapping. Thus currently neigh entry
will just fail and can cause few packets dropped until broadcast
discovery is restarted.
Earlier discussion on the subject:
http://marc.info/?t=139305877100001&r=1&w=2
Signed-off-by: Timo Teräs <timo.teras@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
There's a kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL in a helper
(pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx) used in pfkey_compile_policy which is
called under rcu_read_lock. Adjust pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx to have
a gfp argument and adjust the users.
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Change-Id: Id19a5c2b557f0dbdb57a4097e6d9432065c35e63
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
commit 096f41d3a8fcbb8dde7f71379b1ca85fe213eded upstream.
The parsing of sadb_x_ipsecrequest is broken in a number of ways.
First of all we're not verifying sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len. This
is needed when the structure carries addresses at the end. Worse
we don't even look at the length when we parse those optional
addresses.
The migration code had similar parsing code that's better but
it also has some deficiencies. The length is overcounted first
of all as it includes the header itself. It also fails to check
the length before dereferencing the sa_family field.
This patch fixes those problems in parse_sockaddr_pair and then
uses it in parse_ipsecrequest.
Change-Id: I45fc7347edda881dffe62ad84b526ad65680ab61
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: I4e15550da0a0c0f2ca21477a9e4ac11b16cf877d
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch replaces a comma between expression statements by a semicolon.
A simplified version of the semantic patch that performs this
transformation is as follows:
// <smpl>
@r@
expression e1,e2,e;
type T;
identifier i;
@@
e1
-,
+;
e2;
// </smpl>
Change-Id: Id485b4a0bd0065e85e67b1ccd7fefe069e2e3b1a
Signed-off-by: Himangi Saraogi <himangi774@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Attempting to avoid cloning the skb when broadcasting by inflating
the refcount with sock_hold/sock_put while under RCU lock is dangerous
and violates RCU principles. It leads to subtle race conditions when
attempting to free the SKB, as we may reference sockets that have
already been freed by the stack.
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 6b6b6b6b6b6c4b
[006b6b6b6b6b6c4b] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
task: fffffff78f65b380 task.stack: ffffff8049a88000
pc : sock_rfree+0x38/0x6c
lr : skb_release_head_state+0x6c/0xcc
Process repro (pid: 7117, stack limit = 0xffffff8049a88000)
Call trace:
sock_rfree+0x38/0x6c
skb_release_head_state+0x6c/0xcc
skb_release_all+0x1c/0x38
__kfree_skb+0x1c/0x30
kfree_skb+0xd0/0xf4
pfkey_broadcast+0x14c/0x18c
pfkey_sendmsg+0x1d8/0x408
sock_sendmsg+0x44/0x60
___sys_sendmsg+0x1d0/0x2a8
__sys_sendmsg+0x64/0xb4
SyS_sendmsg+0x34/0x4c
el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
CRs-Fixed: 2251019
Change-Id: Ib3b01f941a34a7df61fe9445f746b7df33f4656a
Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org>
[ Upstream commit 2c4cc9712364c051b1de2d175d5fbea6be948ebf ]
ICMP handlers are not very often stressed, we should
make them more resilient to bugs that might surface in
the future.
If there is no packet in retransmit queue, we should
avoid a NULL deref.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: soukjin bae <soukjin.bae@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
According to RFC1035 "[...] the total length of a domain name (i.e.,
label octets and label length octets) is restricted to 255 octets or
less."
Signed-off-by: Manuel Schölling <manuel.schoelling@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Mathieu Desnoyers
Paul Moore
Masanari Iida
Eric Dumazet
Amit Klein
Li RongQing
Eric Biggers
Cong Wang
Maxime Chevallier
Christoph Paasch
Johannes Berg
Marcel Holtmann
syphyr
Corinna Vinschen
Arun Kumar Neelakantam
Andrey Ryabinin
Dominik Brodowski
Benjamin Poirier
Taehee Yoo
Florian Westphal
Stefano Brivio
Julian Anastasov
Mike Pecovnik
Kal Conley
Stephen Hemminger
Nicolas Dichtel
Daniel Borkmann
Salam Noureddine
Konstantin Khlebnikov
Jun Zhao
Timo Teräs
Nikolay Aleksandrov
Herbert Xu
Fabian Frederick
Himangi Saraogi
Sean Tranchetti
Manuel Schölling